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SUSPECTING THE STATES: SUPREME
COURT REVIEW OF STATE-COURT
STATE-LAW JUDGMENTS
Laura S. Fitzgerald*

INTRODUCTION

At the Supreme Court these days, it is unfashionable to second
guess states' fealty to federal law without real proof that they are ig
noring it. As the Court declared in Alden v. Maine1:

We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to honor the
Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States. The good
faith of the States thus provides an important assurance that "this
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land."2
Accordingly, without proof that a state has "systematic[ally]" shirked
its supremacy clause duty to honor Article I legislation, the Court ap
pears unwilling to enforce compliance in a particular case.3 Likewise,

* Visiting Professor, Duke Law School; Associate Professor of Law, Washington and
Lee University. B.A. 1984, Hollins College; J.D. 1987, Yale University. - Ed. For their ex
traordinary help on this and every project, I thank John Cooper and Barry Friedman. I also
thank others who have generously given time and thought to early drafts, including Lisa
Bressman, Erwin Chemerinsky, Michael Collins, Michael Dorf, Jim Ely, Abner Greene,
Helen Hershkoff, Alfred Hill, Allan Ides, Lash LaRue, Tom McCoy, Daniel Meltzer, Jim
Pfander, Jeff Powell, Judith Resnik, Suzanna Sherry, and Michael Wells. I have benefited
from ideas shared with me during presentations before the law faculties of Vanderbilt Uni
versity and Washington and Lee University, and from the support of the Frances Lewis Law
Center at Washington and Lee University.

1. 527 U.S. 706 (1999) (holding that the Constitution's state sovereign immunity princi
ple prohibits Congress from enforcing Article I legislation through private lawsuits against
unconsenting states in their own courts).
2. Alden, 527 U.S. at 755 {quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI).
3. Id. at 758. See infra notes 346-367 and accompanying text (discussing this aspect of
Alden in greater detail). In Alden, where the Court held that states are constitutionally enti
tled to raise or waive sovereign immunity in their own courts against Article I claims by pri
vate individuals, the Court rejected the argument that Maine had violated the supremacy
clause by raising its sovereign immunity against federal-law claims, while waiving sovereign
immunity against closely analogous state-law claims. Prior to Alden, this type of discrimina
tion against federal law would have raised serious supremacy clause concerns. See Testa v.
Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 394 (1947) (holding that states must permit state courts to hear federal
claims that are of "same type" as state-law claims within state courts' jurisdiction); accord
Brief for Petitioners at 34-37, Alden (No. 98-436) (making argument that Testa's nondis
crimination principle prohibited Maine from raising sovereign immunity against only federal
claim); RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS
AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 149 (4th ed. Supp. 2000) [hereinafter HART & WECHSLER
80
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the Court makes Congress prove a broad "pattern" of federal-law
transgressions by many states before it can hold any state accountable
to individuals for violating their constitutional rights.4 Indeed, a hand
ful of even egregious anecdotes simply cannot overcome the Court's
presumption that all states can be trusted to meet their federal-law du
ties.5
So, too, the Court has made clear that lower federal courts must
presume state courts can be trusted to apply federal law properly un
less there is a demonstrable reason not to. The Court's abstention doc
trines continue to shift federal constitutional claims from federal to
state court, absent extraordinary proof that those claims will be mis
handled there.6 Once state courts lay hold of federal law, moreover,
Supp. 2000] (observing Alden's apparent conflict with Testa's nondiscrimination rule); see
also Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369 (1990) (noting that the supremacy clause imposes an

obligation on states to permit state courts to hear federal claims when state courts may hear
similar actions) (citing FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742; 760 (1982) (holding that states
must permit state agency to hear federal claims similar to state law claims); Douglas v. New
York, 279 U.S. 377, 387-88 (1929)). For a thorough analysis of states' supremacy-clause
based obligation not to discriminate against federal claims in state courts, see Michael G.
Collins, Article III Cases, State Court Duties, and the Madisonian Compromise, 1995 WIS. L.
REV. 39, 49-52, 161-70.

4. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531U.S. 356, 368-72 (2001) (holding that the con
gressional record showing states' irrational discrimination against the disabled was too
scanty to support legislation permitting the disabled to sue states for violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act); id. at 369 (criticizing Congress for relying on a "general
finding" that " 'historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with dis
abilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem,' " where the "great
majority of' the record's specific examples "do not deal with the activities of states"); see
also Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528U.S. 62, 89-91 (2000) (holding that Congress failed
to compile a factual record sufficient to show a "pattern" of state discrimination on the basis
of age to justify permitting individuals to enforce the Age Discrimination in Employment
Act against states); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-31 (1997) (holding that
Congress failed to compile a fa ctual record sufficient to show a widespread "pattern" of
states violating religious free exercise rights to justify the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act; criticizing Congress for reliance on "anecdotal evidence" of state misconduct). See
generally Ruth Colker & Jumes Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80, 85-86
(2001) (discussing cases).
5. Garrett, 531U.S. at 369-70 (stating that "half a dozen examples" in congressional rec
ord of states irrationally discriminating against the disabled "fall far short of even suggesting
the pattern of unconstitutional discrimination on which § 5 legislation must be based"); see
also City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31 (criticizing Congress's reliance on "anecdotal evi
dence" of specific state misconduct).
6. See, e.g., Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481U.S. 1 (1987); Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971) (prohibiting inf erior federal courts from enforcing federal rights by enjoining on
going state judicial proceedings in which those rights may be adjudicated; directing federal

action to be dismissed, forcing parties to proceed in state court, absent evidence of "bad
faith and harassment" or other extraordinary circumstances). For comprehensive discussions
of the Court's various abstention doctrines, see Barry Friedman, A Revisionist Theory of
Abstention, 88 MICH. L. REV. 530 (1989) (hereinafter Friedman, Revisionist Theory]; see also
RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 1222-1336 (4th ed. 1996) (hereinafter HART & WECHSLER]; cf. Burt
Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105 (1977) (arguing that state courts are

structurally less likely to be appropriately sympathetic towards federal-law claims or claim-
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even their erroneous rulings must be honored in later federal habeas
corpus challenges, so long as state courts made a "reasonable, good
faith interpretatio[n]" of existing federal law.7 And in defining the
scope of federal due process guarantees, the Court has combined its
faith in state courts with a faith in state law to force would-be federal
court plaintiffs to pursue state-law remedies in state court instead.8
When it comes to the Supreme Court's own power over state
courts, however, the Court works from a different presumption even
though its formal jurisdiction over them is quite limited. Since at least
the 1789 Judiciary Act, the Court has been authorized to review state
court judgments only on questions of federal law.9 Indeed, the Court
has long recognized that where a state-court judgment rests on an
"adequate and independent" state-law ground - where state law,
standing alone, can fully explain the state court's ruling - the
Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction to review even a federal question the
state court decided too, no matter how wrong the state court got it.10

ants); see also Michael Wells, Beyond the Parity Debate: The Decline of the Legal Process
Tradition in the Law of Federal Courts, 71 B.U. L. REV. 609 (1991). But see England v. Lou
isiana State Bd. of Med. Exam'rs, 375 U.S. 411, 421-22 (1964) (noting that where, under
Pullman abstention, a federal lawsuit is stayed so that the state court may decide a novel
state-law question, the putative federal claimant may reserve the right to return to federal
court for resolution of the federal question by explicitly declaring so on the state-court rec
ord). See generally Ann Althouse, On Dignity and Deference: The Supreme Court's New
Federalism, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 245, 246-49 (2000) (discussing Younger's foundation in prin
ciples of "Our Federalism").
7. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156
(1997) ("[T]he Teague doctrine validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing
precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later deci
sions."); Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Congress has followed the Court's lead, re
cently specifying that federal courts must withhold habeas corpus relief on a federal claim
that a state court has decided unless that ruling "resulted in a decision that was contrary to,
or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal Jaw, as determined
by the Supreme Court of the United States." Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
of 1996, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(l) (Supp. 2002). See Williams, 529 U.S. at 410-12 (holding that
under the 1996 Act "an unreasonable application of federal law is different from an incorrect
application of federal law").
8. See, e.g., Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981) (holding that a state-court state-law
tort remedy, available only after property deprivation, adequately satisfied due process and
so precluded a federal-court lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
9. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (grant now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1993)); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590 (1875). See generally infra Part II {discussing jurisdictional rule).
10. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002) (applying adequate and independent
state grounds doctrine in separate context of federal habeas corpus; discussing doctrine's
continued force on Supreme Court direct review of state-court judgments); Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 {1991) (same); Murdock, 87 U.S. {20 Wall.) 590; see also Long,
463 U.S. 1032. See generally Alfred Hill, The Inadequate State Ground, 65 COLUM. L. REV.
943, 983 (1965) {defining "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine); infra Section
II.C.3 {discussing same). Since at least 1893, the Court has recognized the adequate and in
dependent state grounds doctrine as imposing a "jurisdictional" limit. See Coleman, 501 U.S.
at 729 ("In the context of direct review of a state court judgment, the independent and ade
quate state ground doctrine is jurisdictional."); accord Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 114-15
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And yet, the Court routinely claims the power to review a state-law
decision that blocked a state court from considering a federal claim:
the Court claims jurisdiction to review (and, when it chooses, to re
verse) state courts' state-law judgments wherever they stand in the
path of - or logically "antecede"'' - federal interests. The Court
claims this power, moreover, even where state law fully satisfies all
federal constitutional and statutory standards, and so offers the Court
no federal-law grounds for reversal.12 And - contrary to the presump(2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (describing precedent where the Court had found state
ground "novel" in light of pre-existing state law and theref ore "inadequate to defeat our ju
risdiction" in a discussion of NAA CP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958);
Long, 463 U.S. 1032; Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 128 (1945); Eustis v. Bolles, 150U.S. 361
(1893)). But some commentators maintain - notwithstanding the Court's own repeated as
sertions to the contrary, see Coleman, supra - that the doctrine is merely a self-imposed
prudential restraint showing respect for state autonomy. See Richard A. Matasar & Gregory
S. Bruch, Procedural Common Law, Federal Jurisdictional Policy, and Abandonment of the
Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1291, 1292 n.l
(1986); Michael E. Solimine, Supreme Court Monitoring of State Courts in the Twenty-first
Century, 35 IND. L. REV. 335, 337 n.7 (2002) (adopting Matasar and Bruch view); see also
Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article Ill and the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine,
48 AM.U. L. REV. 1053, 1054 n.1 (1999) (same).
While an "adequate and independent state grounds" doctrine also governs collateral re
view of state judgments through federal habeas corpus, this Article considers only the doc
trine's role in determining the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to reverse state courts on direct
review. See generally Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 416, 429-30, 433 (1963) (emphasizing differ
ences in nature and function between direct appellate review and collateral habeas review;
declaring that the "adequate state ground rule is a function of the limitations of appellate
review" and emphasizing the "inherent and historical limitations of' the Court's appellate
jurisdiction (emphasis in original)); Hill, supra, at 991 (discussing Fay v. Noia's specially lim
ited role for the Supreme Court on direct review - but not habeas review - of state-court
judgments). Notwithstanding the functional differences between direct and habeas review,
the Court now applies an adequate and independent state grounds doctrine to limit both,
using precedents from both categories interchangeably. See Lee, 534 U.S. at 375. I do the
same thing here.
11. This has become a term of art among commentators who have explored the Court's
claim to appellate jurisdiction under such circumstances. See infra Part II; see also HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 520-21 (defining antecedent state grounds as those where "a
state law ruling serves as an antecedent for determining whether a federal right has been
violated"); id. at 526 (describing case in which state statute of limitations was "antecedent"
to federal due process claim) (citing Paschall v. Christie-Stewart Inc., 414 U.S. 100 (1973));
Hill, supra note 10, at 948-49 (referring to the antecedent state-law question as the "thresh
old" state-law question); Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction ofthe Supreme Court:
Reflections on the Law and the Logistics of Direct Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043,
1054 (1977). Some commentators, by contrast, use the term "antecedent state-law grounds"
only to describe the relatively narrow category of cases - like constitutional contract-clause
and property cases - where state law creates a substantive right and then federal law steps
in to protect it. See, e.g., Michael L. Wells, Were There Adequate State Grounds in Bush v.
Gore?, 18 CONST. COMMENT. 403, 412 (2001) (describing "cases in which state law creates a
right and federal law protects that 'antecedent' state right"). I use the terms "antecedent
state-law grounds" and "antecedence-based jurisdiction" to describe the larger group of
cases, where any state-law ruling blocks the path of a federal claim or other federal interest
through state court. See also infra Part II (discussing cases).
12. This Article addresses only those cases where state law cannot be held to violate
federal law outright. In a few rare decisions, where a party's failure to satisfy a state proce
dural rule barred pursuit of a federal claim, the Court declared that the state's rule itself
violated federal due process principles. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v.
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tion of state trustworthiness the Court now imposes on Congress and
the lower courts - the Court claims this power even though it identi
fies no reason to suspect a state court of having evaded or otherwise
cheated federal law in reaching its state-law judgment. It is enough
that state law simply blocked federal law's path through state court.13
The Court staked this antecedence-based jurisdictional claim as
early as 1813 when, in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee,1 4 it re
versed the Virginia Court of Appeals (then the Commonwealth's
highest court) on the purely nonfederal confiscation question whether
and when Virginia had, under Virginia statutes and common law rules,
legally confiscated a parcel of real property from an English land
owner. The Virginia court appeared to rule, under state law, that the
confiscation had been completed no later than 1782.15 But the
Supreme Court, pointing to federal treaties in 1783 and 178416 pro
spectively barring state interference with English subjects' property
rights, reversed on that nonfederal confiscation question so that it
could reach the federal issue logically next in line: whether the English
claimant could invoke the treaties' protection to retain possession of
the land.17 The fact that the state-law ruling blocked that federal claim
was enough, in the Court's view, to justify reversing it.18

Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930); see also Hill, supra note 10, at 943 ("[H]oldings that a state ground
is inadequate are almost invariably made without reliance on the due process clause."); id. at
944-48 (describing the few cases in which a state ground was declared unconstitutional, and
characterizing them as "tangential" to the "central problem" of the Court's doctrinal basis
for inadequacy reversals on nonconstitutional grounds); Daniel J. Meltzer, State Court For
feitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1130, 1137-45 (1986) (discussing the Court's
various nonconstitutional reasons for holding state procedural grounds inadequate).
13. See infra notes 256-295 and accompanying text (tracing evolution of the view that
the Court may review state-court judgment on state-law question logically anteceding fed
eral-law question).
14. 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813) (Story, J.).
15. As discussed fully infra note 96 and accompanying text, there is some confusion
about the exact grounds on which a majority of the Virginia court of appeals had decided
this dispute. But the Supreme Court treated this state-law question - whether and when
Virginia had properly confiscated the disputed property under state and common-law stan
dards - as the one decided by that Virginia court, and I do too. See infra notes 91-103 and
accompanying text.
16. Two treaties entered the dispute: 1783's Treaty of Peace and 1794's Jay Treaty. See
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 356 (1816); infra note 92 and accompa
nying text.
17. See Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (holding that Virginia statutory law
had not abrogated common law requirement of inquest of office to vest title of escheated
land in Commonwealth, and since no inquest of office had been performed, title remained in
English owner, and thus could be devised to heir whose rights then fell under Treaty protec
tion prohibiting subsequent Virginia confiscation). The Court upheld its appellate jurisdic
tion to reach and decide this question in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304
(1816). See infra Section II.A (discussing Fairfax's Devisee and Martin cases in detail).
18. See Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 357-58; see also infra Section II.A (analyzing the
Court's jurisdictional reasoning).
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The modem Court continues to assert antecedence-based jurisdic
tion. In Bush v. Gore,19 three Justices, led by Chief Justice Rehnquist,
argued that the Court should reverse the Florida supreme court's
reading of Florida statutes regulating the vote for presidential electors.
Although the Florida court had read those state statutes to authorize
post-election-day manual recounts of imperfectly marked ballots,
Chief Justice Rehnquist contended that the statutes did not, thus
bringing forward the federal constitutional question logically next in
line: whether Article II prohibits state courts from "alter[ing]" a
state's election law after the votes are cast.20 As in Fairfax's Devisee on which Chief Justice Rehnquist relied21 - the fact that the Florida
court's state-law ruling blocked the Article II issue was enough, it
seemed, to justify Supreme Court review of the state-law ground.22

19. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
20. Bush, 531 U.S. at 114-15 {Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). As others have observed, five
Justices second-guessed the Florida supreme court on a second question of state law by
holding that, on remand following the Court's decision, it was too late for a statewide man
ual recount to proceed on uniform standards correcting the equal protection flaws the Court
had identified. See, e.g., Frank Goodman, Preface to The Supreme Court's Federalism: Real
or Imagined?, 574 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 9, 14-15 (2001); Laurence H.
Tribe, EROG v. HSUB and Its Disguises: Freeing Bush v. Gore From Its Hall of Mirrors,
115 HARV. L. REV. 170, 186-87, 263-68 (2001) (discussing per curiam opinion's treatment of
state-law deadline question); Mark Tushnet, Renormalizing Bush v. Gore: An Anticipatory
Intellectual History, 90 GEO. L.J. 113 (2001). The five-member Court majority concluded
that Florida law required any recount to be complete.d by December 12th, the day the Court
handed down its decision and also the date a federal statute designated as a "saf e-harbor"
deadline before which Congress would accept without challenge any slate of presidential
electors a state reported. Bush, 531 U.S. at 110-11. But the Florida supreme court had not
read that deadline into the Florida statutes, even though it had earlier noted, in passing, that
Florida statutes reflected the legislature's desire to take advantage of the safe harbor if pos
sible; to the contrary, in ordering the manual recounts to proceed on December 8, the
Florida court had set no fixed deadline for its completion, even while it acknowledged the
time for completing those recounts was "desperately short." Gore v. Harris, 772 So. 2d 1243,
1261 (Fla. 2000) ; see also id. at 1268 (Wells, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that a recount would
have to be completed by December 12th in order to take advantage of the congressional
"safe harbor" provision, "assuming the majority recognizes a need to protect the votes of
Florida's presidential electors" under that provision) (emphasis added). As Justice Breyer
pointed out in dissent, Florida law may well have authorized the recounts to continue as late
as December 18th, the date on which the presidential electors were scheduled to meet. Bush,
531 U.S. at 146-47 (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also id. at 135 (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting
same, and adding that there was "no warrant for this Court to assume that Florida could not
possibly comply with this requirement before the date set for the meeting of electors").
Professor Goodman contends that, in superimposing the December 12th deadline onto
Florida law, the Court made "a federal intrusion upon state autonomy more drastic than any
of the congressional intrusions nullified by the Court" in its recent decisions striking down
federal legislation on federalism-related grounds. See Goodman, supra, at 14.
21. Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 n.1 {Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing Fairfax's
Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813)).
22. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) ("To attach definitive weight
to the pronouncement of a state court .. . would be to abdicate our responsibility to enforce
the explicit requirements of Article II."). Most scholars have minimized the Bush v. Gore
concurrence's jurisdictional puzzle - that is, what might have given the Court power to re-
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These examples, and other cases like them, raise a hard but largely
unexplored question: given the longstanding black-letter rule that the
Supreme Court may only review state-court judgments on questions of
federal law,23 what gives it jurisdiction to reverse state-court state-law
rulings at all? The Court's early decisions provided ambiguous and
contradictory answers; since the mid-1900s the Court has stopped try
ing to explain.24 And while commentators have offered jurisdictional
theories to make up the Court's own deficit, each fails in its own way.25
Instead, the Court's practice of state grounds reversals appears to
rest, at bottom, on the intuition that - given the obvious need to en
force federal law's supremacy
there simply must be some federal
-

verse the Florida court's state-law judgment despite its own limited jurisdiction to review
only federal questions? - and have treated the case as raising primarily merits concerns.
These scholars solve jurisdiction by characterizing the concurrence as raising the federal
question of whether the state court's reading of state law violated Article II or a federal stat
ute.See, e.g., Harold J.Krent, Judging Judging: The Problem ofSecondguessing State Judges'
Interpretation ofState Law in Bush v. Gore, 29 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 493, 495 (2001) (analyz
ing various doctrines under which the Court, pre-Bush concurrence, held that state courts
had violated federal law by "alter[ing] state law so as to defeat federal rights"); Tribe, supra
note 20, at 186-88 (noting that the concurrence "affirmatively displaced the decision of a
state's highest court on the meaning of state law," but concluding "[o]f course the federal
judiciary has a role to play in policing what a state's courts do with respect to the manner in
which presidential electors are chosen"); id. at 191-92 ("(l]t plainly was the Supreme Court's
business, as it always is when a federal constitutional norm speaks directly to a challenged
exercise of state power," absent justiciability flaws); Wells, supra note 11, at 417 ("Bush is
actually a simple case of federal law constraining state authority . . . . No deference toward
the state court's interpretation of state law is called for in such a case."); see also id. at 405
("The existence of a federal constraint on state court authority, such as article II, is sufficient
to justify [Supreme Court] intervention."); Solimine, supra note 10, at 347 (agreeing with
Professor Wells that, in Rehnquist's concurrence, "it was the very state-law-based nature of
the decision below that itself was alleged to violate the Federal Constitution"). But see
Erwin Chemerinsky, Bush v. Gore Was Not Justiciable, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1093,
1094-95 (2001) (summarizing article's argument that case was not justiciable on grounds of
standing, ripeness, and political question).
As these commentators suggest, the Court may assert ordinary federal-question jurisdic
tion to decide that a state court's state-law ruling violates federal law outright (a power this
Article does not address).See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 {1993); supra note 12 (noting rare occasions
where the Court has declared a state ground "inadequate" because it violates federal law).
. But the Bush v. Gore concurrence did not do that.Instead, by invoking "adequate and inde
pendent state grounds" precedents, Chief Justice Rehnquist proceeded within the separate
jurisdictional tradition this Article considers: where the Court claims power to reverse a
state court's state-law judgment on nonfederal grounds. Thus, even if commentators can,
post hoc, fit the Bush concurrence into the tidier federal-question paradigm, the concurrence
itself, and the dissents it provoked, still reveal much about how those Justices view the
Court's authority, within that separate jurisdictional tradition, to reverse state courts on
state-law questions. I consider their debate for that purpose here. See infra Section 111.B
(discussing the Bush Justices'·focus on the degree of deference the Court owes state courts'
reading of state law).
23. See supra note 9 (citing authorities establishing rule).See generally infra Part II (dis
cussing rule).
24. What Professor Hill observed in 1965 remains true today: "the doctrinal basis" for
the Court's review of state-court state-law judgments "has seldom been explored - least of
all by the Court itself." Hill, supra note 10, at 943.
25. I critique a number of these theories in Part IV, infra.
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judicial mechanism for catching state courts that disingenuously ma
nipulate antecedent state law to thwart federal interests and then
shield their misconduct behind that superficially "adequate" state
ground.26 To many, it is unimaginable that the Supreme Court could
lack the power to monitor whether state courts are cheating federal
law this way. Indeed, in Bush v. Gore Justice Ginsburg declared out
right that that suspicion of state-court misbehavior - sparked by "his
torical" events surrounding but external to a state court's judgment best explains key cases where the Court has rejected state courts' in
terpretations of state law: the Court's treatment of Virginia law in
Fairfax's Devisee, for example, masked its unarticulated concern about
widespread states' rights attacks on the Marshall Court.27 As Professor
Alfred Hill made the point in 1965, some Supreme Court review of
state-court decisions on antecedent state-law questions seems essential
because otherwise federal law would have "only as much force as state
courts are willing to accord it."28
But no matter how obvious the need appears, it remains critical to
identify an affirmative jurisdictional basis for the Court's review of

26. See, e.g., Hill, supra note 10, at 949; see also id. at 990 (concluding that the supremacy
clause offers a "doctrinal basis" for the Court's practice of reversing state-court state-law
judgments for state-law error); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 520; PETER W.
LOW & JOHN C. JEFFRIES, JR., FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW OF FEDERAL-STATE
RELATIONS 82 (4th ed. 1998) (noting that, in some cases, "if there were no limits" on state
courts' "freedom" to decide antecedent state-law questions, federal rights and obligations
standing next in line "might be easily evaded"); Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1054; see also
infra Section IV.C (discussing commentators' reliance on supremacy-based intuition).
27. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 139-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (discussing Fairfax's Devisee
v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813)). Justice Ginsburg argued further that
mid-Twentieth Century decisions rejecting southern state courts' readings of state proce
dural rules to block those claiming federal civil rights reflected the Court's unarticulated
suspicion of widespread southern "recalcitrance." See id. (discussing NAACP v.Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (discussed infra notes 380-389 and accompanying text),
and Bouie v.City of Columbia, 378U.S. 347 (1964)). In each of these cases, Justice Ginsburg
insisted, the larger historical context of States' political "recalcitrance" itself "warrant[ed]
extraordinary action by [the] Court" even without a finding that those politics had contami
nated the particular judgment under review. Bush, 531 U.S. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(concluding that the Florida supreme court "surely should not be bracketed with state high
courts of the Jim Crow South"); see also Robert J. Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the
Civil Rights Movement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 869, 870 (1994) (arguing that during this period
"the Supreme Court concluded that state courts lacked good faith in handling the federal
claims of civil rights demonstrators"); Michael J. Klarman, Bush v. Gore Through the Lens
of Constitutional History, 89 CAL. L. REV.1721, 1738 (2001) (describing it as "inconceivable
that the Justices' view of the [NAACP v. Alabama} case, both on the merits and on the al
leged state procedural default, was uninfluenced by their knowledge that the state of Ala
bama, including its jurists, were engaged in a project of massive resistance toward Brown v.
Board of Education . . "); Solimine, supra note 10, at 348 (noting that Justice Ginsburg's
"f orthright description of the political context of [these] decisions ... is refreshingly candid
and ... not matched in other opinions involving the adequate and independent ground doc
trine"); Wells, supra note 11, at 418 (discussing the Court's greater scrutiny of state-court
state-law judgments where "real world . . . context" suggests state "recalcitrance").
.

28. Hill, supra note 10, at 949.
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state-court state-law judgments.29 And that jurisdictional justification
should, I suggest, also imply and dictate the conditions under which
the Court may reverse a state-court judgment once it undertakes ap
pellate review: the jurisdictional rule must explain why the Court has
power to review state-court state-law judgments, but it should also ex
plain when the Court may deny a state court's ordinary prerogative
"to utter the last word" on what state law means.30 In other words, the
Court's power to police state courts' fealty to federal law should be
limited by much the same congruence and proportionality criteria that
the Court has imposed on Congress,31 so that the scope of the Court's
appellate jurisdiction over state courts - like the scope of Congress's
legislative jurisdiction over states - reaches only so far as necessary to
police actual, identifiable wrongdoing. To borrow the Court's own
standard, "[t]he appropriateness of remedial measures must be con
sidered in light of the evil presented. "32
Currently, the Court appears to assume it has jurisdiction to review
a state-court judgment on any antecedent state ground.33 On the sec
ond key question - when may the Court reverse state grounds? - the
Court has defaulted to an inconsistent hodge-podge of guidelines sug
gesting how much deference it should give a state high court's reading
of state law on the merits: sometimes the Court conducts a de novo
analysis of state law, other times it will reverse only where the state
court judgment lacks "fair support" or is "egregiously wrong" or
something else.34 Not only are these guidelines discretionary and inde-

29. See infra Part I (advocating clearly-defined jurisdictional rules because they provide
essential operational limits on federal judicial power).
30. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Co., 215 U.S. 349, 370-72 (1910) (Holmes, J.)); see also id. at 80 (declaring that federal courts
violate "rights which ... are reserved by the Constitution to the several states" when they
refuse to honor state courts' interpretation of what state law means).
31. See City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31 (in exercising legislative power to regulate
states under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, Congress must prove "pattern" of
state wrongdoing and then tailor remedy to achieve "congruence and proportionality be
tween the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end"); id. at
530-32 (invalidating Religious Freedom Restoration Act because, in part, law was "so out of
proportion to a supposed remedial or preventative object that it cannot be understood as
responsive to, or designed to prevent unconstitutional behavior"); see also Garrett, 531 U.S.
at 365, 374 (invalidating legislation enforcing Americans With Disabilities Act against states
because Act was not "congruent and proportional to the targeted" state misconduct). For
one critique of the Court's imposition of congruence and proportionality limits on Con
gress's section 5 legislative power, see Evan Caminker, "Appropriate" Means-Ends Con
straints on Section 5 Powers, 53 STAN. L. REV.1127, 1158-67 (2001) (outlining critique). See
also id. at 1153-58 (considering what "congruence and proportionality" mean).
32. City ofBoerne, 521 U.S.at 530.
33. See infra Part Ill (discussing cases).
34. Commentators have attempted to systematize the Court's shifting deference guide
lines, but none identifies a single set of criteria to constrain the Court's state-ground rever
sals.See Wells, supra note 11, at 414 (identifying three different approaches: de novo review,
deferential review, and an "intermediate scrutiny" that asks whether the state-court decision
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terminate35 - imposing no real limit on the Court's use of judicial
power - but they are also unmoored from any justification for why
the Court has appellate jurisdiction in the first place.
This Article proposes an alternative rule: the Court may claim ap
pellate jurisdiction to reverse state-court state-law judgments (absent
an outright federal-law violation) only where it can identify and sub
stantiate some concrete indication that the state court has deliberately
manipulated state law to thwart federal law and then evade Supreme
Court review. Simply put, the Court should have to rebut its own pre
sumption that state courts can be trusted to self-enforce their suprem
acy clause obligations when applying state law.36
This "proven mistrust" rule would give jurisdictional teeth to the
hunch that federal-law supremacy requires some mechanism permit
ting the Court to catch states that cheat. At the same time, it would
also impose a meaningful limit on the Court's power to reverse state
court state-law judgments - something the Court's indeterminate and
discretionary deference guidelines will never do37 - and bring the

" 'rests upon a fair or substantial basis' and uphold the state judgment 'if there is no evasion
of the constitutional issue, and the nonfederal ground of decision has fair support' ") (quot
ing Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S.36, 42 (1944)); Hill, supra note 10, at
965; accord Hill, supra note 10, at 963-65 (canvassing cases in which Court claimed to be
granting state courts different degrees of deference when reviewing state-law grounds). In
his Bush v. Gore concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed to conduct "an independent,
if still deferential, analysis of state Jaw." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 114 (2000) . Commenta
tors have not yet agreed on how to characterize the degree of deference Chief Justice
Rehnquist accorded the Florida supreme court's reasoning in Bush v. Gore. Compare Wells,
supra note 11, at 416-17 (describing the concurrence's review as "deferential," though argu
ing that "[n]o deference ... [was] called for"), with Klarman, supra note 27, at 1735 (ob
serving that the "concurring opinion argues for reduced deference"). See also Tribe, supra
note 20, at 193 (arguing that the Court should reject state-court readings of state election
statutes only if "manifestly unreasonable").
35. Thus, in Bush v. Gore, while three of the four dissenting Justices harshly criticized
Chief Justice Rehnquist for according far too little respect to the Florida court's own reading
of Florida law, none contradicted his basic assumptions that the Court had jurisdiction to
conduct that review and that the Court's only limit - the only constraint on the Court's re
versal power - was whether the review showed enough deference to the state court's con
clusions. See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 129, 131-33 ( Souter, J., dissenting) (asserting that the
Court "should not have reviewed ... this case" and then proceeding to argue that the
Florida court's reading of state Jaw was not so "unreasonable" as to overcome the Court's
"customary respect for state interpretations of state law"); id. at 136-43 (Ginsburg, J., dis
senting) (same); id. at 147-49 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (same).See infra notes 278-295 and ac
companying text (developing this observation). Only Justice Stevens suggested that the
Court lacked jurisdiction altogether, arguing that the dispute presented no "substantial" fed
eral question. Bush, 531 U.S. at 123 ( Stevens, J., dissenting). Cf. Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S.
528, 536-37 (1974) (holding that a federal-law claim cannot confer federal-question jurisdic
tion on an inferior federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 if it is " 'so attenuated and unsub
stantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit' ") (quoting Newburyport Water Co. v.
Newburyport, 193 U.S.561, 579 (1904)).
36. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999); see also supra note 4 (citing
cases).
37. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.898, 928 (1997) ("[A]n imprecise barrier against
federal intrusion upon state authority is not likely to be an effective one."). For one discus-
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Court within constitutional boundaries at least comparable to those it
now imposes on Congress and other federal actors.38
The proven mistrust rule would also impose a more practical con
straint, for it would force the Court to own up to its own suspicions
(and perhaps prejudices) about why a particular state court, at a par
ticular time, cannot be trusted to handle federal law candidly. If the
Court is made uneasy by some political, historical, or cultural phe
nomenon - like states' rights attacks on the Marshall Court39 or the
fact that in November of 2000, Democrats outnumbered Republicans
on the Florida Supreme Court4° - then the Court should have to ad
mit that mistrust and identify some concrete basis for it.41 Requiring

sion of the basic constitutional principle that all federal institutional power must be "lim
ited," see Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., The Inherent Powers of Federal Courts and the Structural
Constitution, 86 IOWA L. REV. 735, 739, 823-34 (2001) (discussing the "limited" nature of
authority delegated to federal institutions as a "principl(e] of constitutional structure").
38. See supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text (discussing cases); see also City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520 (1997) (demanding "congruence and proportionality"
between remedial federal legislation and proven state misconduct); Bd. of Trustees v.
Garrett, 531 U. S.356, 365, 374 (2001) (same).
39. See supra note 27 and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg's explanation
of Fairfax's Devisee).
40. While the Bush majority Justices - all Republican appointees - did not admit this
motivation, scholars have emphasized it. See, e.g., Chemerinsky, supra note 22, at 1093-94
("A large segment of the American people - certainly the majority of citizens who voted
for Al Gore - regard the ruling as a partisan decision where five conservative Republican
Justices handed the election to the Republican candidate, George W. Bush."); Richard A.
Epstein, "In such Manner as the Legislature Thereof May Direct": The Outcome in Bush v.
Gore Defended, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 613, 635 (2001) (arguing that the Florida Supreme Court
had "abuse(d its) . ..discretion for partisan political ends," and so "if it abused its discretion,
then the United States Supreme Court did not abuse its" own authority); Klarman, supra
note 27, at 1723-24 (charging that Bush majority acted out of political partisanship); David
A. Strauss, Bush v. Gore: What Were They Thinking?, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 737, 746, 749
(2001) (suggesting that the Bush majority granted certiorari, despite the centrality of the
case's state-law questions, in "an effort to thwart, by any means necessary, a perceived ille
gitimate act by the Florida Supreme Court"); Tribe, supra note 20, at 174 (noting some ob
servers' argument that the Court simply prevented the "unprincipled partisans" on Florida's
supreme court and "liberal canvassing boards" from "overturning the people's democratic
choice"); id. at 194 & nn.64, 66 (attributing like reaction to Robert Bork and Judge Richard
Posner ); Tushnet, supra note 20, at 115-16 & n.21 (noting some observers' conviction that
"[t)he Justices in the majority sincerely believed that they were observing a process in which
a highly partisan state supreme court had simply gotten out of control and was attempting to
steal the election from the rightful victor"); see also Barry Friedman, The History of the
Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Three: The Lesson of Lochner, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1383,
1384-85 (2001) (citing the "apparently widespread popular belief that politics motivated the
decision" in Bush v. Gore). For one thorough evaluation of the voluminous literature criti
cizing or defending the Court's Bush v. Gore decision, see Louise Weinberg, When Courts
Decide Elections: the Constitutionality of Bush v. Gore, 82 B.U. L. REV. 609, 611-620 (2002)
(canvassing the "proliferation of list-serves, websites, and other correspondence - the out
pouring of books and articles - in which academic shock continued to be registered long
after the election") (citations omitted).
41 . For one argument that the Court's very legitimacy depends on whether its decisions
"are widely understood to be the correct ones given the social and economic milieu in which
they are rendered," see Friedman, supra note 40, at 1387, 1448-55.
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the Court to explain itself forthrightly would discipline and perhaps
constrain the Court's use of power in an individual case; but else
where, this candor would strengthen the Court's jurisdictional claim.42
And candor would begin to provide later courts, both Supreme and
state, with principled precedents to discipline decision making in the
future.43
Part I introduces the proven mistrust proposal and sets its founda
tion not only in the Constitution's structural and practical commit
ments to limited power exercised accountably, but also in the notion
that the Court should not casually be exempted from the constitu
tional constraints it now enforces against Congress in its own dealings
with the states. Part II then analyzes key cases demonstrating the
Court's own ambiguous and contradictory justifications for its long
practice of reversing on state grounds, despite the black-letter rule
granting it jurisdiction only to review state courts' federal-law deci
sions. Part III traces the evolutfon of a view that the Court may re
verse any state grounds that blocks - is "antecedent to" - considera
tion of a federal claim or other federal interest. Part IV considers
commentators' efforts to validate the Court's practice of state
grounds' reversals; and, finally Part V then returns to the proven mis
trust proposal. It argues that, while the proven mistrust rule might
compel different results in paradigm cases now considered beyond de
bate,44 it honors the most compelling insights from the Court's own
history of reviewing state-court state-law judgments, while offering
meaningful jurisdictional limits the alternatives lack.
I.

PROVEN MISTRUST

The proven mistrust proposal rests on three fundamental premises.
First, the Supreme Court - like all other federal courts - is a court of
limited jurisdiction and so may only act where it has an affirmative ju
risdictional basis for acting.45 Article III and the Constitution's separa-

42. See, e.g., infra notes 181-203 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's failure to
invoke a compelling history of state animosity to Indian tribes - relying instead on an un
persuasive and cursory analysis of state common law - in Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17
(1920)).
43. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 15 (1959).
44. See infra Part V. I suggest, for example, that my jurisdictional rule might have pro
duced a different outcome in Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95 (1938), while it
might have produced the same result, but for different reasons, in NAA CP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U. S. 449 (1958).
45. See, e.g., Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U. S. 1, 15 (1976) (Rehnquist, J.) ("[F]ederal
courts, as opposed to state trial courts of general jurisdiction, are courts of limited jurisdic
tion marked out by Congress."); Ex pane Mccardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506, 513 (1868)
(same); Durousseau v. United States, 10 U. S. (6 Cranch) 307, 312 (1810) (holding that the
Court must interpret jurisdictional statutes as denying all power not affirmatively granted).

92

Michigan Law Review

[ Vol. 101:80

tion of powers principle make formal jurisdiction a necessary precon
dition to the exercise of federal judicial power,46 including the power
to interfere with a state court's ordinary prerogative "to utter the last
word" on what state law means.47

46. The Court itself has always declared not only that all federal courts are constrained
by formal jurisdictional limits, but that these limits are a primary way in which the separation
of powers principle operates on the judiciary itself: "The statutory and (especially) constitu
tional elements of jurisdiction are an essential ingredient of separation . . . of powers, re
straining the courts from acting at certain times, and even restraining them from acting per
manently regarding certain subjects." Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U. S. 83,
101 {1998); see also Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U. S. 574, 583 (1999) (" Subject
matter limitations on federal jurisdiction serve institutional interests. They keep the federal
courts within the bounds the Constitution and Congress have prescribed." ); Steel Co., 523
U. S. at 94 (declaring that a federal court proceeding without jurisdiction "offends fundamen
tal principles of separation of powers"). See generally Laura S. Fitzgerald, ls Jurisdiction Ju
risdictional?, 95 Nw.U. L. REV. 1207, 1207 & nn.1-3 (2001) [hereinafter Fitzgerald, ls Juris
diction Jurisdictional?} (exploring the contradictions between the Court's rhetoric of limited
federal court jurisdiction and the practice of dispensing federal judicial power based on how
important the Court considers the federal interests at stake in a controversy and the demon
strated need for a federal, not state, remedy).
47. Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64, 79 (1938) (quoting Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal
Co., 215 U. S. 349, 370-72 (1910) (Holmes, J.)); see also Erie, 304 U. S. at 80 (declaring that
federal courts violate "rights which . . . are reserved by the Constitution to the several
States" when they refuse to honor state courts' interpretation of what state law means).
While some commentators argue that Erie rests only on statutory grounds applying only to
federal diversity jurisdiction - namely, the Court's reading of the Rules of Decision Act Erie's own language describes a constitutional constraint inhibiting all federal judicial power
to interfere with state courts' prerogative over state-law questions. See id; see also id. at 7778 ("If only a question of statutory construction were involved," the Court would have hesi
tated to overturn Swift v. Tyson; "[b]ut the unconstitutionality of the course pursued . . .
compels us to do so."). But see Levinson v. Deupree, 345 U. S. 648, 651 (1953) (finding Erie
"irrelevant" where federal jurisdiction not "derived from diversity of citizenship"). l here
argue that Erie's principle of state-court prerogative over state law should strongly influence
any theory of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction to reverse state-law grounds, but I leave
unanswered whether Erie formally governs the Court's jurisdiction in these cases. For a
sampling of the commentary touching on this question, see Paul D. Carrington, A New
Confederacy? Disunionism in the Federal Courts, 45 DUKE L.J. 929, 996-99 (1995) (discussing
Erie's constitutional basis and asserting that "the prevailing view among contemporary
commentators is that Erie does indeed rest on a constitutional base . . . ."); see id. at nn.335
& 336 (citing earlier scholarship both questioning and confirming Erie's constitutional basis);
Peter Westen & Jeffrey S. Lehman, ls There Life For Erie After the Death of Diversity? 78
MICH. L. REV.311, 312-16 (1980) (describing two "camps" on question of whether Erie "has
meaning" for cases outside diversity jurisdiction); id at 316-41 (elaborating "Axioms of
Federalism" demonstrating Erie's pertinence outside diversity). Compare, e.g., John Hart
Ely, The Irrepressible Myth of Erie, 87 H A RV. L. REV. 693, 700-06 (1974) (same); Henry J.
Friendly, In Praise of Erie - and of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 383,
384-98 (1964) (same); Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine and the Constitution, 53 NW. U. L.
REV. 427, 438-45, 448 (1958) (discussing Erie's constitutional foundation); Henry M. Hart,
Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 489, 509-10 (1954)
(same); with John B. Corr, Thoughts on the Vitality a/Erie, 41 AMER. U. L. REV.1087, 1089,
1117-24 (1992) (arguing that Erie is "not mandated constitutionally"); Judith Resnik, "Uncle
Sam Modernizes his Justice": Inventing the Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century
for the District of Columbia and the Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 643 (2002) (characterizing Erie
as "district court analogue" to Murdock's "concept of state control over state law at the level

of the Supreme Court").
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Second, the Court's jurisdiction, like all other federal institutions',
must be subject to articulated and meaningful limits48 - limits clear
enough both to discipline the Court's own decision making and to en
able others to hold it accountable when it goes too far, for if no one
knows where the line lies, no one can criticize the Court for crossing
it.49
Third, the Court should have to follow constitutional rules, in its
dealings with states, at least as rigorous as those it enforces against
Congress,50 absent a compelling reason for exemption. Thus, not only
the Court must honor the presumption of state trustworthiness that
cases like Alden and Garrett imposed,51 and also the principle that fed
eral responses to state wrongdoing should be tailored to remedy a par
ticular and proven "evil."52 Moreover, the Court must also observe the
more general federalism principles it has invoked to invalidate so
many acts of Congress since 1995.53 Demanding this symmetry is espe-

48. Pushaw, supra note 37, at 823-34 (discussing the constitutional principle of limited
government power). As Professor Weinberg has observed, "Nor is it a novel proposition that
the Supreme Court itself, the font of constitutional law, can violate the constitutional order."
Weinberg, supra note 40, at 619 n.41 (citing Erie v. Tomkins, 304 U. S. 64, 78 (1938), where
the Court struck down "the course pursued" by itself as well as other federal courts under
the Swift v. Tyson doctrine, 41 U. S. {26 Pet.) 1 (1842)).
49. See, e.g., Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 122 S. Ct. 1640, 1645 (2002) (declaring that "ju
risdictional rules should be clear" in holding that state defendant that removes state-law
claims to federal court thereby waives sovereign immunity from federal supplemental juris
diction over those claims); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U. S. 898, 928 (1987) (declar
ing "imprecise barrier[s] against federal intrusion upon state autonomy likely to be ineffec
tive").
50. See Colker & Brudney, supra note 4, at 85-86 (arguing that the Court's recent feder
alism-based decisions show the Court's "growing disrespect for Congress," with the result
that the Court "tak[es] greater power for itself, displacing Congress's proper . . . role"); see
also Laura S. Fitzgerald, Beyond Marbury: Jurisdictional Self-Dealing in Seminole Tribe, 52
VAND. L. REV. 407, 408-09 (1999) (charting the Court's aggressive claims to power at Con
gress's expense); see infra note 57 (citing additional examples decided after 1999). For one
argument, in another context, that courts should face greater constraints than should Con
gress in acting to enforce the Constitution's equal protection values, see Michael C. Dorf,
Equal Protection Incorporation, 88 VA. L. REV. 951, 1022 (2002) [hereinafter Dorf, Equal
Protection Incorporation] ("[W]here judicial interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause is
at stake, the need to constrain judges may require that equal protection doctrine track the
form and content of the textual markers rather closely. Congress, on the other hand, should
only be subject to a considerably weaker constraint requiring that there be some discernible
limit to its powers. Accordingly, it should be permitted to enact antidiscrimination laws that
substantially expand upon the Constitution's text. At some point, however, even legislation
that may be plausibly understood as serving egalitarian values - such as the Gun Free
School Zones Act - ceases to be antidiscrimination legislation as that term is commonly
understood.").
51. See Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356 (2001); Alden v. Maine, 527 U. S. 706,
755 (1999); see also supra notes 1-8 and accompanying text.
52. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 530-31 (1997). See generally supra notes
3-5 and accompanying text (discussing current Court's repeated invalidation of legislation
enforcing federal law against states because Congress had failed to tailor remedy to proven
"widespread pattern" of state wrongdoing).
53. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U. S. 549 (1995); see also Printz v. United States, 521

94

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:80

dally important where state-ground reversals are involved because, as
the Court has long acknowledged, federalism itself underlies the
black-letter rule ordinarily prohibiting reversals on nonfederal
grounds.54 Thus, the Court's recent federalism decisions, which
heighten protections for the autonomy of state institutions (including
state courts),55 suggest that states' dignity and independence interests
now enjoy a constitutional status56 inconsistent with any assumption
that the Court may reverse even antecedent state grounds as a matter
of course."
U.S. 898 (1997) (holding that the Constitution's federalism principles prohibit Congress from
forcing state law enforcement officers to participate in a federal firearms registration pro
gram); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992) (holding that the Constitution's fed
eralism principles prohibit Congress from forcing state legislatures to participate in a federal
program to dispose of low-level radioactive waste). See generally Vicki C. Jackson, Narra
tives of Federalism: Of Continuities and Comparative Constitutional Experience, 51 DUKE
L.J. 223, 234-41 (2001) [hereinafter Jackson, Narratives] (analyzing the Court's recent cases
strengthening federalism as a limit on national power); Vicki C. Jackson, Seductions of Co
herence, State Sovereign Immunity, and the Denationalization of Federal Law, 31 RUTGERS
L.J. 691, 699 (2000) [hereinafter Jackson, Seductions] (same). But see Colker & Brudney,
supra note 4, at 84 (suggesting that the Rehnquist Court's decisions actually show a pattern
of systematically claiming dominant authority for itself, rather than consistent deference to
states).
54. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945) (Jackson, J.) (noting that the "reason" for
the bar was "found in the partitioning of power between the state and federal judicial sys
tems and in the limitations of our own jurisdiction . . . . "); see also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S.
1032, 1040 (1983) (same); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 630 (1874)
(same).
55. See, e.g., Alden, 527 U.S. 706 (holding that the Constitution's federalism and sover
eign immunity principles deny Congress the power to authorize private actions to enforce
Article I legislation against unconsenting states in state court); see also supra note 53 (citing
cases).
56. See generally Evan H. Caminker, Judicial Solicitude for State Dignity, 574 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. SCI. 81 (2001); see also Althouse, supra note 6, at 246-49 (discuss
ing the differences between post Lopez "federalism" principles and earlier interpretations,
as described, for example, in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971)).
-

57. See Jackson, Narratives, supra note 53, at 234-41 (analyzing the Court's recent cases
strengthening federalism as a limit on national power). The Court's federalism decisions
from Lopez forward would appear fundamentally to rework the constitutional balance be
tween state and federal power. See, e.g., Colker & Brudney, supra note 4, at 87-105 (arguing
that recent decisions show not only the Court's heightened federalism commitment, but also
a "new judicial activism . . . in which dis-respecting Congress has become an important
theme"); Jackson, Seductions, supra note 53, at 699 {"There is no doubt that we are in the
midst of a federalist revival. Since 1990, the Court has held unconstitutional seven different
federal laws on the grounds that they extended beyond federal powers into the domain of
the states."). Not everyone has always seen it this way. See Michael C. Dorf, No Federalists
Here: Anti-Federalism and Nationalism on the Rehnquist Court, 31 RUTGERS L.J. 741, 741
{2000) {asserting that, except for United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and City of
Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1998), the Court's federalism decisions "do not yet funda
mentally threaten" Congress's enumerated powers). Professor Dorf delivered this paper at a
symposium held in October of 1999; since then, the Court has struck down three more fed
eral statutes - two that attempted to regulate state conduct directly - declaring that they
exceeded the scope of Congress's enumerated constitutional powers. See Garrett, 531 U.S. at
367-72 {holding that section five of the Fourteenth Amendment did not authorize Congress
to subject state governments to a federal law prohibiting discrimination against the disabled,
given insufficient record evidence of a pattern of actual state discrimination); United States
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These ground rules demand that the Supreme Court's power over
state courts be clearly limited and exercised with discipline. Yet at the
same time - despite the black-letter rule barring state-ground rever
sals - federal law's supremacy does seem to depend on some federal
judicial monitoring of state courts to make sure they do not exploit the
opportunity antecedent state grounds present to thwart federal inter
ests and then evade review behind a disingenuous "adequate" state
ground.58 So, how to enforce constitutional supremacy within real ju
risdictional limits?
The first step is easy, for the Court may claim jurisdiction to review
state grounds from a perfectly ordinary source: like any other federal
court, it may exercise the jurisdiction necessary to determine its own
jurisdiction.59 Thus, given the Court's statutory appellate jurisdiction,
granted since 1789, to review state courts' federal-law decisions,(j() the
Court must have the power to monitor whether its authority is being
compromised by a state's evasive mishandling of an antecedent state
law question. In other words, just as a federal diversity court may ask
whether a party is lying about his state of citizenship or the dollar
amount in controversy,61 so may the Supreme Court ask whether a
state-court judgment apparently resting on state grounds does genu
inely rest there or instead masks an attempt to disfavor the federal in
terest standing logically next in line.62
v. Morrison, 529 U. S. 598 (2000) (holding that neither section five of the Fourteenth
Amendment nor the Article I commerce clause authorized Congress to create a federal civil
remedy for gender-related violence in the Violence Against Women Act); Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000) (holding that section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
did not authorize Congress to subject state governments to a federal law prohibiting age dis
crimination in employment).For some of Professor Dorfs views on these more recent Court
decisions, see Dorf, Equal Protection Incorporation, supra note 50, at 1020 ("Even if one
thinks, as I do, that the Court has applied the congruence and proportionality test in an
overly restrictive manner, given the Court's premises, some attempt to draw an outer
boundary around Congressional power is necessary. Within these premises, an account of
Section Five that permits Congress to define the Fourteenth Amendment independently of
the Court's Section One jurisprudence must, at a minimum, include a limit on the Section
Five power.").
58. See infra Part III (discussing federal judicial suspicion of states as a possible source
of "antecedence"-based jurisdiction).
59. I am grateful to Lash LaRue and Barry Friedman for suggesting this to me. See gen
erally 2 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 12.30[4) (3d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE] (explaining that, on challenge to a court's ju
risdiction, the trial court may take and weigh evidence to confirm its jurisdiction; "the exis
tence of disputed material facts does not preclude the trial court from evaluating for itself
the merits of jurisdictional claims").
60. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (grant now codified at 28 U.S. C. § 1257
(1993)).
61. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1994) (granting federal district courts jurisdiction over civil
actions between parties who are citizens of different states, where the amount in controversy
exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs); 2 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra
note 59, § 12.30[4).
62. See infra Section 11.C.3 (discussing how some early nineteenth century Court deci-
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But if the Court's jurisdiction to review state grounds does rest on
this practical basis, then the Court should not be free to reverse a
state-law decision for just any reason once that review is underway. To
the contrary: if the Court has jurisdiction to review a state ground be
cause it needs to check whether a state court is cheating federal law
then the Court should be able to reverse that state-law judgment only
where it can identify and substantiate some concrete indication that
the state court has deliberately manipulated state law to thwart federal
law and circumvent Supreme Court review.63 That is, if potential state
court evasion is the "evil presented," then only state-court evasion jus
tifies reversal.64 The Court should not, then, claim power to disturb
state rulings just because it found them erroneous, or even "egre
giously" wrong, under state law.65
It may be unrealistic to require the Court, considering a single
case, to document a state's "widespread pattern" of federal-law viola
tions (like the Court now requires before Congress may regulate states
under the Fourteenth Amendment),66 or even a state's "systematic"

sions handled suggestion of actual state wrongdoing).
63. See Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U. S. 36, 49 (1944) (Douglas. J.,
concurring) (arguing that the Court lacked justification for inquiring at all into the New
York court's state-law judgments on property questions antecedent to a federal due process
challenge in the absence of any "suggestion here that state law has been manipulated in eva
sion of a federal constitutional right"); see also Hill, supra note 10, at 965 (characterizing the
Demorest concurrence as contending that the "state ground could be disallowed only if cir
cumstances warranted the inference of a willful evasion of the federal claim").
64. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U. S. 507, 530 (1997) (demanding "congruence" be
tween state wrongdoing and federal response). See generally supra notes 31-32 and accom
panying text.
65. Cf. Hill, supra note 10, at 969-70 & n.106 (advocating Supreme Court reversal of
state-court state-law decisions for "egregious error" or "arbitrariness" without inquiring into
states' actual bad faith or hostility to the federal claim logically next in line, in order to "en
sur[e] that federal claims are given their due under the supremacy clause"). Some have pro
posed these standards as offering a kind of "objective" proxy for identifying state-court mis
behavior. See MARTIN H. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE
ALLOCATION OF JUDICIAL POWER 269, 269-71 (2d ed. 1990); Hill, supra note 10, at 969-70
& n.106; see also Krent, supra note 22, at 520 (analyzing the Court's ex post facto jurispru·
dence as attempting to prohibit a state's "arbitrary governance," and observing, "[p]erhaps
no direct way to police judicial bias exists, but if a [court's state-law] construction is foresee
able, then it makes it less likely that animus was a determining factor"). While the Court has,
in the past, inquired into the accuracy of a state-law judgment as one way to determine
whether the state court had improperly "evaded" federal law, it has never gone so far as to
hold that it could reverse state grounds on a finding of "erroneousness" alone, without the
further inference of state misbehavior. Enter. Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243
U. S. 157 (1917). See generally Part II (discussing cases). For one 1930 decision in which the
Court used language that, while confusing, might be construed to endorse state-grounds re
versal where either erroneous or indicating evasion, see Broad River Power Co. v. South
Carolina, 281 U. S. 537, 540-41 (1930).
66. Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U. S. 356, 367-72 (2001) (striking down a federal stat
ute, passed under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, because Congress had failed
to compile a record proving a "widespread pattern" of state wrongdoing); Kimel v. Florida
Bd. of Regents, 528 U. S. 62, 89-91 {2000) (same); City of Boerne, 521 U. S. at 530-31 (same).
For one critique of the Court's emphasis in these cases on the state of Congress's "legislative
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discrimination against federal law (like the Court may now demand
before it will use the supremacy clause to force a state court to hear a
federal-law claim).67 But it should be possible for the Court to articu
late some concrete reason, particular to the case before it, why that
particular state court should not be taken at its word on what state law
means.68 Indeed, the Court's own recent habeas corpus rules require
an analogous finding: unless an inferior federal court can say that a
state court's federal-law reading was not "reasonable" or a "good-faith
application" of federal law, that reading must be honored even if it is
wrong.69 Surely a state court deserves no less respect, on direct review,
when it decides a state-law question than it gets, on collateral review,
when it decides federal-law questions in serious criminal, even capital,
cases.
By demanding a sign of actual state wrongdoing, the proven mis
trust proposal departs significantly from other commentary and from
the Court's practice for most (but not all) of its history.70 The modern
Court only rarely takes suspicion of state-court cheating into account,
record," see William W. Buzbee & Robert A.Schapiro, Legislative Record Review, 54 STAN.
L. REV. 87, 89-90 (2001) (summarizing article's observation that between 1995 and 2001, the
Court invalidated six federal statutes "based at least in part on the inadequacies of the rec
ord before Congress," and arguing that the Court now inappropriately "import[s] . . . from
different institutional settings . . . the expectation that a written record will justify a legal
judgment").
67. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999); see infra Part III (discussing Alden).
68. For one possible analogue, consider the Younger abstention doctrine, in which the
Court has carefully dictated what kinds of facts must be shown before a federal court may
overcome the fe deralism-based presumption against interfering with a state-court proceed
ing where fe deral claims are at issue. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (indicating the
facts that may show that a state proceeding reflects "bad faith or harassment," including re
peated criminal indictment followed by dismissal and improper public use of illegally seized
documents); see also HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 1269 (noting that the Younger
fa cts did not "exhibit any special factors that might tend to justify federal interference with a
pending judicial action, such as a pattern of bad faith or harassment in which state courts
were arguably complicit"); id. (stating that "[w]hatever may have been the case in other eras,
by 1971 [when Younger was decided} there was no reason to think state courts generally un
trustworthy in cases involving claimed federal rights") (citing Friedman, Revisionist Theory,
supra note 6, at 561-63).
69. Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); see O'Dell v. Netherland, 521 U.S. 151, 156
(1997) ("[T]he Teague doctrine validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations of existing
precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to later deci
sions.") (internal quotations omitted); see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 410-12
(2000) (construing 1996 statute prohibiting federal habeas relief unless state court's federal
law decision inter alia "involved an unreasonable application of clearly established Federal
law." The Court noted that, although "[t)he term 'unreasonable' is no doubt difficult to de
fine . . . the most important point is that an unreasonable application of federal law is differ
ent from an incorrect application of federal law"). It remains a somewhat open question
whether this limitation on federal habeas power is jurisdictional or not. See Collins v.
Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 41 (1990) (holding that, unlike ordinary subject matter jurisdiction
rules, a state party could waive Teague limits).
70. See infra Section 11.C.3 (discussing cases, over the roughly fifty years straddling the
tum of the twentieth century, where the Court suggested actual state misbehavior when de
ciding whether state grounds were "adequate" to preclude Supreme Court review).
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and then only when selecting which level of deference to give a state
court's reading of state law on the merits.71 And even those who justify
the Court's state-ground reversals on the need to police states' su
premacy clause violations discount particularized state-court conduct,
taking instead a more structural, prophylactic stance that simply as
sumes enough cheating by all states, over time, to warrant Supreme
Court review all of the time.72 Because an antecedent state ground al
ways creates the opportunity for state courts to cheat federal law, that
is, many consider sufficient the structural probability that a single state
court will take that chance to cheat in a single case.
By requiring the Court to identify more specific wrongdoing, the
proven mistrust proposal also contradicts scholars who have argued
that the Court's jurisdiction over state courts would better rest on
standards that free the Court from having to "attribut[e] bad faith to
state officers sworn to uphold federal law."73 Certainly, to make the

71. Compare, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U. S. 98, 136, 140 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(arguing that, absent proof of state "recalcitrance" comparable to what she thought southern
courts showed during the mid-twentieth century civil rights struggles, the concurrence's re
view showed insufficient deference to the Florida court's state-law reading: "There is no
cause here to believe that the members of Florida's high court have done less than 'their
mortal best to discharge their oath of office.' ") (quoting Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549
(1981)), with Bush, 531 U. S. at 114, 115, 119 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (claiming to con
duct "deferential" state-grounds review, concluding that the judgment was "of course, ab
surd" and one "no reasonable person" would reach). Suspicions of state-court misbehavior
may also affect the Court's discretionary grant or denial of certiorari, quite apart from rais
ing more fundamental questions about jurisdiction. See Strauss, supra note 40, at 746 (sug
gesting that the Bush majority's "inchoate" sense that the Florida supreme court had misbe
haved overcame the "strong presumption" against granting certiorari where, as in Bush, the
case "raised difficult issues of state law and no obvious issues of federal Jaw").
Professor Weinberg identifies another way in which the Court, on direct review, may ex
press its "[r)age" at state court "arbitrar[iness)," "intransigen[ce)" or "recalcitrance": by re
versing a state-court judgment and entering final judgment without remand. See Weinberg,
supra note 40, at 642-44 (observing that in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304
(1816), the Supreme Court "short-circuited the recalcitrant Virginia Court of Appeals below
- with whom it had been at odds throughout the Marshall Court period - and reversed
without remanding[,]" with the effect that "(t]itle to vast lands in Virginia eerily changed
hands up there on the Court's Olympic heights."); see also id. at 643 (noting that "Bush v.
Gore puts one in mind of Martin v. Hunter's Lessee," and that "other illustrious examples of
the use of and need for reversal and remand" include NAA CP v. Alabama, supra). But see
id. at 643 (observing that Chief Justice Rehnquist's Bush concurrence cited Martin and
NAACP v. Alabama "only to make the quite different point that the Supreme Court must
sometimes interpret state law for itself in deciding a federal question").
72. See, e.g., HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 521 (where state-law grounds are an
tecedent to a federal claim, "some [ Supreme Court] review of the basis for the state court's
determination of the state-law question is essential if the federal right is to be protected
against evasion and discrimination - as Martin [v. Hunter's Lessee] itself exemplifies");
Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1055, 1056 (noting that antecedence-based appellate jurisdiction
permits direct review where "necess(ary] to maintain the effectiveness and uniformity of the
federal law"). But see City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530 ("While preventive rules are some
times appropriate remedial measures, there must be a congruence between the means used
and the ends to be achieved.'').
73. Hill, supra note 10, at 970; see REDISH, supra note 65, at 269-71 (suggesting prefer
ence that the Court avoid the "difficult and awkward" task of "inquir[ing] into the motives
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Supreme Court corrie right out and call a state court a cheat would
strain the conventions of comity between federal and state judiciar
ies.74 But that conventional cordiality may only encourage the Court to
interfere more frequently (and for less reason) with state courts' pre
rogative to say definitively what state law means. If the Court need
find only error to reverse state grounds (even egregious error) then
state courts deciding state law stand in no better relation to the Court
than does any inferior federal court deciding federal law, no matter
how deferential the Court's attitude.75 By contrast, requiring the Court
to articulate some concrete reason to mistrust a particular state court
before reversing its state-law judgment would force the Court to show
a real and functional respect - not just good manners - towards all
the others.
Indeed, imposing the discomfort of calling states names is, in part,
the point. By so raising the price of state-ground reversals, the proven
mistrust rule would constrain the Court's casual use of a reversal
power that does, after all, both encroach on states' turf and exceed the
limits of the Court's formal jurisdiction - limits with both constitu
tional and statutory roots.76 That ought to be an uncomfortable thing
to do.
of the state court"); Klarman, supra note 27, at 1738 (noting that the cases on which the
Bush v. Gore concurrence relied for authority to reverse state-law decisions "involved situa
tions where state courts had manifested, beyond a shadow of a doubt, the willingness to defy
federal law"; not addressing the fact that the Court did not explicitly say so in the decisions
themselves); see also Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 122 S. Ct. 1640, 1645 (2002) (noting that,
"while jurisdictional rules should be clear," a suite's "[m]otives" for removing case fr om
state to federal court "are difficult to evaluate"). In a letter to this author dated March, 2002,
Professor Hill restated his view more strongly:
In what circumstances, if ever, cognizance should be taken of judicial motive, presents a
problem more basic than either of us have dealt with. I have always understood inquiry into
legislative motive to be strongly discouraged, if not actually forbidden. I have assumed that
the question of judicial motive should be treated similarly.
Letter from Alfred Hill to Laura S. Fitzgerald, Mar. 20, 2002 (on file with the author); cf.
Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (where ambiguous whether the state-court judgment
rests on state or federal-law grounds, the Court adopted a presumption against state-law re
liance, thus ensuring Supreme Court jurisdiction to review more state-court judgments ab
sent a "clear statement" to contrary by state court).

74. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). It may make Congress just as un
comfortable to prove a broad pattern of particularized misconduct before enacting legisla
tion to regulate states. See Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367-72 (2001). This
Article asks, but does not answer, whether imposing that discomfort on Congress is appro
priate if it is too much to impose on the Court. See infra Part V.
75. Cf. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 755 (1999) (holding that the Constitution requires
Congress to show actual, not theoretical, respect for state courts, which imposes a practical
constraint on power to legislate); see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 583 (1995)
(referring to "etiquette of federalism").
76. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945); Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20
Wall.) 590, 630, 635 (1875) (explaining the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine
as required by federalism principles and by the Article III rule against advisory opinions);
see also Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (grant now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1993)). See generally infra Part II (discussing sources of jurisdictional limit).
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THE WINDING PATH OF A JURISDICTIONAL CLAIM

Where has the Court gotten the power to reverse state courts'
state-law judgments? Neither the Constitution's text nor its framing
history offer much to work with. Article III does not mention state
courts or state law at all.77 And while Article VI makes federal sub
stantive law "the supreme Law of the Land," binding both federal
courts and "the Judges in every State,"78 the Constitution nowhere
specifies what effect state law ought to have - in federal or state court
- ori nonfederal questions.79 Of course, during framing and ratifica
tion, the Constitution's friends and enemies did thoroughly debate the
role of state courts in the new system, including whether state courts
should be allowed to decide questions of federal law.80 And in wran
gling over what became the supremacy clause they addressed state
courts' obligations to honor and enforce federal law.81 Yet they paid

77. See U.S. CONST. art. III.
78. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
79. For one argument that Article III was meant to include state common law among
the "laws of the United States" placed within the federal courts' potential subject matter ju
risdiction, see 1 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION 610-40
(1953) (developing argument); see also 2 WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 785, 781 (1953) (identifying the moment when the Court, under
Jeffersonian influence, gave up its constitutionally mandated jurisdiction as United States v.
Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32 {1812) (holding that Article III granted federal
courts no implied power to exercise common-law criminal jurisdiction)); see also WILFRED J.
RITZ, REWRITING THE HISTORY OF THE JUDICIARY ACT OF 1789: EXPOSING MYTHS,
CHALLENGING PREMISES, AND USING NEW EVIDENCE (Wythe Holt & L.H. LaRue eds.,
1989) (critiquing Erie's reading of section 34 and arguing that in 1789 there was no such
thing as "state [common] law" as we now think of it, articulated by a formal and hierarchical
state judiciary).
80. For a thorough analysis of the framing and ratification debates over the state courts'
capacity to decide federal questions, see generally JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS:
POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 172-74 (1996) (summarizing
the debates during the Convention on the question of whether state courts could obviate the
need for an inferior federal judiciary); Collins, supra note 3, at 119-26; id. at 126-29 (discuss
ing the debates leading to the Madisonian Compromise, and later affecting debates on the
First Judiciary Act); James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, "Some Effectual Power": The
Quantity and Quality of Decisionmaking Required of Article Ill Courts, 98 COLUM. L. REV.
696 {1998) (offering a thorough recounting of the convention debates that produced Article
III and the supremacy clause).
81. Those debates make clear that the Supreme Court was meant to exercise appellate
jurisdiction over state-court decisions on federal questions as a means of enforcing states'
obligation to follow federal law. Hamilton, for example, argued that the Supreme Court
must have appellate jurisdiction over state-court decisions on Article Ill questions in order
to ensure national uniformity; otherwise, state courts would have to be denied jurisdiction
over such questions altogether:
The national and state systems are to be regarded as ONE WHOLE. The courts of the latter
will of course be natural auxiliaries to the execution of the laws of the union, and an appeal
from them will as naturally lie to that tribunal, which is designed to unite and assimilate the
principles of national justice and the rules of national decisions. The evident aim of the plan
of convention is that all the causes of the specified classes, shall for weighty public reasons
receive their original or final determination in the courts of the union.
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little attention to the converse question: what power should the
Supreme Court have to reverse a state court's decision declaring what
state law means?82
The Judiciary Act of 1789, by its terms, answered, "None," and
thus first codified the black-letter rule that the Supreme Court may
review state-court judgments only on questions of federal law. While
the Act's section 25 authorized the Court to "re-examin[e] and re
vers[e] or affir[m]"83 a final judgment by a state's "highest court" on
certain specified federal-law questions,84 it denied the Court jurisdic
tion to review state-court decisions on all other questions, including

THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 556 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961); see id. at
555-56.
82. During the ratification debates, Article III's critics, like George Mason, charged that
"the j udiciary of the United States is so constructed and extended as to absorb and destroy
the judiciaries of the several States." JONATHON ELLIOT'S DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATES CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 475 (James
McCllelan & M.E. Bradford eds., 1989). But its advocates insisted, to the contrary, that the
national judiciary would dominate state courts only on questions that were purely federal.
As Hamilton argued, Article III "carefully restricted" the federal judiciary's jurisdiction "to
those causes which are manifestly proper for the cognizance of the national judicature," THE
FEDERALIST No. 81, at 552 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961), which
Hamilton limited to those actually specified in Article III. See THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at
534-41 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (discussing Article Ill's heads of
jurisdiction as the "proper objects" of a federal judiciary). When Hamilton did mention the
Supreme Court's involvement with the "common law," it was only to suggest that some
Article III cases would arise in a common-law "mode" - that is, using the traditional proce
dural forms of a common-law, as opposed to civil law, claim - thus limiting the Court to
reviewing questions of law, and not of fact. See THE FEDERALIST No. 81 , at 551 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). Elsewhere, Hamilton more specifically limited the
scope of Article Ill's "federal question" jurisdiction to causes "which arise out of the laws of
the United States, passed in pursuance of their just and constitutional powers of legislation,"
and "those which concern the execution of the provisions expressly contained in the articles
of union." THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 539, 534-35 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., 1961).
83. See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (now codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1257
(1993)).
84. Id. Congress did not authorize the Court to review state-court decisions on just any
federal-law question, but only those
in any suit . . . where is drawn in question the validity of a treaty or statute of, or an authority
exercised under the United States, and the decision is against their validity; or where is
drawn in question the validity of a statute of, or an authority exercised under any State, on
the ground of their being repugnant to the constitution, treaties or laws of the United States,
and the decision is in favour of such their validity, or where is drawn in question the con
struction of any clause of the constitution, or of a treaty, or statute of, or commission held
under the United States, and the decision is against the title, right, privilege or exemption
specially set up of claimed by either party, under such clause of the said Constitution, treaty,
statute or commission . . . .
1 Stat. 73, 85 (1789). Section 25 thus conditioned the Court's appellate jurisdiction over
state-court judgments not only on a state court's decision of a federal question, but on that
court's decision of a federal question in a particular way - against the party attempting to
raise federal law to his advantage. The Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction if the state court
had decided a federal question in that claimant's favor, no matter how erroneous that deci
sion might be. This limit on the Court's appellate jurisdiction remained until repealed by
Congress in 1914. Act of Dec. 23, 1914, c. 2, 38 Stat. 790.
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those involving state law.85 And, at least since 1875, the Court has em
braced the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine, which
goes beyond the statute's basic bar: where a state court's final judg
ment can rest on state law standing alone, then the Court lacks juris
diction86 even to review any federal question the state court may have
decided too, no matter how erroneously.87
At the black-letter level, these rules remain in place today.88 Yet,
since at least 1813 the Court routinely has reversed state courts on
state-law questions, leaving behind a string of ambiguous and contra
dictory clues to explain why.
A.

The Court's Early Claims: Martin v. Hunter's Lessee and Osborn
v. Bank of United States

In Martin, the early Court claimed a broad power to reverse state
grounds from two separate sources: from the Court's statutory and
constitutional role of enforcing fe deral law's supremacy,89 and from
reading section 25 to grant an expansive supplemental jurisdiction
over all questions - state or federal - arising in any case where fed
eral interests may Iurk.90
Martin capped more than twenty-five years of litigation over land
in Virginia's Northern Neck, owned by Thomas Sixth Lord Fairfax at

85. Section 25 concluded:
But no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal in any such case . . .
than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before men
tioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, treaties, statutes, com
missions, or authorities in dispute.
Judiciary Act of 1789, § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85.
86. The Court has recognized this doctrine to impose a jurisdictional - not merely pru
dential - bar at least since 1893. See Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361 (1893); see also supra
note 10 (citing additional sources).
87. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983); Hill, supra note 10, at 983 n.166 (noting
that the presence of an adequate state ground deprives the Supreme Court of "coercive
power" to force state courts to reconsider a "waiver" of compliance with state procedural
grounds because "the presence of an adequate state ground means either a lack of jurisdic
tion; or an extremely limited jurisdiction which encompasses the power to affirm, or to re
mand for special purposes, but not to reverse" (citing cases)).
88. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002) (applying adequate and independent
state grounds doctrine in separate context of federal habeas corpus; also discussing doc
trine's continued force on Supreme Court direct review of state-court judgments); Coleman
v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991) (same). They remain in place even though Congress
long ago repealed the explicit statutory language that codified them. See infra notes 118-134
and accompanying text (discussing Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590
(1875)).
89. See infra Section 11.A.1 (discussing Martin's supremacy-based claim).
90. See infra Section II.A.2 (discussing Martin's supplemental jurisdiction claim). As I
discuss in Part III, infra, both of Martin's claims today influence prominent commentators in
their pursuit of a theory to justify the Court's state-grounds reversals.
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his death in 1781.91 As viewed by the Supreme Court; the dispute cen
tered on one question: had the Commonwealth of Virginia, under
nonfederal common law and state statutory rules, legally confiscated
that land from its English owner by the time new treaties between the
United States and Great Britain prohibited states from thereafter
seizing English subjects' property?92 If Virginia had legally seized the
land in time, that left nothing in English hands for the treaties to pro
tect (and Virginia could grant good title to another, Hunter's lessor93).
If not, the land had remained in what became the federally-protected
hands of Lord Fairfax's English heir, Denny Fairfax.94 Virginia's high
est court rejected Martin's claim and awarded the property to
Hunter's lessor,95 but the U.S. Supreme Court disagreed: it held that
title had not legally passed to Virginia in time, and so the land be
longed to the Fairfax heir.96
91. Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 355-56 (1816). First commenced
in a Winchester, Virginia state court in 1791, the suit was an action in ejectment, a nonfed
eral cause of action through which two or more adverse claimants to the same real estate
could resolve which held the superior right to possess it. See Martin', 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at
355-56; see also id. at 304. As discussed below, infra notes 92-103 and accompanying text, this
long-running property dispute produced two separate Supreme Court decisions, issued three
years apart: 1816's Martin is the second and more familiar decision; the first was Fairfax's
Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813). The parties' stipulation of facts
appears in Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 604. For a thoroughly detailed discussion
of all the issues and events in this convoluted litigation, see 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 79, at
785-817.
92. Two treaties entered the dispute: 1783's Treaty of Peace and 1794's Jay Treaty. See
Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 356; Fairfax's Devisee, 1 1 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 621-24 (discussing
arguments based on 1783 Treaty of Peace); see also id. at 624-28 (discussing arguments based
on 1794 Jay Treaty, which further protected the property rights of "British subjects who now
hold lands in the territories of the United States . . . ") (quoting language of Jay's Treaty).
The parties' numerous arguments emphasized each treaty, both together and in the alterna
tive. The Supreme Court, deciding the merits, emphasized the 1794 Treaty as the one which
dispositively marked Virginia's last chance to confiscate the property from Fairfax hands
without violating federal law. See Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 627; see also Mar
tin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 359-60 (noting that in deciding the merits, "the [C]ourt did not
deem it necessary to rest . . . upon the treaty of peace, believing that the title of the defen
dant was, at all events, perfect under the treaty of 1794"). But in later resolving the challenge
made to the Court's appellate jurisdiction altogether, the Court emphasized the 1783 Treaty
of Peace. See id. at 356-57.
93. See Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 356 (recounting that.the original plaintiff, Hunter's
Lessee, "claimed the land under a patent granted to him by the state of Virginia, in 1789,
under a title supposed to be vested in that state by escheat of forfeiture").
94. See id. at 356 (recounting that the "original defendant claimed the land as devisee
under the will of Lord Fairfax"); accord Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 621-24
(elaborating adverse claims). Denny Fairfax died before the Virginia Court of Appeals de
cided the dispute, devising his Virginia holdings to Philip Martin, who was then substituted
as party appellee in that court and as defendant in error in the Supreme Court. See Hunter v.
Fairfax's Devisee, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) 218 (1810).
95. This gave Hunter's lessee the superior claim to possession and the right to an order
ejecting the Fairfax claimant. Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 231-32. At that time, Virginia's
high court was called the Court of Appeals.
96. Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 628 (announcing the Court's "opinion that
the judgment of the Court of Appeals of Virginia ought to be reversed," and that the pro-

104

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 101:80

The Court's decision, explained by Justice Story, boiled down to
two nonfederal rulings. First, he declared, the common law permitted
a sovereign (like the Commonwealth of Virginia) to confiscate the
property of an alien {like the British Fairfaxes) only if that sovereign
executed an adjudication of escheat, known as an "inquest of office,"97
which all agreed Virginia had not done.98 Second, while a sovereign
could always legislatively "repeal" the common law inquest require
ment,99 Justice Story declared as a matter of Virginia law that Virginia

Fairfax judgment of the state trial court should be "affirmed"). The Court entered a man
date "requiring the judgment rendered in this very cause . . . to be carried into due execu
tion." Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 323.
Perhaps undercutting Martin's assertion of broad appellate jurisdiction to reverse state
courts on state-law questions, see infra note 103 and accompanying text, the state court ap
peared to decide the dispute on more ambiguous grounds than either the Supreme Court
then - or I have now - emphasized. See Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 231-32, 235-38, where
the two voting Virginia judges agreed only on the ground that state legislation passed in 1796
to settle this particular dispute compelled a ruling in favor of Hunter's lessee, whose claim
derived from Virginia's confiscation; only one of those two judges also declared, in the alter
native, that Virginia had successfully seized the property by 1782, leaving the 1783 Treaty of
Peace with "nothing left whereon to operate." Id. at 231; see also HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 6, at 496 (summarizing the Virginia judges' opinions). The Supreme Court, however,
refused to consider the 1796 compromise legislation as a grounds for judgment because it
rested on matters outside the formal record - which, in tum, consisted of a "special state
ment of facts in the nature of a special verdict" agreed upon by the parties. Martin, 14 U.S.
(1 Wheat.) at 356; see also Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 223 (noting, " [a]t the trial, the parties
agreed a case in lieu of a special verdict"). Thus, the Supreme Court reviewed what it treated
as the Virginia's court decision on the question highlighted here: whether Virginia had prop
erly confiscated the property before the federal treaties went into effect. See Fairfax's Devi
see, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 620-28; see also Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 360 (rejecting the
argument that the Virginia court had decided the case under state compromise legislation,
concluding that "[a]t all events, we are bound to consider that the court did decide upon the
facts actually before them," that is, those facts about Virginia's various efforts to confiscate
the Fairfax property before the treaties were operative). The Virginia Court of Appeals
opinions would not have entered the record presented to the Supreme Court on the writ of
error authorized by section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789. See § 25, 1 Stat. 73, 85 (now codi
fied at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (1993)).
97. Justice Story's "inquest of office" requirement rested exclusively on English com
mon-law authorities. See Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 621-22 (citing English
precedents); 38 AM. JUR. 2D, Aliens and Citizens § 2553 (1998) (describing the "inquest of
office" as "adjudication of escheat"); see also Doe ex dem. Governeur's Heirs v. Robertson,
24 U.S. 332 (1826) (discussing requirement). Justice Story also referred to "inquest of office"
as an "office of entitling" which was "necessary to give this notoriety, and fix the title in the
sovereign." Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 621. In the Virginia courts, Hunter's les
see had admitted that an inquest of office would have been necessary to a successful confis
cation "under the general laws as applying to ordinary cases." Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at
224.
98. The parties stipulated to this fact. See Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 622
(noting stipulation); accord Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 223-34. Thus, Justice Story noted, "it
would seem therefore to follow, upon common law reasoning, that the grant [from Virginia]
to the lessor of the original Plaintiff . . . issued improvidently and erroneously, and passed
nothing." Fairfax's Devisee, 1 1 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 622.
99. Counsel fo r Hunter's lessee had contended " [t]hat the common law as to inquests of
office and seizure, so far as the same respects the lands in controversy, is completely dis
pensed with by statutes of the commonwealth, so as to make the grant to the original Plain
tiff . . . complete and perfect . . . ." Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 622; see also
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had not done so, rejecting several arguably good statutory candi
dates100 including one, enacted in 1782, which a Virginia Court of
Appeals judge had read as legally confiscating the land before the fed
eral treaties took effect.101 But ruling otherwise, the Supreme Court
Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 234 (noting claimant's argument that Virginia's statutes "were
equivalent [to], and supplied the place" of the inquest of office). The Supreme Court agreed
that state statutes could dispense with the common-law requirement: "we will not say that it
was not competent for the legislature, (supposing no treaty in the way) by a special act to
have vested the land in the commonwealth without an inquest of office for the cause of al
ienage." Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 622; see also id. at 623 (referring to permis
sible "repeal" of common-law requirement).

100. See Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 622-27 (discussing and rejecting repeal
arguments based on Virginia statutes enacted in 1777, 1779, 1782 - all before the 1783
Treaty of Peace - and also two passed in 1784 and 1785, before the 1794 Jay Treaty).
Justice Story rejected all the Virginia candidates because they failed to satisfy his own "clear
statement rule": given how "useful," "important," and "salutary" he considered the com
mon-law inquest of office rule, Justice Story declared, "The common law . . . ought not to be
deemed to be repealed, unless the language of a statute be clear and explicit for this pur
pose." Id. at 623. Cf. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992) (analyzing
clear statement rules as "substantive" canons that reflect judges' own values and superim
pose them onto the interpreted texts). One Virginia Court of Appeals judge took a different
approach to statutory interpretation, and identified a 1782 statute as effectively - although
implicitly - repealing the common law. See Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 230-31 (Roane, J.)
(citing, inter alia, Kinney v. Beverley, 12 Va. (2 Hen. & M.) 318, 344 (1808). But see Hunter,
15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 233-34 (Fleming, J.) (disagreeing with Judge Roane and arguing that the
legislature must be explicit in substituting other means of confiscation for "office found").
101. See Hunter, 15 Va. (1 Munf.) at 229-30. Some detail is necessary to judge whether
the Virginia judge's reading was plausible. The 1782 statute was enacted after the 6th Lord
Fairfax died in 1781, leaving the disputed land to Denny Martin. Although the deceased
Lord Fairfax had been a citizen of Virginia, Martin remained a British subject. The Virginia
legislature, concerned that Lord Fairfax's extensive Virginia landholdings "had devolved on
alien enemies," id. at 228, passed the 1782 statute to gain control over that property's dispo
sition. Id. As to some of the land - that which had been granted to the use of others during
Lord Fairfax's life - the statute sequestered the quit rents due in that legislative session and
ordered them paid into the state treasury. Id. As to other portions of the land - that which
was vacant, or "waste and ungranted," id. at 223, at Lord Fairfax's death (including the land
at issue in this litigation) - the 1782 statute provided that anyone wishing to "make entries
for vacant lands" could do so under the same procedures that Lord Fairfax himself had fol
lowed in his own offices, and that such entries were "good and valid in law" until the legisla·
ture adopted another "mode" of allocating the property. Id. at 228-29. Judge Roane, of the
Virginia Court of Appeals, concluded that this provision amounted to a legislative act of
confiscation without inquest of office:
As there could be no conceivable motive with the Legislature to abstain from taking posses
sion of those vacant lands, and granting them out, thereby to settle the country while it was
taking possession of the quit rents and granted lands thereof, the authorizing entries to be
made therefor, is as strong a mode as they could possible have adopted to declared that they
then and there took possession of the same.

Id. at 229. Thus, Judge Roane concluded, the 1782 statute accomplished a successful confis
cation, notwithstanding the common-law rule:
(l]n fact, this new and ridiculous idea of the necessity of ordinary and particular inquests of
office, as applying to the case in question, or of any other symbol of investiture, than that
most notorious one of all, (an act of the Legislature,) had not then occurred to the mind of
the General Assembly: in relation to the Commonwealth, the mere assumption of the lands
by law was sufficient, though, as to the grantees of the Commonwealth, other acts were nee-
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concluded that Virginia had not gained good title over the Fairfax
lands before the treaties placed them under federal protection.102
But what authorized the U.S. Supreme Court to decide all these
dispositive but nonfederal questions? The Court gave two separate an
swers, developed in two later cases, Martin v. Hunter's Lessee103 and

Osborn v. Bank of United States.104
1.

The Court's Role of Enforcing Federal Law's Supremacy
Authorizes State-Ground Reversals

Martin, the Court's second and last decision in the Virginia-Fairfax
land dispute, is best known for broadly reading Article III to claim for
the Court a special role of enforcing federal law's constitutional su
premacy in state courts, so justifying the Court's appellate jurisdiction
to review state courts' federal-law decisions.105 But Martin also invoked
essary to complete their title: it is, however, enough to avoid the bar presented by the (1783]
treaty that the title (including the possession) of the lands was then completely in the Com
monwealth.
Id. at 230. This 1782 confiscation by statute, according to Judge Roane, meant that "the title
of the Commonwealth to the land in question, having been perfected by a seisin under the
act of 1782, or, in other words, the confiscation being complete, that treaty had nothing left
whereupon to operate." Id. at 231. The other voting member of Virginia's Court of Appeals
disagreed. See id. at 234-35 (Fleming, J.) (concluding that the 1782 legislation showed "the
Legislature was quite undetermined on the subject of this territory, and had done nothing
that squinted at an inquisition of office: and, therefore there was, from any act of govern
ment at that time, scarce a semblance of a title vested in the Commonwealth").
102. Fairfax's Devisee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) at 627 (concluding that Virginia's failure to
properly confiscate the disputed property by 1794, at the latest, meant that the 1794 Jay
Treaty "completely protect[ed] and confirm[ed]" the Fairfax claimant's title, even if the 1783
Treaty of Peace had left him "wholly unprovided for").
1 03. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); see, e.g. , David P. Currie, The Constitution in the
Supreme Court: The Powers of the Federal Courts, 1801-1835, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 646, 686
n.356 (1982) (identifying Martin's "final" question whether the Court "had jurisdiction not
only to construe the treaty but also to determine whether escheat had been accomplished
before the treaty took effect" as a purely nonfederal question). The Martin decision followed
the Virginia high court's defiance of the Court's 1813 order to award the disputed property
to Denny Fairfax, on the grounds that the Supreme Court lacked appellate jurisdiction over
any decision by a state court. See Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 323-24 (quoting the Court of
Appeals' explanation for refusing to execute the mandate). Martin is better known for its
separate ruling, in response, that the Constitution meant the Supreme Court to review state
court decisions on federal questions. See id. at 338-52; see also Collins, supra note 3, at 55-58;
Currie, supra, at 681 -87.
104. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
1 05. See Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 338-52 (reasoning that the Constitution author
ized Congress to grant appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments because otherwise
the Court could not carry out its Article I l l role of enforcing the supremacy and uniformity
of federal law); Akhil Reed Amar, A Nev-Federalist View of Article Ill: Separating the Two
Tiers of Federal Jurisdiction, 65 B.U. L. REV. 205, 210-19 (1985) (discussing Story's related
argument that Article Ill mandates that certain federal-law questions be within the jurisdic
tion of some federal court; analyzing the merits and "mistakes" of Justice Story's mandatory
view of federal-court jurisdiction); Collins, supra note 3, at 55-58 (discussing Martin's signifi
cance for modern doctrines concerning state-court obligations and limitations under the
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federal supremacy to claim the distinct power to decide any state-law
question that blocked federal law's path through state court.106 Brush
ing off arguments that the Court could consider only whether federal
law gave Denny Martin a superior claim to the land, Justice Story de
clared that so limiting the Court's j urisdiction would permit state
courts to "evade" appellate review " at pleasure."107
How, indeed, can it be possible to decide whether a title be within the
protection of a treaty, until it is ascertained what that title is, and
whether it have a legal validity? From the very necessity of the case,
there must be a preliminary inquiry into the existence and structure of
the title, before the court can construe the treaty in reference to that ti
tle. If the court below should decide, that the title was bad, and therefore,

not protected by the treaty, must not this court have a power to decide the
title to be good, and, therefore, protected by the treaty?108

Unless state courts were always to have the last word on what federal
law meant in cases like Martin - an unacceptable result given Story's
supremacy-based reading of Article III - then the Court must of
course have the power to reverse on state grounds.109
2.

Supplemental Jurisdiction Over State-Law Questions: Martin and
Osborn

Martin also justified state-ground reversals as a natural and neces
sary supplement to its statutory appellate jurisdiction to review state
courts' federal-law decisions. When section 25 granted appellate juris
diction over state-court "cases" involving federal questions - and not
just over isolated federal questions - it gave the Court a broad sup
plemental jurisdiction to decide even nonfederal common-law and
state statutory questions arising alongside federal questions in a single
dispute.110 Thus, once the Fairfax claimant argued that Virginia failed
Constitution's supremacy clause); Currie, supra note 103, at 681-87 (discussing Martin's rea
soning on the constitutionality of appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments on Article
III questions).
106. See infra Part III (discussing the twentieth century Court's gradual return to a
Martin-like approach to state grounds reversals).
107. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) at 357.
108. ld. at 358 (emphasis added) ..
109. See infra Section III.A. (tracing more recent elaborations of this aspect of Martin).
110. Asking "[w]hat is the case for which . . . [section 25] provides a remedy . . . ?", Story
responded, "a suit where is drawn in question the construction of a treaty." Martin, 14 U.S. (1
Wheat.) at 358 (summarizing section 25) (emphasis added). In reasoning other commenta
tors have criticized as "disingenuous" and "questionable," Justice Story maintained that the
federal treaty's presence in this dispute made review of the state-law questions unavoidable.
He declared:
How, indeed, can it be possible to decide whether a title be within the protection of a treaty,
until it is ascertained what that title is, and whether it have a legal validity? From the very
necessity of the case, there must be a preliminary inquiry into the existence and structure of
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to confiscate the land in time, leaving it in English hands long enough
to gain federal protection under the post-War treaties,111 the U.S.
Supreme Court was free to decide even nonfederal questions in the
same case.112
Martin claimed this supplemental j urisdiction primarily from sec
tion 25.113 But eight years later, Osborn v. Bank of United States114

the title, before the court can construe the treaty in reference to that title.
Id; see also 1 CROSSKEY, supra note 79, at 615 (calling reasoning "questionable"); Currie,
supra note 103, at 686 n.356 (calling Story "disingenuous"). Professor Currie crisply identi

fied Story's flaw: "As a matter of logic, the state court's threshold determination of its own
law could certainly have been accepted . . . " Id.; cf. Fox Film Corp. v. Muller, 296 U.S. 207,
210-11 (1935) (distinguishing adequate and independent state-law grounds for decision over which the Supreme Court enjoys no appellate jurisdiction - from state-law decisions
that "constitute a preliminary step which simply had the effect of bringing forward for de
termination the federal question," over which federal appellate jurisdiction may attach). For
a more detailed discussion of when and how the Supreme Court has asserted appellate juris
diction to review a state-law decision deemed antecedent to a federal claim, see infra notes
256-295 and accompanying text.
.

111. Manin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 356. Justice Story reasoned:
It is apparent . . . that the title thus set up by the plaintiff [Hunter's Lessee] might be open to
other objections; but the title of the defendant was perfect and complete, if it was protected
by the treaty of 1783. If therefore, this court had authority to examine into the whole record,
and to decide upon the legal validity of the title of the defendant, as well as its application to
the treaty of peace, it would be a case within the express purview of the 25th section of the
act; for there was nothing in the record upon which the court below could have decided but
upon the title as connected with the treaty; and if the title was otherwise good, its insuffi
ciency must have depended altogether upon its protection under the treaty. Under such cir
cumstances it was strictly a suit where was drawn in question the construction of a treaty,
and the decision was against the title specially set up or claimed by the defendant. It would
fall, then, within the very terms of the act.
Id. at 356-57.

112. Id. at 358-59. lt made no difference, indeed, that the dispute itself turned primarily,
if not entirely, on nonfederal grounds. Justice Story declared, "It is . . . the decision against
the title set up with reference to the treaty, and not the mere abstract construction of the
treaty itself, upon which the statute intends to found the appellate jurisdiction." Id. at 358. It
is worth noting here that Martin characterized this land dispute in a way that differed signifi
cantly - in emphasis if not in actual substance - from Justice Story's merits analysis in
Fairfax's Devisee. On the merits, Justice Story had stressed the reasons, under the common
law and Virginia statutes, why Virginia's confiscation efforts had failed, thus disabling the
Commonwealth from granting good title to Hunter's lessor; he treated the federal treaties,
essentially, as just setting the deadlines by which Virginia's efforts would have had to suc
ceed. See supra notes 97-102 and accompanying text (recounting the merits reasoning in
Fairfax's Devisee). But in Martin, Justice Story characterized the dispute as turning primar
ily, if not exclusively, on the treaties themselves, declaring: "there was nothing in the record
upon which the court below could have decided but upon the title as connected with the
treaty; and if the title was otherwise good, its sufficiency must have depended altogether upon
its protection under the /1783] treaty." Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 357 (emphasis added);
see also Collins, supra note 3, at 55 n.42 (noting, without citation, that "Story later explained
Martin as a case that arose under federal law of which the state court had 'incidentally
take[n] cognizance' insofar as the federal questions arose only by way of defense or reply to
the state law criminal action") (alteration in original).
1 13. Martin offers some suggestion that Article III also supports the Court's claim to
broad supplemental jurisdiction over state courts: had Congress not prohibited the Court
from reversing on nonfederal alternative grounds, Justice Story declared, the Supreme Court
would "unquestionably" have enjoyed the "right of revising all the points involved in the
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made that claim fully constitutional. There, Chief Justice Marshall de
clared that federal courts may decide not only those federal-law ques
tions falling squarely within Article Ill's "judicial power," but also all
other questions - including state-law questions - in any case that
even threatens to raise a question under federal law. 1 15 Marshall ex
plained:

We ask, then, if it can be sufficient to exclude this jurisdiction, that the
case involves questions depending on general principles? A cause may
depend on several questions of fact and law. Some of these may depend
on the construction of a law of the United States; others on principles
unconnected with that law. If it be a sufficient foundation for jurisdiction,
that the title or right set up by the party, may be defeated by one con
struction of the constitution or law of the United States, and sustained by
the opposite construction
then all the other questions must be decided
as incidental to this, which gives that jurisdiction. Those other questions
cannot arrest the proceedings.116
.

.

.

cause." Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 359 (emphasis added) (citing Smith v. Maryland, 10
U.S. (6 Cranch) 286 (1810)). Justice Story might have meant that section 25 - and not
Article III itself - would have granted the Court that "right" absent the statute's restrictive
language; under that reading, Article III must still have permitted Congress to grant the
Court broad supplemental jurisdiction to review state-court decisions, even if the
Constitution did not grant that jurisdiction itself. Compare United Mine Workers v. Gibbs,
383 U.S. 715, 725-26 (1966), with Aldinger v.Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18-19 (1976); see also infra
note 1 16 (discussing the Court's shifting stance about whether federal supplemental jurisdic
tion requires a statutory grant).But Justice Story's definition of which questions comprised a
single "case" sounds generalized and not limited to section 25. See Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat)
at 358. Moreover, read alongside Martin's earlier claims that Article III mandates federal
jurisdiction over all "cases" within the federal "judicial power" - including those that origi
nate in state courts and raise federal questions only "incidentally" to those state-law actions,
see id. at 338, 342, - and Martin's assertion that that jurisdiction must extend to Supreme
Court appellate review of state-court decisions on such incidental federal questions, id., it is
reasonable to discern a constitutional and not just statutory foundation for Justice Story's
claim to broad supplemental jurisdiction.
1 14. 22 U.S.(9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
1 15. See Osborn, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) at 822-24 (declaring that Congress may grant juris
diction over any case in which a question within the Article Ill judicial power "forms an in
gredient of the original cause," even if that question - like the Bank's capacity to sue or be
sued in the statute there - was not in fact raised (and is very unlikely to be raised) in the
case). In Osborn, an Ohio branch of the National Bank pursued common law replevin and
equitable remedies against state officials who had burglarized the branch and seized
$100,000 to pay a state tax imposed on the Bank's Ohio operations.Id. at 739-41. Although
the Bank plaintiffs filed in federal court, invoking jurisdiction under the federal statute that
created the National Bank and authorized it "to sue and be sued in any court of the United
States," id. at 817, the Bank sought only nonfederal relief: namely, replevin's standard rem
edy of the return of property improperly held by another. In the end, that is exactly what the
federal court granted, and what the Supreme Court affirmed, with one relatively minor ad
justment. See id. at 871 (affirming lower court's order to return the seized money, but re
versing the order to pay interest on that amount for the time the money was in defendant's
possession, since common Jaw did not authorize interest under those circumstances).
116. Osborn, 22 U.S. at 821-22 (emphasis added). The Court has followed this same
constitutional reasoning in developing its doctrine of supplemental federal jurisdiction, to
govern when inferior federal courts may exercise original jurisdiction over nonfederal claims
between nondiverse parties. See Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 371
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In other words, Article III itself contemplated broad federal j urisdic
tion to decide any question - federal or state - arising alongside one
within the federal "judicial Power."1 1 7

(1978). In United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966), the Court held that an inferior
federal court properly hearing a federal question may also constitutionally decide any non
federal question within the same "case or controversy" as the federal question, which the
Court defined further as any question presented by the "common nucleus of operative fact"
that presents the federal question. Id. at 725 (defining which claims "compris[e) but one con
stitutional 'case' " for purposes of Article Ill's extension of federal judicial power to cases
and controversies arising under federal law). While the Court has sometimes suggested that
federal supplemental jurisdiction requires a statutory grant as well as Gibbs's constitutional
authorization, see Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1, 18 {1976), the Court has never repudiated
Gibbs's definition of what constitutes an Article I I I "case or controversy." But see Richard
A. Matasar, Rediscovering "One Constitutional Case": Procedural Rules and the Rejection of
the Gibbs Test for Supplemental Jurisdiction, 71 CAL. L. REV. 1399, 1416 (1983) (arguing
that it is not "obvious" that Gibbs established a constitutional test, as opposed to simply in
terpreting the statutory grant of federal question jurisdiction at issue there, see 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1993)). In 1990, Congress enacted legislation governing the exercise of supplemental
original jurisdiction by inferior federal courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1993). That statute
speaks only to federal district courts, and it says nothing at all about the Supreme Court or
its appellate jurisdiction to review state-court decisions. For a thorough discussion of federal
supplemental jurisdiction, including cases from Osborn forward developing that principle,
see Matasar, supra, at 1407-17 (recounting the development of supplemental jurisdiction
from Osborn through Gibbs and Kroger, to support the argument that Gibbs unduly restricts
supplemental jurisdiction to fewer nonfederal claims than Osborn - which linked jurisdic
tion to contemporary pleading rules that governed which claims could be pursued in one
case - would have permitted).
1 17. In Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) - decided three years before
Osborn - Chief Justice Marshall offered what might have been a more qualified view of the

scope of the Court's appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments on questions other
than those specified in Article Ill. In Cohens, reprising Martin, Virginia challenged the con
stitutionality of Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over a state-court criminal judgment.
Virginia argued, inter alia, that such federal supervision violated the Constitution's federal
ism principles, which prohibited the "complete consolidation of the States, so far as respects
the judicial power" with the national judiciary. Id. at 422. While the Cohens Court reaf
firmed Martin's ruling that the Constitution did contemplate Supreme Court appellate juris
diction over state-court judgments, id., Chief Justice Marshall did so with what could be read
as a significant reservation. Noting that any "complete consolidation of the States" under the
federal judiciary "would authorize the legislature to confer on the federal Court appellate
jurisdiction from the State Courts in all cases whatsoever," id., Marshall observed: "The dis
tinction between such a power, and that of giving appellate jurisdiction in a few specified
cases in the decision of which the nation takes an interest, is too obvious not to be perceived
by all." Id.; see also id. at 420 (quoting with approval statement in THE FEDERALIST NO. 82
(Alexander Hamilton), declaring, "The evident aim of the plan of the national convention is,
that all the causes of the specified classes shall, for weighty public reasons, receive their
original or final determination in the Courts of the Union") (emphasis added). At least one
commentator has argued that Marshall's qualifying language excludes appellate jurisdiction
over all questions (like common-law and state statutory questions) other than those "few
specified cases" identified in Article III, in that author's view, because Marshall was "striv
ing . . . to introduce a certain element of confusion as to what the Court's position was, and,
so, to soothe and mollify elements in the country that were resentful of the sweeping doc
trines of Justice Story's great opinion in Martin v. Hunter." 2 CROSSKEY, supra note 79, at
816. In any event, in 1824's Osbom v. Bank of United States, Chief Justice Marshall claimed
or reclaimed a supplemental appellate jurisdiction at least as robust - and far more consti
tutionally explicit - than any Story asserted in Martin.
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Launching A Middle Era: Murdock v . City of Memphis

In Martin and Osborn, the early Court claimed a robust preroga
tive to reverse on state grounds, but 1875's Murdock v. City of Mem
phis118 signaled a more reserved approach. There, the Court not only
disclaimed jurisdiction to review state-court judgments on nonfederal
issues, but it also ruled that the Court should not review state-court
decisions even on federal-law questions - no matter how erroneous
- where state grounds supply an adequate and independent basis for
the state court's j udgment.1 19 In doing so, Murdock launched an era of
greater restraint in which the Court puzzled over the scope of its own
power to reverse on state grounds and, for awhile, followed more rig
orous standards in doing so.
For one thing, Murdock overtly repudiated Martin's claim to broad
supplemental jurisdiction under section 25. In 1867, Congress had re
enacted that grant with one controversial change: it omitted language
that had explicitly restricted the Court's review of state-court j udg
ments to those "errors" that "immediately respec[t]" the federal-law
questions triggering the Court's appellate j urisdiction in the first
place.120 Ruling that Congress had not intended by this to change the
scope of the Court's j urisdiction, Murdock read that now-tacit restric
tion to permit a far more limited review than Martin had done when
the restriction was express: Murdock, unlike Martin, read the statute
to permit review of the specific federal questions triggering j urisdic
tion in the first place, but none other.121 Emphasizing how very nar
rowly Congress had defined even those federal questions within the
Court's appellate j urisdiction - denying review unless the state court
118. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
119. As HART & WECHSLER notes, some suggest that Murdock and its immediate suc
cessors regarded the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine "merely as pruden
tial." HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 524. But since 1893, the Court's practice, on
identifying an adequate state ground, has been to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. See Eustis
v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 370 (1893).
120.

The omitted clause read:

But no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground for reversal in any case as
aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the be
fore mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, treaties, stat
utes, commissions, or authorities in dispute.
Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73, 86-87 (1789); see Act of Feb. 5, 1867, 14 Stat. 385, 386-87
(1867). In Martin, Justice Story had read this provision narrowly, concluding that it meant
only to prohibit the Court from considering state grounds for relief raised as an alternative
to a federal claim. See Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 352-54 (1816).

121.

The Court stated:

We are of opinion that upon a fair construction of the whole language of the section the ju
risdiction conferred is limited to the decision of the questions mentioned in the statute, and,
as a necessary consequence of this, to the exercise of sucti powers as may be necessary to
cause the judgment in that decision to be respected.

Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 627-28.
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decided against the federal claimant122 - Murdock asked: "Is it consis
tent with this extreme caution to suppose that Congress intended,
when those cases came here, that this court should not only examine
those [federal] questions, but all others found in the record? - ques
tions of common law, of State statutes, of controverted facts, and con
flicting evidence?"123 Answering "No," Murdock flatly rejected the ar
gument - central to Martin - that when "one of the [federal]
questions mentioned has been decided . . . this court has j urisdiction,
and that jurisdiction extends to the whole case."124
Murdock also rejected Martin's supremacy-based claim to a broad
power to reverse on state grounds. While Murdock recognized the
Court to be not only the "most appropriate" but also the "only proper
tribunal" for finally and uniformly deciding questions arising under
federal law,125 that role was not implicated by state-law questions:

[n]o such reason nor any necessity exists for the decision by this court of
other questions [than federal onesJ in those cases . . . . The State courts
are the appropriate tribunals . . .[12 ] for the decision of questions arising
under their local law, whether statutory or otherwise. And it is not lightly
to be presumed that Congress acted upon a principle which implies a dis
trust of their integrity or of their ability to construe those laws cor
rectly.127
Not only did Murdock undercut the expansive supremacy-based
and "whole case" jurisdictional claims driving Martin and Osborn, but
it also identified two constitutional principles arguing against broad
Court authority to reverse state grounds.128 First was federalism itself.
122. Id. at 625-26 (stressing "the most important part of the statute," defining which
federal questions fall within the Court's appellate jurisdiction).
123. Id. at 626.
124. Id. at 627 (emphasis added).
125. See id at 626.
126. Here, the Court added "as this court has repeatedly held," but without citation. Id.
127. Id. at 626; see also Currie, supra note 103, at 686 n.256 (describing Murdock as
holding that "the purposes of uniformity and protection of federal rights, which Martin had
identified as underlying article III, did not generally require the Supreme Court to review
state law questions in state court cases"). Murdock stressed that the Court's authority to
render final and conclusive decisions on federal questions was essential, given the potential
for "various and conflicting" rulings by state courts. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 632. But
this purpose "does not require that, in a case involving a variety of questions, any other
should be decided than those described in" section 25. Id.; see also id. at 632-33 (repeating
that "(i]t cannot . . . be maintained that it is in any case necessary for the security of the
rights claimed under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States that the Supreme
Court should examine and decide other questions not of a Federal character"). As others
have pointed out, "(t]he Court's clear recognition in Murdock that it lacks authority to re
view a state court on issues of state law should be contrasted with its conclusion in Swift v.
Tyson, (41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842)] that the federal courts sitting in diversity need not follow
state court decisions on issues of common law." HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 520.
128. Contrast the commentators cited supra note 10, who argue that adequate and inde
pendent state grounds doctrine is merely a self-imposed prudential restraint.
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Murdock stressed the "general principle" that state courts retained a

structural "independence" from federal supervision on all questions
"arising under their local law" - indeed, on all questions except those
within the Article III j udicial power.129 Indeed, so "vital in its essential
nature to the independence of the State courts" was it to restrict fed
eral review to federal questions that it "may well be held to have been
superfluous, or nearly so" in section 25 itself.130 To Murdock, state in
dependence mandated the "fundamental" rule that the Court's "juris
diction was limited to the correction of errors relating solely to Federal
law."131

129. Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 626, 630 (1875).
130. Id. at 630. Murdock stressed that this limit was not merely statutory:
And though it may be argued with some plausibility that the reason of this is to be found in
the restrictive clause of the act of 1789, which is omitted in the act of 1867, yet an examina
tion of the cases will show that it rested quite as much on the conviction of this court that
without that clause and on general principles the jurisdiction extended no further.
Id. (emphasis added).
131. Id. (emphasis added). Murdock's federalism views have resurfaced even where the
Court pursues its· practice of reversing on state grounds. For example, in Herb v. Pitcairn,
324 U.S. 117 (1945), Justice Jackson, for the Court, declared the "reason" for the adequate
and independent state grounds doctrine (prohibiting Court review of state courts' federal
law decisions where state law can fully support judgment) to be "found in the partitioning of
power between the state and federal judicial systems and in the limitations of our own juris
diction. Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to the extent that they incor
rectly adjudge federal rights. " Id. at 125-26. In fact, even as tlte Herb Court claimed the
power to reverse state grounds it found "inadequate," see id. at 125, Justice Jackson declared
the jurisdictional bar itself "so obvious that it has rarely been thought to warrant statement."
Id. So too, in Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 {1983), the Court identified "[r]espect for the
independence of state courts" as one of the "cornerstones of this Court's refusal to decide
cases where there is an adequate and independent state ground." Id. at 1040. And even
Chief Justice Rehnquist in Bush v. Gore,. urging an aggressive merits review of a state-court
state-law judgment, admitted that "[i]n most cases, comity and respect for federalism compel
us to defer to the decisions of state courts on issues of state law. That practice reflects our
understanding that tlte decisions of state courts are definitive pronouncements of the will of
the States as sovereigns." 531 U.S. 98, 112 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (including
"cf." citation to Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)); see supra note 47 (citing de
bate about whether Erie's constitutional rulings apply outside diversity context). But see
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729-30 {1991) (suggesting that federalism concerns ex
plain the rule barring federal review of adequate and independent state grounds in a habeas
proceeding, but that a "somewhat different" principle - the ban of advisory opinions - ex
plains the same rule on direct review).
It is unclear whether the federalism principles invoked in Murdock, Herb, and Long are
those constitutionally mandating state freedom from federal interference - as in New York,
Printz, and Alden - or, instead, are federalism principles that simply counsel the Court, as a
matter of prudence, to decline jurisdiction it may legitimately exercise, like federalism in
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Cf. Althouse, supra note 6, at 246-49 (discussing tlte
differences between post-Lopez "federalism" principles and earlier interpretations, as de
scribed, for example, in Younger v. Harris). But see Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 388 (2002)
{Kennedy, J., dissenting) (asserting that adequate and independent state grounds "de
prives th[e] Court of jurisdiction" on direct review and that that bar "has always been 'about
federalism' " (citing Coleman, 501 U.S. at 726)).
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Second, Murdock held, state-ground reversals violated Article Ill's
rule against advisory opinions:132 the "adequate and independent state
grounds" doctrine was necessary "to prevent a useless and profitless
reversal, which can do the plaintiff in error no good, and can only em
barrass and delay the defendant . . . . "133 As the Court later elaborated:
[O]ur power is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We
are not permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judg
ment would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of
federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an advisory
opinion.134
C.

A Middle Era: Circumscribed Power and the Dilemma of Trust

Even though Murdock
retreating from Martin and Osborn
disclaimed an expansive power to reverse on state grounds, it did not
renounce those reversals altogether. Murdock's adequate and inde
pendent state grounds doctrine simply focused the Court on a more
precise jurisdictional question: when are a state court's state-law deci
sions "adequate" to bar the Court from reaching federal claims or in
terests lurking in the same case?135 From Murdock through at least the
mid-1920's, the Court's attempts to answer that question raised even
more fundamental questions: When can we trust state courts to apply
their own laws without cheating federal interests that may lurk
nearby? How can we know when they don't?
-

-

132. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 1 (federal judicial power extends only to live "cases
or controversies").
. 133. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 635; see also Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U.S. 93, 98-99
(1907) (Holmes, J.) (citing Murdock for the rule that the Court's jurisdiction attaches only
where the state court's decision on a federal question was "necessary to the decision of the
case").
134. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125-26 (1945). Michigan v. Long reaffirmed this rea
soning: the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine stems from the "jurisdictional"
prohibition on advisory opinions. 463 U.S. at 1041-42 (citing Herb v. Pitcairn 324 U.S. 1 17
(1945)); accord Coleman, 501 U.S. at 729-30 (suggesting that, while Article Ill's ban on advi
sory opinions prohibits Court consideration of adequate and independent state grounds on
direct review, federalism and comity concerns provide a "somewhat different" basis for the
rule when applied to prohibit collateral federal review of state-court judgment in habeas
proceedings).
135. I concentrate here on the Court's development of standards to determine whether
an asserted state ground is "adequate" - not whether that ground is "independent" of any
federal ground "and broad enough to sustain the judgment." See, e.g., Enter. Irrigation Dist.
v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917); Beaupre v. Noyes, 138 U.S. 397, 402
(1891) (concluding, given an apparent nonfederal ground for the state court's decision,
"Whether sound or not, we do not inquire. It is broad enough, in itself, to support the final
judgment, without reference to the federal question").
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D o We Trust States o r Suspect Them? A Short History of
Ambivalence

The Constitution's values of state independence and of federal su
premacy have been in tension from the start.136 At the constitutional
convention, the "crucial issue" in integrating national and state gov
ernments was how to resolve "the anticipated rivalry [between
them] . . . short of overt resort to coercion."137 Nationalists proposed
three "mechanisms" to enforce federal law against recalcitrant states:
"the use of coercive force against defiant states . . . ; the negative on
state laws; or the legal prosecution of individuals who violated or in
terfered with national law."138 Proposals for the second of these - a
federal veto on state laws - took two basic forms. Some federal body
(whether its make-up was political, j udicial, or mixed), could review
state laws before they went into effect to ensure their compliance with
federal law.139 Or a federal court could do so afterwards, exercising
136. Professor Fallon has explored how the law of judicial federalism, in general, em
bodies a like conflict between a "federalist" urge - which presumes state courts "to be as
fair and competent as federal courts" - and a "nationalist" urge, which presumes that fed
eral courts will always offer a more competent forum for enforcing federal rights. Richard H.
Fallon, Jr., The Ideologies of Federal Courts Law, 74 VA. L. REV. 1141,1143-45 (1988).
137. RAKOVE, supra note 80, at 171. Professor Rakove has argued that this concern
overshadowed issues about state representation in the federal government, or how the states
would "project" their "political influence" nationally. Id.
138. Id. at 172.
139. Madison persistently advocated a proposal authorizing Congress to veto state laws
"contravening . . . the articles of union, or any treaties subsisting under the authority of the
union," as well as "all Laws which it shd. Judge to be improper." See RAKOVE, supra note
BO, at 81 (quoting from I I RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787' at 27-29 (Max
Farrand ed., rev. ed. 1937) (hereinafter RECORDS]; I RECORDS 245)). Professor Kramer has
argued extensively that Madison's veto proposal formed the prescriptive " 'hinge' " to his
theory, most familiarly developed in Federalist No. 10, that populist state governments un
der the Articles of Confederation demonstrated the worst effects of rampant factionalism,
contributing to the national state of affairs making the constitutional convention - and the
Constitution itself - necessary. Larry D. Kramer, Madison's Audience, 112 HARV. L. REV.
611 , 634-35, 626-27 (1999) (describing Madison's position, in a letter to Thomas Jefferson,
that states' "[e]ncroachments . . . on the general authority, sacrifices of national to local in
terests, interferences of the measures of different States, form a great part of the history of
our political system") (alteration in original); see also id. at 649 (characterizing the national
veto as the "keystone to Madison's plan for the Union, the critical ingredient that made his
whole scheme work"). But see id. at 646-47 (arguing that, while many other delegates shared
Madison's "disenchant[ment) with politics as it was being practiced in the states and thought
that the state governments were irresponsible," they did not share "Madison's insight that
countering the irresponsibility of internal state government might be a proper goal of federal
constitutional reform"). A new federal Congress, in Madison's view, should thus have the
authority to veto state laws " 'in all cases whatsoever' " in order to "screen out those that
were the product of a factious majority." Id. at 634, 649; see also id. at 633, 634-35 (explain
ing Madison's conviction that the very size of national government - that is, the "extended
republic" - would itself "neutraliz(e] the threat of a factious majority" in Congress and thus
place Congress in the best position to police faction's worst effects in states). Professor
Kramer observes, however, that Madison appears to have held these views alone among his
Convention and ratification colleagues. See id. at 649-53 (detailing delegates' opposition to
Madison's proposal for an unlimited national veto; concluding that by mid-summer at the
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what was to become ordinary judicial review.140
The Convention chose the latter, expressing its choice not through
an explicit directive that federal courts monitor state obedience, but
by adopting the supremacy clause.141 Still, loading onto that clause the
heavy work of ensuring state compliance with federal law, the
Convention also necessarily placed supremacy's enforcement squarely
on the courts - both federal and state.142 And it did so even while
some of the Constitution's strongest advocates feared "that the Courts
of the States can not be trusted with the administration of the national
laws."143
Convention, even Madison recognized "that his theory was a flop with the other delegates").
But a more limited proposal, for a national legislative veto on unconstitutional state laws,
had backing until the vote to accord states equal representation in the Senate, after which
the legislative veto was voted down altogether. See RAKOVE, supra note 80, at 80-82.
140. See RAKOVE, supra note 80, at 81-82 This debate fed into the Convention's ongo
ing dispute over whether to create an inferior federal judiciary - "a complete system of na
tional courts" that could effectively police States' compliance with their supremacy clause
obligations - or, instead, to create only the Supreme Court and rely otherwise on existing
state courts. Id. at 172.
141. On the same day the delegates voted down Madison's proposal for a legislative
negative on state laws, they also adopted a "substitute resolution" that made federal statutes
and treaties the "supreme law of the respective states," binding on their judiciaries "any
thing in the respective laws of the individual States to the contrary notwithstanding."
RAKOVE, supra note 80, at 82 (quoting II RECORDS, supra note 139, at 27-29; I RECORDS,
supra note 139, at 245) (noting that the proposal was "ironically presented as a weak meas
ure" after defeat of the more virulent legislative veto); see Kramer, supra note 139, at 652-53
(noting that on August 23rd, even a limited national veto proposal was defeated "by an alli
ance of those who continued to abhor the very idea, those who found the practical objections
telling, and those who believed the addition of the Supremacy Clause eliminated the need
for a negative by putting courts in a position to protect federal interests"); see id. at 653 n.180
(detailing how the proposal for the Supremacy Clause "reduced still further the need for a
legislative veto, placing the primary responsibility for preventing state encroachments on
federal interests in the courts"). The clause was altered by the Committee of Detail and also,
later, by the full Convention to read, as finally adopted:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. See RAKOVE, supra note 80, at 173-74 (recounting the steps be
tween the clause's original language and the final ratified version).
142. Once a supremacy clause was substituted for the legislative negative, "it was evi
dent that the authority of the national government would depend on judicial enforcement."
RAKOVE, supra note 80, at 173. Moreover, "the problem of balancing the respective author
ity of national and state courts came to the fore." Id. And the Supreme Court would have
the last word on that problem: the supremacy clause gave the Supreme Court ultimate
power "to resolve conflicts between national and state laws" through the practice of judicial
review. Id. at 175-76 (quoting, inter alia, James Madison's assertion, in THE FEDERALIST
No. 39, that " 'in controversies relating to the boundary between the two jurisdictions' of
national and state governments, 'the tribunal which is ultimately to decide, is to be estab
lished under the general government' ")
.

143. RAKOVE, supra note 80, at 173 (quoting II RECORDS, supra note 139, at 46). Three
of five Committee of Detail members evidently shared this view, and it influenced their re
writing of the supremacy clause to spell out state judges' obligations more explicitly. See id.;
Collins, supra note 3, at 58-78 (discussing the "shifting" views during the Constitution's
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Alexander Hamilton conveyed the same ambivalence during ratifi
cation. Defending the Constitution's failure to draft state courts exclu
sively to exercise original jurisdiction over Article III cases - the
choice, that is, to permit Congress to create an inferior federal judici
ary - Hamilton in one breath expressed both trust and mistrust of
state courts: while "the fitness and competency of those courts should
be allowed in the utmost latitude," still they could not be counted on.
The most discerning cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local
spirit may be found to disqualify the local tribunals for the jurisdiction of
national causes; whilst every man may discover that courts constituted
like those of some of the states, would be improper channels of the judi
cial authority of the union. State judges, holding their offices during
pleasure, or from year to year, will be too little independent to be relied
upon for an inflexible execution of the national laws.144
And, perhaps much like those in the Convention itself, Hamilton
countered his anxiety by advocating broad Supreme Court review
whenever state courts did decide federal questions:

[I]f there was a necessity for confiding the original cognizance of causes
arising under those [national] laws to [state courts] there would be a cor
respondent necessity for leaving the door of appeal as wide as possible.
In proportion to the grounds of confidence in, or diffidence of the subor
dinate tribunals, ought to be the facility or difficulty of appeals.145
2.

Ambivalence and the Court

This same tension between federal-law supremacy and state
autonomy - this built-in ambivalence between trusting and suspect
ing states - has infused the Court's attitude towards state courts. In
1816's Martin v. Hunter's Lessee,146 for example, the Court declared
confidently that it should and did have jurisdiction to review state
court decisions on state-law questions whose resolution determined
whether a federal question had to be reached or not, because other
wise the Supreme Court's power to review federal questions "may be
evaded at pleasure" by a calculating state court.147 But, in 182l's
framing, ratification, and early implementation by Congress, about state courts' competence
to decide federal-law claims). See generally Kramer, supra note 139, at 649 (noting that
Madison advocated an unlimited national veto on state laws "because otherwise '[e]vasions
might and would be devised by the ingenuity of the Legislatures' " attempting to encroach
on federal prerogatives (quoting Madison's notes, Aug. 28, 1787) (alteration in original)).
144. THE FEDERALIST
1961).

No. 81, at 546-47 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,

145. Id. at 547.
146. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
147. Id. at 357. Hamilton, by contrast, suggested that granting state courts concurrent
jurisdiction over Article III questions without federal appellate review would tempt parties
to evade the federal judicial power. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at 556 (Alexander Hamilton)
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Cohens v. Virginia,148 Chief Justice Marshall expressed both mistrust
and trust of states in the same opinion. While claiming to "[d]ismis[s]
the unpleasant suggestion, that any motives which may not be fairly
avowed, or which ought not to exist, can ever influence a State or its
courts,"149 Marshall nonetheless catalogued a history of state resis
tance to federal law - resistance both extreme and subtle - that
compelled Supreme Court review of state-court decisions.150
Moreover, presaging the modern debate over state and federal court
"parity,"151 Marshall warned:
States may legislate in conformity to their opinions . . . . It would be haz
arding too much to assert, that the judicatures of the States will be ex
empt from the prejudices by which the legislatures and people are influ
enced, and will constitute perfectly impartial tribunals. In many States
the judges are dependent for office and for salary on the will of the leg
islature . . . . When we observe the importance which . . . [the fe deral]
constitution attaches to the independence of judges, we are the less in
clined to suppose that it can have intended to leave these constitutional
questions to tribunals where this independence may not exist . . . .152
But in 1875's Murdock v. City of Memphis,153 the Court refused to
"impl[y) a mistrust of [state courts'] integrity or of their ability to con
strue those [state] laws correctly."154 And as for the fe ar that state
courts would deliberately read state law to avoid enforcing what the
Supreme Court declared to be federal law, Murdock declared that in
appropriate:
It is not to be presumed that the State courts, where the rule is clearly
laid down to them on the Federal question, and its influence on the case
fully seen, will disregard or over look it, and this is all that the rights of
the party claiming under it require.155
(Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (worrying that "every plaintiff or prosecutor" could evade fed
eral authority "at [their] pleasure" absent federal appellate review).
148. 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
149. Id. at 416.
150. Id. at 386-87. Absent federal judicial control, the federal government and its laws
would be "prostrate(d] . . . at the feet of every State in the Union. . . . Each member will pos
sess a veto on the will of the whole." Id. at 385.
151. See generally Fallon, supra note 136 (discussing the constant conflict, in debates
over judicial federalism, about whether to presume state courts are as competent or less
competent than federal courts to enforce federal law properly); Neubome, supra note 6
(expounding the classic argument that lack of institutional protections like life tenure makes
state courts presumptively inferior in enforcing federal law); Wells, supra note 6 (same).
152. Cohens, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) at 386-87.
153. 87 U.S. {20 Wall.) 590 (1875).
154. Id. at 626.
155. Id. at 632. Accordingly, Murdock refused to accept the argument - a variant of
that state-court inferior
which the Court had adopted in Osborn v. Bank of United States
ity required federal review of all questions, even nonfederal ones, arising in a case alongside
federal questions. Murdock concluded that Supreme Court control of the federal questions
-

Suspecting the States

October 2002)

3.

119

Ambivalence and the Adequacy of State Grounds

When Murdock shifted the Court's focus to the question of
whether state grounds were "adequate" to preclude Court decision of
lurking federal questions, this long-standing tension between trusting
and mistrusting states came to the forefront. And for roughly five dec
ades after Murdock, deciding the "adequacy" of state grounds came to
mean, largely, deciding whether state grounds were genuine or, in
stead, a disingenuous attempt to thwart federal-law interests and then
evade Supreme Court review.
Even before Murdock, the Court claimed the power to evaluate
independently whether a nonfederal ground for a state-court j udg
ment was indeed "adequate."156 Murdock was clear that a state-law
decision could not be reversed simply because erroneous under state
law,157 but then what else could make one "inadequate"?158 In 1 887's
Chapman v. Goodnow's Administrator,159 the Court introduced a stanalone would adequately ensure federal-law's supremacy. Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 63233. But Osborn thought Article III "obviously intended to secure to those who claim rights
under the constitution, laws, or·treaties of the United States, a trial in the federal courts,"
not "restrict[ing] [federal claimants] to the insecure remedy of an appeal upon an insulated
point, after it has received that shape which may be given to it by another tribunal, into
which he is forced against his will." Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738,

822, 822-23 (1824).
156. See Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 635; Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257,
263 (1871). As one post-Murdock Court explained, when evaluating a possible adequate and

independent state ground, "[t]his Court must determine for itself whether the suit really in
volves any Federal question which will entitle it to review the judgment of the state court"
under the jurisdictional statute succeeding Section 25. Newport Light Co. v. Newport, 151
U.S. 527, 536-37 (1894) (rejecting certification by the Chief Justice of Kentucky Court of
Appeals that a federal question existed in the case, and dismissing writ of error for want of
Supreme Court jurisdiction given the presence of adequate and independent state grounds
for state-court decision). The modem Court makes this same point more succinctly: " '[T]he
adequacy of state procedural bars to the assertion of federal questions' . . . is not within the
State's prerogative finally to decide; rather, adequacy 'is itself a federal question.' " Lee v.
Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002) (citing Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965) (al
teration in original)).

157. Murdock authorized a "look into" the record to see whether a state court's nonfed
eral decisions "are sufficient to maintain the judgment of that court," but only to determine
whether the nonfederal grounds were sufficiently broad to support a final judgment:
[T]his examination into the points in the record other than the Federal question is not for
the purpose of determining whether they were correctly or erroneously decided, but to as
certain if any such have been decided, and their sufficiency to maintain the final judgment,
as decided by the State court.
Beyond this we are not at liberty to go, and we can only go this far to prevent the injustice of
reversing a judgment which must in the end be reaffirmed, even in this court, if brought here
again from the State court after it has corrected its error in the matter of Federal law.

Murdock, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 635.
158. See supra note 135 (noting that this Article focuses on the Court's standards to
evaluate state grounds "adequacy," not their "independence" from federal law).
159. 123 U.S. 540 (1887). Professor Hill identified Chapman as the "earliest case in
which the Court expressly asserted its general authority to review the adequacy of a state
ground actually passed upon by a state court.'' Hill, supra note 10, at 954.
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dard: "All we have to consider is, whether [the asserted state-law
ground] was the real ground of decision, and not used to give color
only to a refusal to" give proper res j udicata effect to a prior federal
judgment.160
In the early years of the twentieth century, the Court continued to
intensify the standards for measuring adequacy and began to worry
out loud that state courts could manipulate state law to thwart federal
law yet remain immune from Supreme Court review. In 1904, as the
Court rejected a state court's ruling that a criminal defendant's consti
tutional challenge to the exclusion of blacks from his grand j ury was
defaulted because his two-page motion to quash the indictment was
"prolix" under state law, Justice Holmes declared: "It is a necessary
and well settled rule that the exercise of j urisdiction by this court to
protect constitutional rights cannot be declined when it is plain that
the fair result of a [state-court] decision is to deny the rights."161
160. Chapman, 123 U.S. at 546-47; see also Johnson v. Risk, 137 U.S. 300, 307 (1890)
(asking whether the state-law ruling was "good and valid . sufficient of itself to sustain the
judgment" or if, by contrast, it was "palpably unfounded" and so permitted Supreme Court
review of the federal question also in the case) (quoting Klinger, 80 U.S. (13 Wall) at 257)
(emphasis added). Both Klinger and Johnson, however, endorsed testing the "good[ness]
and valid[ity]" of state grounds to solve a very particular problem: determining appellate
jurisdiction where the state court's judgment left it unclear which, among possible federal
and nonfederal grounds, were the basis for its judgment. Klinger declared:
.

.

[W]here it does not appear on which of the two grounds the judgment was based, then, if the
independent ground on which it might have been based was a good and valid one, sufficient
of itself to sustain the judgment, this court will not assume jurisdiction of the case; but if such
independent ground was not a good and valid one, it will be presumed that the State court
based its judgment on the law raising the Federal question, and this court will then take juris
diction.

Klinger, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 263 (emphasis added). In the face of such uncertainty, the
Johnson Court elaborated, "when put to inference as to what points the state court decided,
we ought not to assume that it proceeded on grounds clearly untenable." Johnson, 137 U.S.

at 307. But where the state court's grounds for decision were clear, "we should not, in order
to reach a federal questions, resort to critical conjecture as to the action of the court in the
disposition of such defence." Id. (asking whether state-law statute of limitations grounds for
dismissal was "so palpably unfounded that we must presume that the state court overruled
it?"); see also Klinger, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) at 263 (holding that where the record shows that
the state court "did, in fact, base its judgment on such independent ground, and not on the
law raising the Federal question, this court will not take jurisdiction of the case, even though
it might think the position of the State court an unsound one"). The Court soon applied the
"good and valid" and "palpably unfounded" tests even where the state court clearly had
based its decision on nonfederal grounds, thus converting standards first announced to solve
the particular problem of uncertainty - by assuming the state court would not have decided
on "invalid" or "unfounded" grounds - into general standards for judging every asserted
adequate state ground. See, e.g. , Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U.S. 93, 99 (1907) (Holmes, J.).

161. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 230 (1904) (Holmes, J.) (emphasis added). In
1907, Justice Holmes, speaking hypothetically, added that state courts might also try to
evade Supreme Court review by taking advantage of the fact that, at the time, the Court's
statutory appellate jurisdiction extended only to those state-court judgments deciding fed
eral questions against federal claimants. "It may be imagined, for the sake of argument, that
it might appear that a state court, even if ostensibly deciding the Federal question in favor of
the plaintiff in error, really must have been against him upon it, and was seeking to evade
the jurisdiction of this court." Leathe, 207 U.S. at 99. See § 709 Revised Statutes (1874) (re-
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But the Court soon expressed a more pervasive mistrust, and it
added an additional standard for measuring a state ground's adequacy:
"A case may arise in which it is apparent that a Federal question is
sought to be avoided or is avoided by giving an unreasonable construc
tion" to state law in applying it on a particular record; therefore, the
Court must ask whether anything "justif[ies] a suspicion that there was
any intent to avoid the Federal questions."162 By 1917, moreover, the
Court had expanded its "adequacy" review even further, holding:
our jurisdiction is plain where the non-federal ground is so certainly un
founded that it properly may be regarded as essentially arbitrary or a
mere device to prevent a review of the decision upon the federal ques
tion.[163] But, where the non-federal ground has fair support, we are not
at liberty to inquire whether it is right or wrong, but must accept it, as we
do other state decisions of non-federal questions.1 64
Even as the Court intensified its standards for testing a state
ground's "adequacy" - making it theoretically harder to avoid the
Court's appellate jurisdiction - it at first applied those heightened
standards in ways that, while varying among cases, nonetheless tended
to find state grounds adequate after all.165 Sometimes, the Court tested
the state court's asserted "good and valid reason" for its state-law deenacting section 25 of the First Judiciary Act, 1 Stat. 73, 95-87 (1789)); see also The Judiciary
Act of 1914, Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790 (authorizing the Court to review state
court rulings upholding a claim of federal right for the first time).
Justice Holmes cited no precedent for his hypothetical worry in Leathe; he did follow it
immediately with Johnson v. Risk 's observation that, given uncertainty over which grounds
the state court decided, the Supreme Court would presume it had decided the federal ques
tion to avoid the conclusion that it had rested on "palpably unfounded" state grounds.
Leathe, 207 U.S. at 99 (citing Johnson, 137 U.S. at 307). Justice Holmes was, of course, not
the first to worry that states could cheat under the adequate and independent grounds doc
trine. In 1887's Chapman decision, the Court noted:
We are aware that a right or immunity set up or claimed under the Constitution or laws of
the United States may be denied as well by evading a direct decision thereon as by positive
action. If a Federal question is fairly presented by the record, and its decision is actually nec
essary to the determination of the case, a judgment which rejects the claim, but avoids all
reference to it, is as much against the right, within the meaning of [the statutory grant], as if
it had been specifically referred to and the right directly refused.
Chapman v. Goodnow's Adm'r, 123 U.S. 540, 548 (1887).
162. Vandalia R.R. Co. v. Indiana ex rel. South Bend, 207 U.S. 359, 367 (1907) (empha
sis added); see also Terra Haute & Indianapolis R.R. Co. v. Indiana, 194 U.S. 579, 589 (1904)
(Holmes, J.) (holding that the Court may not "decline jurisdiction of a case . . . because the
state court put forward [an] . . . untenable construction" of state law to avoid constitutional
challenge and that "[t]o hold otherwise would open an easy method of avoiding the jurisdic
tion of this court").
163. Enter. Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917) (citing

Leathe, 207 U.S. at 99, and Vandalia R.R., 207 U.S. at 367) (emphasis added).

164. Enter. Irrigation, 243 U.S. at 164 (citing, inter alia, Leathe, 207 U.S. at 99; Eustis v.
Bolles, 150 U.S. 361, 369 (1893); and Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635
(1875)) (emphasis added).
165. But cf. Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226 (1904) (discussed supra note 161 and ac
companying text).
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cision simply by performing a quick, common-sense review of the facts
and law on record.166 In others, the Court conducted some independ
ent review of the applicable state law.167 In several others, the Court
directly broached the question of how to identify a cheating state
court, suggesting that suspicion might properly arise where a state
court itself - not a party - introduced the dispositive nonfederal ar
guments.168
But three cases, decided between 1918 and 1923, suggest a hard
ening of the Court's suspicion against state courts, and a shortening of
the Court's patience with claims that state grounds were "adequate"
to preclude Supreme Court review. These are Union Pacific Railroad
v. Public Service Commission,169 Ward v. Love County,170 and Davis v.
Wechsler.171 I discuss each in turn.
a. Union Pacific Railroad v. Public Service Commission. 172 A
Missouri agency, acting under a state statute, charged the Union
Pacific railroad a fee of over $10,000 for permission to issue almost $32
million in bonds secured by the entire Union Pacific system, even

166. See, e.g., Enter. Irrigation, 243 U.S. at 165 (applying the "essentially arbitrary" or
"without fair support" standard, the Court recited record facts and then concluded, essen
tially without further analysis, that the nonfederal estoppel decision "cannot be said . . . [to
be] without fair support or so unfounded as to be essentially arbitrary or merely a device to
prevent a review of the other ground of the judgment); see also Vandalia R.R. Co., 2fJ7 U.S.
at 366-67 (applying the "unreasonableness" standard, the Court reproduced the state court's
reasoning on a nonfederal question, then declared, essentially without further comment, that
the state court's decision was "a reasonable one" not "justify[ing] a suspicion that there was
any intent to avoid the Federal questions"); Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 253, 263
(1871) (applying the "good and valid" standard, the Court decided - without citing any
precedent at all - that the state court "could well have" found a juror unfit for a criminal
trial because of his continued statements of loyalty to the Confederacy, and not because of
his refusal to take an unconstitutional state test oath as a condition of jury service, and that
this decision was "in the discretion of the [state] court, if not its duty"). But see Abie State
Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1931) (refusing to accept nonfederal estoppel grounds
as effectively denying Court review of a federal takings claim).
167. See, e.g., Johnson v. Risk, 1 37 U.S. 300, 308-09 (1890) (applying the "good and
valid" standard, reviewing Tennessee law on nonfederal statute of limitations as applied to a
claim against a deceased's estate - noting one Massachusetts state decision and two U.S.
Supreme Court decisions - and concluding that the Tennessee supreme court "would [not]
have been erroneous" had it rested its decision on those nonfederal grounds).
168. See Enter. Irrigation, 243 U.S. at 165 (applying the "essentially arbitrary or mere . . .
device" standard, and asking whether state grounds had "fair support," the Court empha
sized that "the [nonfederal) question did not originate with the (state) court. It was pre
sented by the pleadings, was in the minds of the parties . . . and was dealt with by counsel
and court as a matter of obvious importance"); see also Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U.S. 93, 99100 (1907) (applying the "palpably unfounded" standard, the Court emphasized that non
federal grounds "were on the record and at issue. The plaintiff had notice that the defendant
meant to prevail on whatever ground he could").
169. 248 U.S. 67 (1918).
170. 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
171. 263 U.S. 22 (1923) (Holmes, J.).
172. 248 U.S. 67 (1918).
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though only a fraction of the railroad's line ran through the state and
even though the railroad did no intrastate business in Missouri.173
Union Pacific paid the fee under protest, then challenged the agency's
decision, arguing, inter alia, that the state statute authorizing the fee
interfered with interstate commerce in violation of the Constitution's
Article 1.174 The Missouri supreme court held that Union Pacific had
voluntarily applied to the agency for permission to issue the bonds,
and was therefore estopped from challenging the fee charged in re
tum.11s
In the Supreme Court, the state agency argued the estoppel ruling
constituted an adequate nonfederal ground for the j udgment against
the railroad, denying the Court j urisdiction to reach the railroad's
commerce clause claim. The Court, speaking through Justice Holmes,
disagreed: "[IJt is the duty of this Court to examine for itself whether
there is any basis in the admitted facts, or in the evidence when the
facts are in dispute, for a finding that the federal right has been
waived."176 And without specifying any standard for j udging the "ade
quacy" of the Missouri high court's ruling, Justice Holmes declared
that Union Pacific had had no choice but to apply for the state bond
permit, given the dire commercial consequences for refusing. Citing
only Supreme Court precedent,177 Holmes concluded, on the merits,
that that kind of compulsion constituted duress and so could not estop
the railroad's later constitutional challenge.178
173. Id. at 68-69. The statute set the fee for such permission at a fixed percentage of the
total bond issue, regardless of the issuer's actual presence - of lack of intrastate business in the state. Id. at 69.
174. Id. at 68. Union Pacific also argued that the fee was "bad under the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 69.
175. Id. at 69; see Union Pacific R.R. v. Public Service Comm'n, 187 S.W. 827 (Mo.
1916).
176. Union Pacific, 248 U.S. at 69-70. For this, Justice Holmes cited Creswill v. Knights
ofPythias, 225 U.S. 246 (1912), in which the Court held - with Holmes dissenting - that no
adequate state ground existed where the Georgia supreme court had rejected a federal-law
defense notwithstanding defendant's claim of plaintiffs )aches. The Knights of Pythias ma
jority reviewed what it considered the undisputed factual record and concluded, contrary to
the Georgia court, that they "leave no room for any other but the legal conclusion of !aches"
by plaintiff, thus precluding equitable relief against defendant. Id. at 262. But Justice
Holmes, in dissent, argued that the Court lacked appellate jurisdiction: "When a Federal
right is held by a state court to have been lost by subsequent conduct that of itself involves
no Federal question I think we are not at liberty to reexalnine the decision unless we can say
that the state court in substance is denying the right." Id. at 263 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (cit
ing cases dismissing writ for lack of jurisdiction where state judgment rested on res judicata,
estoppel, statute of limitations, and !aches) (emphasis added). In Union Pacific, Justice
Holmes cited the Knights of Pythias majority, not his own dissent; he did not specify what in
the railroad's case made him conclude that Georgia had "in substance" denied the railroad's
commerce clause rights.

177. Union Pacific, 248 U.S. at 70.
178. Id. at 70. Union Pacific is often cited as authority for an especially searching review
of assertedly adequate state grounds wherever claims to vindicate federal rights are at stake.
Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1068-69 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (arguing

See, e.g., Michigan v.
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that the Court's "primary role" in reviewing state-court judgments "is to make sure that per
sons who seek to vindicate federal rights have been fairly heard"); see also infra notes 181230 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's hardening of suspicion against states in
Ward v. Love County and Davis v. Wechsler). But Union Pacific has also been cited, on the
merits, for Holmes's substantive definition of "duress" in both constitutional and commer
cial contexts. See, e.g., Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582, 600 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., dis
senting) (voluntariness in the Fourth Amendment context); United States v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 327 (1942) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (commercial duress). A
pre-Erie case, Union Pacific might be understood as tacitly adopting a federal common-law
rule to decide what conduct constitutes waiver of a federal right. Cf. Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (adopting federal common-law rule to determine what
constitutes laches by the United States precluding action to recover for mishandled commer
cial paper). Remember, in earlier cases, the Court had often been content to permit state
courts to decide under state law what constituted waiver or estoppel even where federal
rights were at stake. See, e.g., Enter. Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157
(1917) (estoppel precluded due process challenge); Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361 (1893)
(waiver precluded contract clause challenge); see also Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. at 263-64
(Holmes, J., dissenting) (citing cases in which a state court's estoppel or waiver rulings pre
cluded Supreme Court decision on federal question, absent indication that the state court "in
substance [was] denying the right"). In Union Pacific and after, however, the Court took a
tougher stance. See, e.g., Abie State Bank v. Bryan, 282 U.S. 765, 776-77 (1931) (holding the
Nebraska Supreme Court's finding of estoppel inadequate to preclude Supreme Court deci
sion on a federal takings challenge to a state bank regulation); id. at 776 (citing Union Pacific
for the rule that a decision made "according to interest" in avoiding negative commercial
consequences "does not exclude duress").
All the same, in 1925 the Court explicitly freed states to deem a federal claim waived if
not raised in compliance with state appellate procedure rules, so long as they complied with
the basic due process standards of "giv[ing] . . . the litigant a reasonable opportunity" to
have the federal claim heard and decided on appeal. Central Union Tel. Co. v. City of
Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 194-95 (1925) (Taft, C.J.) (refusing jurisdiction where a claimant
first appealed contract-clause and due process challenges against state tax from an Illinois
trial court to an intermediate appellate court lacking jurisdiction to hear constitutional
claims, instead of straight to the Illinois supreme court, as required under state law). Citing
Union Pacific, among other precedents, the Court declared:
[T)here is nothing in these cases which justifies this Court in ignoring or setting aside a re
quired form of practice under the appellate statutes of the State by which federal constitu
tional rights, as well as state constitutional rights, may be asserted in the Supreme Court of
the State or be held to be waived . . . .

Id. at 194 (citing also Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 (1923), discussed infra notes 204-230
and accompanying text). But see Hill, supra note 10, at 951 n.25 (distinguishing intentional
waiver from constructive waiver, and asserting, without elaborating, that "a decision of a

state court on intentional waiver of a federal right can hardly be deemed to rest on an inde
pendent state ground" (adding "cf." cite to Carnley v. Cochran, 369 U.S. 506, 513-17 (1962),
which holds, on federal habeas corpus grounds, that the state court should not have inferred
waiver of the right to counsel from a record that did not disclose whether the defendant had
been apprised of that right and waived it knowingly)). Adding to the difficulty in making
sense of the Court's various positions, over time, on whether and when state-court "waiver"
decisions constitute "adequate and independent state grounds" is that waiver, like estoppel,
will often tum on state-court findings of fact, which the Court ordinarily - but not always refuses to review. As Professor Hill explains:
[t]he Supreme Court avoids resolution of conflicts in evidence. Nevertheless, it does not
yield to the states absolute power to defeat federal rights by allowing them, in these circum
stances, the final word as to the inferences, even of the 'factual' type, which may be drawn
from undisputed facts or from the underlying facts as found after resolution of evidenliary
conflict.
Hill, supra note 10, at 951 (citing, inter alia, Knights ofPythias, 225 U.S. at 261 ).
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But Justice Holmes also stressed that the Supreme Court had al
ready declared state statutes like Missouri's to constitute "unlawful in
terference with commerce among the States."179 And even though that
was after the Missouri court issued its own Union Pacific j udgment,180
Justice Holmes left the strong impression that the Court was, at bot
tom, determined to enforce its new constitutional rule against every
state imposing financial burdens on interstate rail commerce, notwith
standing the Missouri court's use of state estoppel grounds to deny the
railroad its constitutional win in this case.
b. Ward v. Love County.181 The Court's determination to enforce a
particular constitutional ruling against a possibly evasive state was
more pronounced in this 1920 decision. In 1912, the Court had ruled
that due process required certain Choctaw-held property to be free
from Oklahoma state taxation, reversing three Oklahoma supreme
court rulings to the contrary.182 While that litigation was pending, tax
officials of Love County, Oklahoma, demanded payments from
Choctaw property holders, threatening to sell their land and impose an
eighteen percent penalty if they refused. They paid, under protest, and
then filed suit in state court against the Love County commissioners,
seeking a refund on the grounds, again, that the tax was unconstitu
tional.183
The Oklahoma Supreme Court dismissed the Choctaw claim.184
Even though the United States Supreme Court had by then already
upheld the same due process claim,185 the state court decided the
claimants had paid the tax "voluntarily"; and because state law recog
nized no cause of action for refunding voluntarily paid taxes, the re
fund claim could not proceed.186 In the United States Supreme Court,

179. See Union Pacific, 248 U.S. at 69 (citing Int'l Paper Co. v. Massachusetts, 246 U.S.
135 (1918), and Looney v. Crane, 245 U.S. 178, 188 (1917)).
180. See Union Pacific R.R. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 187 S.W. 827 (Mo. 1916).
181. 253 U.S. 17 (1920).
182. Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 (1912); English v. Richardson, 224 U.S. 680 (1912);
Gleason v. Wood, 224 U.S. 679 (1912); see also Love County, 253 U.S. at 20. The Supreme
Court held that an 1898 Act of Congress, which granted land allotments to members of the
Choctaw tribe free from state taxation for twenty-one years, created a vested property right
in those landholders which the Fifth Amendment protected from subsequent congressional
efforts to repeal the tax exemption before twenty-one years had passed. Id.
183. Love County, 253 U.S. at 20.
184. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Love County v. Ward, 173 P. 1050 (Okla. 1918).
185. See Love County, 253 U.S. at 20 (discussing cases).
186. Id. at 21 . The Oklahoma court also ruled that no state law made the County liable
for taxes collected and then paid over to the state and to other municipal bodies, as the
Commissioners claimed to have done. Id.
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Love County argued that this ruling provided an adequate nonfederal
ground for the state court's judgment against the Choctaw claimants,
precluding Supreme Court review.187
The Supreme Court disagreed.
The right to the [tax] exemption was a federal right . . . . Whether the
right was denied, or not given due recognition, by the Supreme Court is a
question as to which the claimants were entitled to invoke our judg
ment . . . . It therefore is within our province to inquire not only whether
the right was denied in express terms, but also whether it was denied in
substance and effect, as by putting forward non-federal grounds of deci
sion that were without any fair or substantial support. Of course, if non

federal grounds, plainly untenable, may be thus put forward successfully,
our power to review easily may be avoided.188

Here, in other words, was exactly the kind of state defiance its appel
late jurisdiction was intended to police, a jurisdiction "conferred by
law and designed to protect and maintain the supremacy of the
Constitution and the laws made in pursuance thereof."189 To the
Court,190 the County's threats to sell the Choctaw land and impose
heavy penalties meant the claimants "plain[ly]" had paid the tax in
voluntarily, stripping "any fair or substantial support" from the
Oklahoma court's contrary ruling.191 Accordingly, the Court asserted
jurisdiction and reversed.192
Love County's sharp tone broadcasts the Court's irritation that
Oklahoma retained these taxes even after the Court had declared
187. Id.
188. Love County, 253 U.S. at 22 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added) (citing,
inter alia, Union Pacific R.R. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918); Enter. Irrigation
Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917); Creswell v. Knights of Pythias,
225 U.S. 246, 261 (1912); Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U.S. 93 (1907); Vandalia R.R. Co. v.
Indiana ex rel. South Bend, 207 U.S. 359 (1907)); see also Cent. Union Tel. Co. v. City of
Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 195 (1925) (holding that the Court may not second-guess the
Illinois supreme court's interpretation of a state waiver-of-claim rule to forfeit federal consti
tutional rights, unless the state court's interpretation was "so unfair or unreasonable in its
application to those asserting a federal right as to obstruct it").
189. Love County, 253 U.S. at 23. This language echoes Justice Story's vehemently na
tionalist reading of Article Ill in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat) 304, 338-52
{1816). See supra notes 105-109 and accompanying text.
190. Love County, 253 U.S. at 23. The Court cited only Supreme Court precedents. See,
e.g., Union Pacific, 248 U.S. 67 (rejecting a state court's view of what constitutes waiver of a

constitutional claim).

191. Love County, 253 U.S. at 23. The Court then declared - in Love County's more
famous ruling - that due process requires a state to provide a remedy for refund of unlawful
taxes where involuntarily paid. Id. at 24 (holding that the County could not avoid paying the
refund by claiming to have paid some of the collected taxes over to the state itself); see also
Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106 (1994); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages and
Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 33-34 (1990); First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of
Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304 (1987). But see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999) (sug
gesting the Court is qualifying constitutional remedial requirement).
192. Love County, 253 U.S. at 25.
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them unconstitutional193 on the merits.194 But the Oklahoma court,
ruling that the claimants had paid the tax "voluntarily" and so could
not pursue a state-law refund action, had cited numerous precedents
- including U.S. Supreme Court cases - which distinguished taxes
paid involuntarily (a common-law term-of-art) from taxes simply paid
under protest, for which no refund was available.195 That was a techni
cal, perhaps counter-intuitive distinction, but it had a genuine footing
in the common law of Oklahoma and other states as well, as the
Supreme Court itself had earlier acknowledged.196 More to the point, it
193. The Court stressed that Oklahoma officials, including its supreme court, continued
to demand and then to hold the Choctaw claimants' taxes, paid under protest, for six years
after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled those taxes unconstitutional.
[I)t is certain that the lands were nontaxable. This was settled in Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S.
665 (1912), and the other cases decided with it; and it also was settled in those cases that the
exemption was a vested property right arising out of a law of Congress and protected by the
Constitution of the United States. This being so, the State and all its agencies and political
subdivisions were bound to give effect to the exemption. It operated as a direct restraint on
Love County, no matter what was said in local statutes. The county did not respect it, but, on
the contrary, assessed the lands allotted to the claimants, placed them on the county tax roll,
and there charged them with taxes like other property.
Love County, 253 U.S. at 21-22. The Oklahoma supreme court issued its ruling against the
Choctaw in 1918. Bd. of County Comm'rs of Love County v. Ward, 173 P. 1050 (Okla. 1918).
194. The Court also suggested, rather obliquely, that the status of these claimants should
have made the state court more sympathetic to their claims. See Love County, 253 U.S. at 23:
The claimants were Indians just emerging from a state of dependency and wardship.
Through the pending suits and otherwise they were objecting and protesting that the taxa
tion of their lands was forbidden by a law of Congress. But, notwithstanding this, the county
demanded that the taxes be paid, and by threatening to sell the lands of these claimants and
actually selling other lands similarly situated made it appear to the claimants that they must
choose between paying the taxes and losing their lands . : . . The moneys thus collected were
obtained by coercive means - by compulsion. The county and its officers reasonably could
not have regarded it otherwise; much less the Indian claimants.
195. See Bd. of County Comm'rs of Love County, 173 P. at 1051-52. The Oklahoma
Supreme Court quoted an 1878 United States Supreme Court ruling:
Where a party pays an illegal demand with a full knowledge of all the facts which render
such demand illegal, without an immediate and urgent necessity therefor, or unless to re
lease his person or property from detention, or to prevent an immediate seizure of his per
son or property, such payment must be deemed voluntary, and cannot be recovered back.
And the fact that the party at the time of making the payment files a written protest does not
make the payment involuntary. . . . This, as we understand it, is a correct statement of the
rule of the common law.
Id. at 1052 (quoting Union Pacific R.R. Co. v. Dodge County Comm'rs, 98 U.S. 541, 544
(1878) (quoting Wabaunsee County v. Walker, 8 Kan. 431 (1871)) and citing Lamborn v.
Dickinson County Com'rs, 97 U.S. 181 (1877)). In Love County, however, the Supreme
Court dismissed these precedents, and others like it, stating summarily, "[T]hose cases are
quite distinguishable in their facts and some of the general observations therein . . . must be
taken as modified by the later cases" on which the Love County Supreme Court relied to
reverse the Oklahoma judgment, including Union Pacific. See Love County, 253 U.S. at 2324. This hardly amounts to a finding that the Oklahoma supreme court's reading and appli
cation of that precedent was "plainly untenable." Id. at 22.
196. See supra note 195 (quoting the Supreme Court's 1878 Dodge County ruling
adopting the common law's distinction of what was involuntary, as a legal matter, from what
was merely done under protest). Interestingly, the Supreme Court claimed to have followed
that common-law distinction in the Lamborn case because it was there compelled to follow
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was not necessarily a fiction the Oklahoma court fabricated to thwart
these claimants' federally-protected tax exemption and then evade
Supreme Court review.197 Thus, while the Oklahoma court's applica
tion of the voluntary payment case law might have been erroneous
and, indeed, while it might have been invidious198 - the Court's cri
tique does not prove it "plainly untenable" and "without any fair or
substantial support,"199 making it inadequate to support the state
judgment and preclude Supreme Court review.
Perhaps the best explanation for Love County is that the Supreme
Court suspected the Oklahoma court had unearthed an old common
Kansas law on that question. See Dodge County, 98 U.S. at 543. Similar to Union Pacific, see
supra note 178, this does raise the question of whether Love County should be read less as a
jurisdictional ruling than as a kind of federal common-law ruling declaring what constitutes a
"voluntary" payment of allegedly unconstitutional taxes, precluding later refund claims
raising that federal-law argument.
197. Professor Hill offered three ways to look at the Love County outcome. See Hill,
supra note 10, at 950 n.25. First, the Oklahoma court appears to have rested on a "theory of
constructive waiver," holding that property owners are "presumed to know the law, and ac
cordingly cannot be coerced by an illegal tax; this is so even where the law provides penalties
for nonpayment, since the penalties fall with the tax." Id. at 951 n.25. Professor Hill sug
gested that this ruling might have supplied an adequate state ground for the Oklahoma su
preme court judgment, insofar as "the payment of the tax, except in special circumstances
not present, constitute[d) a forfeiture of objections to the tax, irrespective of actual intent."
Id. {distinguishing ruling from one finding intentional waiver of the federal due process
claim, and asserting that a state court's decision of "intentional waiver of a federal right can
hardly be deemed to rest on an independent state ground"). Second, the Oklahoma court
might have meant that the claimants had failed to exhaust their state remedies for challeng
ing the tax without paying it, which could have included litigation against one who bought
the property at the tax sale threatened by the Love County tax officials, a state-law ground
adequate to support the judgment so long as the remedies were deemed constitutionally suf
ficient. Id. (suggesting that the Supreme Court ruling reflected the view that Oklahoma's
post-deprivation remedies were inadequate). Third, because the Oklahoma supreme court
had relied on federal precedents in reaching its conclusion that the Choctaw had waived
their federal claims, one could argue that that court's waiver judgment was not "independ
ent" of federal law, and therefore appropriate for Supreme Court review. Id; see also infra
note 269 (discussing the distinction between the twin requirements that state-law grounds be
both "adequate" and "independent" to preclude Supreme Court review); supra note 178
(discussing the problem of how to characterize state-court "waiver" decisions in assessing
whether they constitute "adequate and independent state grounds").
198. See infra notes 200-203 and accompanying text (discussing possible impact on Love
County Court of states' historical animosity towards Indian tribes).
199. See Love County, 253 U.S. at 22 {adopting the "plainly untenable" and "without
any fair or substantial support" standard for disregarding an asserted adequate state
ground); supra text accompanying note 188 (quoting language adopting the standard). Only
three years before, the Court had insisted its jurisdiction was "plain":
where the non-federal ground is so certainly unfounded that it properly may be regarded as
essentially arbitrary or a mere device to prevent a review of the decision upon the federal
question. But, where the non-federal ground has fair support, we are not at liberty to inquire
whether it is right or wrong, but must accept it, as we do other state decisions of non-federal
questions.
Enter. Irrigation Dist. v. Farmers Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917) (emphasis added)
(citing, inter alia, Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U.S. 93 (1907); Vandalia R.R. Co. v. Indiana ex rel.
South Bend, 207 U.S. 359 (1907); Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361 (1893); and Murdock v.
Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1875)).
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law trick just to deny the Choctaw their new federal due process
rights.200 Certainly, the history of state animosity towards Indian Tribes
justified misgivings.201 But the Love County Court did not admit any
such suspicion, nor did it identify anything in or outside the record to
suggest that the state court's ruling masked an improper prejudice.202
Thus, as a jurisdictional precedent, Love County perhaps forfeited its
most compelling reason for declaring the Oklahoma court's j udgment
inadequate to preclude Supreme Court review: outright state-court
misconduct.203
c. Davis v. Wechsler.204 In this 1923 decision - one of the most fre
quently cited authorities permitting state-ground reversals205 - the
Court gave even less reason for reversing a Missouri state-court j udg
ment upholding a $5000 jury verdict in favor of a passenger injured in
a derailment on the Chicago Great Western Railroad.206 At the time of
the accident, in 1920, the Great Western was operating under the con
trol of a federal Director General of Railroads pursuant to the Federal
Control Act of 1918, under which the Wilson Administration had
taken over railroads, like the Great Western, involved in transporting

200. See Rogers v. Alabama, 192 U.S. 226, 230 (1904) (Holmes, J.) (holding that the
Court's jurisdiction to protect constitutional rights "cannot be declined when it is plain that
the fair result of a [state-court] decision is to deny the rights"); see also supra note 27 and
accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg's assertion, dissenting in Bush v. Gore, 531
U.S. 98 (2000) , that "historical contexts" best explain cases where the Court rejected a state
court's interpretation of state law).
201. See generally RUSSELL LAWRENCE BARSH & JAMES YOUNGBLOOD HENDERSON,
THE ROAD: INDIAN TRIBES AND POLITICAL LIBERTY (1980); ANGIE DEBO, THE RISE AND
FALL OF THE CHOCTAW REPUBLIC 245-68 (2d ed. 1961); CHARLES F. WILKINSON,
AMERICAN INDIANS, TIME, AND THE LAW: NATIVE SOCIETIES IN A MODERN
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1987). For a recent case demonstrating the continued ten
sions between Indian Tribes and the states surrounding them, see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S.
353 (2001) (holding that Tribes may not regulate, nor tribal courts adjudicate, claims arising
from state officials' entry onto tribal land to enforce the state's criminal laws against a tribe
member).

202. The closest the Court came was to observe that the Choctaw "claimants were
Indians just emerging from a state of dependency and wardship." Love County, 253 U.S. at
23. But cf. cases discussed supra note 168 and accompanying text (where the Court identified
factors that might indicate a state court had manipulated state law to disadvantage federal
interests).
203. Love County's silence about its special historical context may fit within a larger
tendency in traditional "federal courts' jurisprudence" to ignore the particular "problems of
the relationship between Indian tribes, the federal government, and the states." Judith
Resnik, Dependent Sovereigns: Indian Tribes, States, and the Federal Courts, 56 U. CHI. L.
REV. 671, 676 (1989).
204. 263 U.S. 22 (1923) (Holmes, J.).
205. See, e.g., Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 376 (2002); see also Hill, supra note 10, at
943-44 (noting Davis's influence).
206. 263 U.S. at 23; see also Wechsler v. Davis, 239 S.W. 554, 555 (1922) (opinion of the
Missouri Court of Appeals). The Missouri supreme court refused to review the case, Davis,
263 U.S. at 24, and so the U.S. Supreme Court reviewed the state court of appeals' judgment.

130

Michigan Law Review

(Vol. 101:80

troops and supplies for the First World War.2(17 The Director General,
in turn, had issued two regulations important to the Davis dispute:
General Order No. 50, which required state-law claims against feder
ally-controlled railroads to be brought against the Director General
instead of the railroad companies208; and General Order No. 18-A,
which established venue rules permitting those lawsuits to be brought
only where the plaintiff resided or where his cause of action arose in Davis, where the derailment occurred.209
207. In 1916, Congress authorized the President, "in time of war" to "take possession
and assume control of any system . . . of transportation . . . and to utilize the same, to the ex
clusion as far as may be necessary of all other traffic thereon, for the transfer or transporta
tion of troops, war material and equipment, or for such other purposes connected with the
emergency as may be needful or desirable." Act of August 29, 1916, ch. 418, 39 Stat. 619,
645. In December 1917, when the United States entered World War I, President Wilson es
tablished a Railroad Administration and authorized its Director General to take over rail
roads as needed for the war effort, severing the railroads "completely" from the control and
management of their civilian owners and managers. See Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Ault,
256 U.S. 554, 557 (1921) (recounting the appointment and role of the Director General of
Railroads). President Wilson's actions were ratified by the Federal Control Act of 1918, ch.
25, 40 Stat. 451. See Ault, 256 U.S. at 557; Alabama & Vicksburg Ry. Co. v. Journey, 257
U.S. 1 1 1 , 112-13 & n.l (1921) (Brandeis, J.) (identifying Act to Provide for the Operation of
Transportation Systems While Under Federal Control (Mar. 21, 191 8)); see also Davis, 263
U.S. at 23.
208. General Order No. 50 provided:
It is . . . ordered, that actions at law, suits in equity, and proceedings in admiralty hereafter
brought in any court based on contract, binding upon the Director General of Railroads,
claim for death or injury to person, or for loss and damage to property, arising since
December 31, 1917, and growing out of the possession, use, control, or operation of any rail
road or system of transportation by the Director General of Railroads, which action, suit, or

proceeding but for Federal control might have been brought against the carrier company, shall
be brought against . . . {the] Director General of Railroads, and not otherwise . . . . The
pleadings in all such actions . . . may on application be amended by substituting the Director
General of Railroads for the carrier company as party defendant and dismissing the com
pany therefrom.

Ault, 256 U.S. at 562 n.1

(quoting General Order No. 50) (emphasis added).

209. General Order No. 18-A, amended, declared: "It is therefore ordered that all suits
against carriers while under Federal control must be brought in the county of district where
the plaintiff resided at the time of the accrual of the cause of action or in the county or dis
trict where the cause of action arose." Alabama & Vicksburg, 257 U.S. at 113 n.l (Brandeis,
J.) (quoting General Order No. 18-A, issued by the Director General of Railroads on April
18, 1918); see id. at 1 1 3 (rejecting the Mississippi supreme court's challenge to Order 18
made on grounds that it "exceeded the powers conferred by Congress on the President and
by him on the Director General"); see also Wechsler v. Davis, 239 S.W. 554, 556 (1922) (sug
gesting plaintiff's cause of action accrued at site of derailment). General Order No. 18-A
explained the reason for this venue rule:
[I)t appears that suits against the carriers for personal injuries, freight and damage claims,
are being brought in States and jurisdictions far remote from the place where plaintiffs re
side or where the cause of action arose, the effect thereof being that men operating the
trains engaged in hauling war materials, troops, munitions or supplies, are required to leave
their trains and attend court as witnesses and travel sometimes for hundreds of miles from
their work, necessitating absence from their trains for days and sometimes for a week or
more; which practice is highly prejudicial to the just interests of the government and seri
ously interferes with the physical operation of the railroads; and the practice of suing in re
mote jurisdictions is not necessary for the protection of the rights or the just interests of
plaintiffs.
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The injured plaintiff properly sued the Director General, who
made three arguments in response: that the plaintiff had filed in the
wrong venue under General Order 18-A,210 that the court lacked per
sonal jurisdiction over the Director General,211 and that the plaintiff
could not prevail on the merits.212 Before trial, however, the first
named Director General resigned; his successor entered a notice of
appearance and then "adopted the [first Director's] answer."213 After
trial, a third Director General was substituted and entered his appear
ance in open court.214
The problem in Davis stemmed from these party substitutions. The
Missouri court ruled under state law that, although the first Director
General had properly preserved challenges to jurisdiction and venue
while also raising a merits defense, the second and third defendants
had waived their own jurisdiction and venue objections by making

Alabama & Vicksburg, 257 U.S. at 113 n.l (quoting General Order No. 18-A, issued by

Director General of Railroads on April 9, 1918). In February of 1920 - two months after
the Davis plaintiff was injured - Congress enacted The Transportation Act, which required
all railroads to be released from federal control. Wechsler v. Davis, 239 S.W. 554, 574 (1922).
The Davis Court declared the 1920 Transportation Act to have no effect on the issues in this
case. Davis, 263 U.S. at 25.

210. There is some confusion, evident both in the state court and Supreme Court opin
ions, about whether General Order 18-A affected only venue, or whether it also somehow
conditioned jurisdiction over Directors General - who, after all, would likely not have been
residents of the states where railroad litigation took place - on satisfying the Order's venue
requirements. It is unclear, for example, whether the Director General agreed to submit vol
untarily to any court's jurisdiction where venue was proper. See Wechsler, 239 S.W. at 555
(acknowledging that state court "under General Order 18-A had no jurisdiction over the
person of [the first Director defendant] . . . unless he choose to voluntarily submit to the ju
risdiction of the court"); id. at 557 (noting that one of three Director General defendants
was a citizen of New York "with his official residence" in Washington, D.C.). The Supreme
Court criticized the state court for treating the Order as affecting only venue, but went on to
conclude that even if the state court had treated the Order as affecting jurisdiction too, that
court's conclusion would have been equally flawed. See Davis, 263 U.S. at 24.
211. See Wechsler, 203 S.W. at 555 (noting that first defendant's answer "contain[ed] a
plea to the jurisdiction").
212 See id. at 555 (noting that Missouri practice permitted a defendant to join objec
tions to personal jurisdiction and to venue with a defense on the merits). Plaintiff filed suit in
Jackson County, Missouri. Id. Because plaintiff was undisputedly a resident of Illinois, see
id., then venue could only be proper under General Order 18-A if the train had derailed in
Jackson County. See supra note 209 (quoting General Order 18-A's provisions making
venue proper only where plaintiff resided or cause of action accrued). But there was dis
agreement on the question of in which Missouri county the accident had occurred: plaintiff
alleged only that the train had derailed "near the town of Wyeth, in the State of Missouri;"
but it is unclear from the pleadings whether that meant within Wyeth's limits and, further
more, whether Wyeth itself was, under state law, an "incorporated place," which would evi
dently have placed it within Andrew County, or an unincorporated town, which would evi
dently have placed in within Jackson County. Wechsler, 239 S.W. at 556 (noting confusion on
question of where derailment occurred, and observing a "great conflict of opinion as to
whether the courts will take judicial notice of small towns not incorporated by public law").
213. Wechsler, 239 S.W. at 555 (emphasis added).
214. Id. at 576 (quoting record).
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"general appearances"215 first and only then adopting the original de
fe ndant's pleadings:216 their general appearances thus waived any fur
ther challenge to the state court's venue or jurisdiction.217 Accordingly,
the Missouri court refused to consider the later defendants' assertions
that venue was improper under General Order 18-A, and so upheld
plaintiff's $5000 verdict on the merits.218
The Supreme Court disagreed, even though, as Justice Holmes
made clear, the Missouri pleading rules did not violate federal law: the
state remained free to apply its rule, in precisely the way it had done
here, in cases involving only nonfederal interests.219 Nonetheless, the
Court concluded, Missouri's rule here was too "unreasonable" to
block state-court litigants from claiming the benefit of federal law.220
But why "unreasonable"? The Court did not really say. As in Love
County,22 1 it spent essentially no time reviewing the Missouri law re
quiring defendants to be very explicit to preserve j urisdictional objec
tions when making voluntary appearances.222 Moreover, Justice
215. Under Missouri practice, a "general appearance" was any appearance made with
out "expressly stat[ing] that the appearance is only for the purpose of excepting to the juris
diction." Id.
216. Id. at 555-56 (announcing this holding as to first substituted defe ndant); id. at 556
(same, as to second substituted defendant).
217. Id. at 556 (citing, inter alia, an Illinois and a New York case each adopting the same
rule). The state court reasoned that, by making general appearances first, the second and
third defendants had nothing left to "adopt" from the first's pleadings except his merits de
fense. Id. at 575 ("Under the circumstances we must construe the entry [of the second de
fendant] to mean that [he] entered his general appearance and thereafter adopted that part
of the answer containing a plea to the merits."). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
objections to venue and personal jurisdiction are also deemed waived if omitted from defen
dant's first responsive pleading. See FED. R. C1v. P. 12(h)(l).
218. Wechsler, 239 S.W. at 556 (noting difficulty of venue question and concluding "we
prefer to place our decision on the ground that venue was waived by defendant entering his
general appearance").
219. Justice Holmes declared, "The state courts may deal with that [the rules for pre
serving jurisdictional challenges on voluntary appearances] as they think proper in local mat
ters but they cannot treat it as defeating a plain assertion of federal right." Davis v.
Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22, 24 (1923).
220. "[L]ocal practice shall not be allowed to put unreasonable obstacles in the way."
Davis, 263 U.S. at 25. This language prefigured the Court's contemporary rule that a state
law procedural default by a federal claimant in state court may not preclude Supreme Court
appellate review of a federal question when the state has no "legitimate interest" in the
rule's enforcement. See Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 124 (1990); see also Lee v. Kemna,
534 U.S. 362, 380 (2002) (holding state procedural default does not preclude federal review
where "unyielding application of the general rule would disserve any perceivable interest").
221. See supra notes 181-203 and accompanying text (discussing decision).
222. Justice Holmes emphasized the state court's recognition "that by Missouri practice
the defendant had a right to unite a plea to the jurisdiction and a defence [sic] on the mer
its." Davis, 263 U.S. at 24; see also Wechsler, 239 S.W. at 555 (noting that first Director
General defendant had successfully done just that). But he ignored altogether Missouri's
rule demanding that a defendant wishing to do so must explicitly challenge jurisdiction be
fore he could join that challenge to a plea on the merits. Wechsler, 239 S.W. at 555. Nor did
Justice Holmes address the undisputed fact, stressed by the state court, that the second
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Holmes ignored altogether the state court's common-sense view about
why the second Director General might reasonably have chosen to
waive his objections under General Order 18-A:223 even if the plaintiff
had filed his lawsuit in the wrong Missouri county,224 he could simply
have refiled immediately in the correct one,225 simultaneously curing
both venue and jurisdiction and so leaving the Director General's po
sition essentially unchanged.226 Moreover, by 1921, when the second
defendant appeared, Congress had already directed the President to
"wind up all business growing out of" wartime federal railroad con
trol.227 So to the Missouri court, it made perfect sense for that Director
General to waive any nonmerits challenges that would only have de
layed resolving this personal injury lawsuit.
Thus, although the Missouri court may well have erred in applying
state practice rules to the Directors General here - and surely it ap
plied them in a rigorous, technical way - it is not obvious why the

Director General had not only failed to challenge jurisdiction properly, but he had not even
conditioned his voluntary appearance on being allowed to adopt the first Director General's
responsive pleading, which did explicitly challenge jurisdiction. Id.

223. The third Director General made his substituted appearance only after trial, in
open court, and then immediately appealed the verdict to the court of appeals. Wechsler, 239
S.W. at 556. The Missouri court treated this latter appearance as a general appearance, like
the second Director General's, and so concluded that that defendant, too, had waived venue
and jurisdiction on appeal. Id.
224. This question was complicated by uncertainty in the record about exactly where the
train had derailed, and about whether state law considered the nearest town to be in one
county or another. See supra note 212.
225. Nothing in either the state court's opinion or in the Supreme Court's opinion indi
cates that this plaintiff would have faced a statute of limitations bar if forced to dismiss his
first lawsuit and refile elsewhere. To the contrary, the state court relied on the fact that the
plaintiff would have been able to refile easily. See Wechsler, 239 S.W. at 555.
226. This, of course, would not have been true had an ordinary defendant successfully
challenged a state court's personal jurisdiction over him. Ordinary defendants challenge ju
risdiction based on an entire state's power to hold them answerable in any state court, and so
when they win that challenge they cannot be sued on the same complaint anywhere in the
state.
The Missouri court made this common-sense point in a slightly different way than I have
done here. That court appeared to read the 1920 Transportation Act as somehow altering
the venue rules in place under the 1918 Railroad Act - and so under General Order 18-A
- making Jackson County, Missouri a proper venue for this lawsuit no matter what. See
Wechsler, 239 S.W. at 555. Thus, even if the state court had accepted the second Director
General's venue/jurisdiction challenge, the plaintiff could have refiled in the same state
court. See Id. Justice Holmes replied to this view obliquely, declaring without elaboration,
"The Transportation Act, 1920, in no way invalidates a defence [sic] good when it was
passed." Davis, 263 U.S. at 25 (citation and enactment details omitted). But even if the state
court had been wrong about which county would be proper for a refiled complaint, either
Jackson or its neighbor, Andrew County, would have been the new venue, which would not
appear to have altered the litigation materially. See Wechsler, 239 S.W. at 556.
227. Wechsler, 239 S.W. at 556.
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state court's state-law ruling was "unreasonable"228 too. And Justice
Holmes gave no particular reason why it was,229 other than suggesting
that the second and third defendants had both stated their wish to
challenge venue and jurisdiction through means that the state court
should have accepted as a "plai[n] and reasonabl[e]" substitute for the
state's ordinary practice.230
D.

Mistrusting States or Antecedence Alone?

So what explains the Court's inadequacy rulings in these three piv
otal cases? And what explains the opinions' harsh rhetoric in doing
so? In Davis, for one, Justice Holmes suggested not only that the state
court had applied state law incorrectly, but that it had applied state
law dishonestly:
Whatever springes the State may set for those who are endeavoring to
assert rights that the State confe rs, the assertion of federal rights, when
plainly and reasonably made, is not to be defeated under the name of lo
cal practice . . . . [E]ach Director General in turn plainly indicated that he
meant to adopt the position of his predecessor, and to insist that the suit
was brought in the wrong county. His lawful insistence cannot be evaded

228. See Davis, 263 U.S. at 25 ("[I)t is necessary to see that local practice shall not be
allowed to put unreasonable obstacles in the way [of federal claims in state court).") (empha
sis added).
229. The Court did not, for example, suggest that the state court had fabricated a novel
rule to thwart the federal defendant. Cf. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 382 (2002) (holding
state procedural grounds inadequate because, inter alia, it was "novel" in its "application to
the facts" there) (internal quotation omitted); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958)
(ruling that a state procedural rule invoked by the Georgia court to preclude a federal claim
was inadequate to prohibit Supreme Court review because rule was novel under Georgia
law); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (same, where state proce
dural rule held not to have been applied consistently in past Alabama cases). HART &
WECHSLER characterizes Davis as holding the Missouri court of appeals judgment "inade
quate" because it enforced the state's general appearance rules in an "unduly burdensome"
way, though not so burdensome as to implicate due process concerns. See HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 581 (noting that "[c]ases finding state grounds inadequate be
cause burdensome are especially rare").
230. Davis, 263 U.S. at 24. Jn this, Davis prefigured the Court's controversial holding in
Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), that a state procedural default may not preclude
Supreme Court review of a federal claim where the claimant had substituted some other
procedure that "substantially served" the state interest behind the defaulted rule itself. Id. at
448. For the first thirty-seven years after Henry was announced - and, indeed, in Henry it
self - the Court never declared a state procedural default "inadequate" to preclude federal
review because a claimant had followed an adequate alternative. See HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 6, at 584-86 (describing Henry as "radical" and tracing its "demise"); see 16B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4020, at 291 (2d
ed. 1996) (noting later decisions' failure to rely on Henry). But Lee came close: there, while
disclaiming reliance on Henry, the Court held a state procedural default inadequate to pre
clude federal habeas review of a due process claim because (as the "most important" among
other reasons) the claimant had "substantially complied" with the state's rule. See 534 U.S.
at 382-86 & n.16; see also id. at 393-95 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (charging that majority rea
soning improperly resurrected Henry rule, notwithstanding majority's disclaimer).
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by attempting a distinction between his appearance and his substantially
contemporaneous adoption of the [first defendant's] plea.231
Given the relatively trivial federal interest at stake in Davis - a

federal defendant's ability to force a plaintiff to refile his state-law
claim in a neighboring county232 - the Court's suspicions feel dispro
portionate.233 But Justice Holmes elevated the Director General's
"federal right" to insist on his venue objection to the same level as the
due process rights vindicated in Love County134; here, as there, the
Court declared itself unwilling to permit a state court to use state law
to "defea[t] a plain assertion of [a] federal right."235
One of three things might help explain the Court's stance. First, al
though the Court did not say so, it may have believed the Missouri
court to be part of a larger multi-state resistance to federal wartime
control of railroads - and to the ways in which federal control
changed how state law could be enforced against those railroads under the 1918 Federal Control Act.236 That federal control was con231. Davis, 263 U.S. at 24 (emphasis added). As strident as this language is, the Court
now exaggerates it. In Lee, the majority cited this passage in Davis for the rule that "[t]here
are . . . exceptional cases in which exorbitant application of a generally sound rule renders
the state ground inadequate to stop consideration of a federal question." 534 U.S. at 376
(emphasis added).
232. See supra notes 225-226 (discussing state court's view - uncontradicted by the
Supreme Court - that plaintiff could have refiled lawsuit immediately if defendant's venue
or jurisdictional challenges had proven successful).
233. This has not made Justice Holmes' rhetoric any less influential. As Professor Hill
observed a generation ago, Davis's no-state-"springe" language has been "quoted more of
ten than any other as expressive of the applicable principle" permitting the Court to reverse
state-court state-law decisions despite its ordinary lack of jurisdiction over them. Hill, supra
note 10, at 944; see id. at 943 (quoting Davis language reproduced in text accompanying note
218, supra). Indeed, as Professor Hill also noted, Davis - for all its curtness - "represents
one of the fuller explications of the Supreme Court on the subject." Hill, supra note 10, at
944.
234. See Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 21-22 (1920); see also supra notes 181-203
and accompanying text (discussing Love County reasoning). Justice Holmes cited only Love
County and Creswill v. Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. 246 (1912), to support the Court's con
clusion that the Missouri court's state-law ground for decision was inadequate. Davis, 263
U.S. at 24-25; see supra notes 176-178 (discussing Knights ofPythias).
235. Davis, 263 U.S. at 24 (citing Love County, 253 U.S. at 22). Justice Holmes himself
did not specify what "federal right" was at stake here. He might have meant to read General
Order 18-A as vesting in the Director General a right to be free from· the personal jurisdic
tion of state courts lacking proper venue in lawsuits against federally-controlled railroads,
but he also insisted that the state court had evaded a federal right even if General Order 18A were read simply to grant the Director General a pure venue objection. Davis, 263 U.S. at
24. With ordinary defendants, personal jurisdiction problems implicate the defendant's own
due process rights, see World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980),
but venue problems do not.
236. See also supra notes 179-180 and accompanying text (suggesting that Union Pacific
reversal may have reflected the Court's intention to enforce against resistant states its own
decisions according railroads federal commerce-clause protection against state regulation);
supra notes 200-203 and accompanying text (suggesting that Love County reversal may have
reflected Court's intention to enforce against Oklahoma in particular its decision according .
Choctaw claimants federal due process protection against state taxation).
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centrated in, and personified by, the Director General.237 And while
Congress had specified that railroads under federal control should re
main subject to the same "laws and liabilities . . . under State or
Federal laws or at common law"238 in force during peacetime - like
the Davis plaintiff's state-law personal injury claim - the Director
General had declared that he must be substituted as defendant and the
railroads dismissed in any lawsuit enforcing those civilian laws.239
Moreover, it was the Director General who had unilaterally set the
venue rules for those lawsuits - and, apparently, the terms under
which he would make himself available for state-court lawsuits, under
General Order 18-A.240
By the time the Supreme Court heard Davis, it had already de
cided a handful of other cases reversing state supreme courts for re
sisting the Director General's orders. In June, 1921 - just eight
months before the Missouri court issued its Davis ruling - the
Supreme Court had reversed the Arkansas Supreme Court for dis
obeying the Director General's order requiring state courts to dismiss
railroad companies as defendants once the Director General entered a
237. As the Court earlier had characterized this official's position:
The Railroad Administration established by the President in December, 1917, did not exer
cise its control through supervision of the owner-companies, but by means of a Director
General through "one control, one administration, one power for the accomplishment of the
one purpose, the complete possession by governmental authority to replace for the period
provided the private ownership theretofore existing."
Missouri Pacific R.R. Co. v. Ault, 256 U.S. 554, 557 (1921) (quoting Northern Pacific Ry. Co.
v. North Dakota, 250 U.S. 135, 148 (1919)).
238. Federal Control Act, ch. 25 § 10 provided:
That carriers while under Federal control shall be subject to all laws and liabilities as com
mon carriers, whether arising under State or Federal laws or at common law, except in so far
as may be inconsistent with the provisions of this Act or any other Act applicable to such
Federal control or with any order of the President . . . . But no process, mesne or final, shall
be levied against any property under such Federal control.
Federal Control Act, 40 Stat. 451, 456 (1918).
239. Recall that General Order No. 50 provided:
It is . . . ordered, that actions at law, suits in equity, and proceedings in admiralty hereafter
brought in any court based on contract, bringing upon the Director General of Railroads,
claim for death or injury to person, or for loss and damage to property, arising since Decem
ber 31, 1917, and growing out of the possession, use, control, or operation of any railroad or
system of transportation by the Director General of Railroads, which action, suit, or pro
ceeding but for Federal control might have been brought against the carrier company, shall
be brought against . . . [the) Director General of Railroads, and not otherwise . . . . The
pleadings in all such actions . . . may on application be amended by substituting the Director
General of Railroads for the carrier company as party defendant and dismissing the com
pany therefrom.
See Ault, 256 U.S. at 562 n.1 (quoting General Order No. 50).
240. Davis, 263 U.S. at 23; see also supra note 209 (quoting General Order 18-A). Again,
both the Missouri court of appeals and the U.S. Supreme Court were unclear about whether
and how General Order 18-A's venue rules intersect with a state court's personal jurisdiction
over the Director General; both courts reached their conclusions based on venue principles
alone. See supra notes 210-218 (discussing same).
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lawsuit,241 and for ignoring his order exempting federally-controlled
railroads from "fines, penalties, and forfeitures" otherwise appropriate
under state law.242 And in November, 1921 - three months before the
Missouri court ruled in Davis - the U.S. Court had reversed a
Mississippi Supreme Court ruling that General Order 18-A's venue
rules themselves exceeded the powers that the Control Act had
granted President Wilson and the powers that the President had dele
gated to the Director General.243 Given these other cases, perhaps
Davis's harsh language reflects the Court's accumulated impatience
with states resisting the Director General's authority.
Or, as a second hypothesis, the Davis Court may have viewed
Missouri and its courts with particular suspicion during this period,
just as it may have suspected the Oklahoma court of anti-Indian ani
mus in Love County. Five years before Davis, in Union Pacific,244
Justice Holmes had declared that another Missouri court had used an
"inadequate" state-law estoppel ruling to shield state interference with
the railroads' federally-protected interstate commercial activities.245
Although it is beyond the scope of this Article to undertake a thor
ough inquiry into the tensions between states like Missouri and the
federal government's role, especially the federal courts', in the cen
tury's early decades,246 it is certainly possible that the Court's impa241. Ault, 256 U.S. at 555, 558 (holding that Director General correctly read the Federal
Control Act § 10, see supra note 238, as prohibiting lawsuits against railroad companies
themselves while under federal control). The Ault Court acknowledged that "[t]he cases in
the state courts show a considerable diversity of view" on the question whether the railroads
must be dismissed altogether from lawsuits arising during their federal control. See Ault, 256
U.S. at 562, 563 n.2 (citing decisions by the Mississippi and Minnesota supreme courts re
jecting the Ault Court's conclusion that suits might proceed only against the Director
General alone).
242. Ault, 256 U.S. at 564 (quoting Director Generals' order No. 50). The Ault Court
reversed the Arkansas court's decision, enforcing a state statute requiring railroads to pay
discharged employees their "full wages" within seven days or face a penalty, to impose a
$390 penalty on the Director General on top of $50 in awarded backpay; the Court upheld
an order of the Director General prohibiting claims against federally-controlled railroads for
"fines, penalties, and forfeitures." See id. at 555, 563-65 (upholding Director General's Order
No. 50 as consistent with Federal Control Act § 10); see also supra note 239 (quoting Gen
eral Order No. 50).
243. Alabama & Vicksburg R.R. Co. v. Journey, 257 U.S. 111, 113-14 (1921).
244. Union Pacific R.R. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918).
245. See id.; see also supra notes 176-178 and accompanying text (discussing Union
Pacific ruling that state-law estoppel judgment was inadequate to shield state-court decision
from reversal by the Supreme Court on finding that state commission's high fee for
authorizing railroad to issue bonds secured by railroad's few in-state assets interfered with
interstate commerce, in violation of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8).
246. See EDWARD A. PURCELL, JR., BRANDEIS ANO THE PROGRESSIVE
CONSTITUTION: ERIE, THE JUDICIAL POWER, ANO THE POLITICS OF THE FEDERAL COURTS
IN TWENTIETH-CENTURY AMERICA 1 1-16 (2000) (discussing the development of Populist
Progressive political opposition to "big business" of national corporations like railroads by
groups including midwestern farmers); id. at 14 (noting that as Congress began to enact re
form legislation regulating business, "the federal courts gradually became the principal tar-
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tience in Davis - so out of proportion to the actual issue there sprang from the larger political environment in which the dispute
arose.247
Third, apart from any external political or historical reason why
the Court might have tended to mistrust these particular states during
this particular time, perhaps the Court's harsh treatment of the
Missouri court of appeals in Davis - like its treatment of the Missouri
Supreme Court in Union Pacific and the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Love County - reflected, more fundamentally, the Court's evolving
claim to a special constitutional prerogative to vindicate federally
protected interests wherever the Court finds them lurking.248 That im
pulse might explain why in these three opinions - which say little to
suggest that the state courts were deliberately cheating federal inter-

get of Progressive criticism"); id. at 21-22 (recounting how the Court in the early 1920s be
came "more actively anti-Progressive" in decisions "favor[ing] the interests of private busi
ness," spurring Progressives to join with states' rights advocates in opposition to the Court);
Friedman, supra note 40, at 1391-96 {discussing Populist-Progressive political opposition to
Supreme Court decisions invoking federal constitutional rights to strike down state commer
cial regulation, as in Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating, on due process
grounds, a New York statute setting maximum working hours for bakers)); see also Fried
man, supra note 40, at 1427-27 {discussing Populist-Progressive criticism of federal judges'
use of Sherman Act to enjoin labor strikes while refusing to use same Act to "combat mo
nopolization" by big business).
247. See supra note 246 (citing sources discussing tensions between pro-national
business Court and Populist-Progressive political movements in the early twentieth century);
see also Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 139-41 (2000) {Ginsburg, J., dissenting) {arguing that
"historical contexts" external to and unmentioned by the Court best explain "rare" cases
where the Court has rejected a state high court's interpretation of state law); supra note 27
and accompanying text (discussing Justice Ginsburg's assertion and citing commentators'
reactions to her "candid" assessment); Friedman, supra note 40, at 1388, 1448-55 (arguing
that the Court's legitimacy depends substantially on its responsiveness to social and eco
nomic realities surrounding legal controversies).
248. See, e.g., Home Tel. & Teleg. Co. v. Los Angeles, 227 U.S. 278, 285 (1913) {declar
ing federal courts "the primary source for applying and enforcing the Constitution of the
United States"); Deposit Bank v. Frankfort, 191 U.S. 499, 518 (1903) (declaring federal
courts' "ultimate right . . . to protect the citizens of the United States, and of every State, in
the enjoyment of rights and privileges guaranteed by the Federal Constitution"); see
PURCELL, supra note 246, at 45-46 {discussing the Court's efforts to expand its own authority
over Congress and states during pre-World War I period; citing Home Telephone and
Deposit Bank as proof of the Court's goal of judicial supremacy in enforcing the Constitu
tion). For the Court's more recent claims to the last word on constitutional rights, see United
States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (declaring that the Court and not Congress has final
say on the scope of equal protection guarantees); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ.
Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (declaring that the Court and not
Congress has final say on what property interests the Constitution's due process and takings
clauses protect); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-31, 536 (1997) (holding that once
the Court defines the scope of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, Congress may not
grant greater protections); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (holding that
the Court alone may define which "fundamental rights" are protected by the Constitution's
due process guarantees); see also Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-19 (1958) (declaring the
federal judiciary "supreme in the exposition of the law of the Constitution" guaranteeing
equal protection). See generally Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 {2001) (discussing judicial supremacy).
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ests249 - the Court reintroduced the strong supremacy rhetoric it
stressed in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee but then undercut in Murdock v.
City of Memphis. Davis declared:
If the Constitution and laws of the United States are to be enforced, this
Court cannot accept as final the decision of the state tribunal as to what
are the facts alleged to give rise to the right or to bar the assertion of it
even upon local grounds.250
Likewise in Love County, even as the Court acknowledged the rule
that "a j udgment of a state court, which is put on independent non
federal grounds broad enough to sustain it, cannot be reviewed by
us,"251 it also worried that that bar permitted state courts to frustrate
what the Court viewed as its own special role. To give state courts the
last word, where state-law shuts out federal claims, would be to "re
nounc[e]" the Court's prerogative "to protect and maintain the su
premacy of the Constitution and the laws made in pursuance
thereof. "252
In fact, each of these three pivotal cases raised exactly that prob
lem: some state-law issue rose up to block a federal claim's path
through state court and into the Supreme Court. In Union Pacific, the
claimant's estoppel by conduct blocked it from raising its commerce
clause claim; in Love County, the claimants' waiver by voluntary tax
payment blocked them from raising their due process claim; and in
Davis, the defendant's waiver by general appeai:ance blocked him
from raising his federal venue claim. In all three cases, the Court's re
fusal to find the state courts' j udgments "adequate" simply removed
state-law debris from a federal claimant's path.
Put bluntly, then, perhaps Justice Holmes in Union Pacific and
Davis, and Justice Van Devanter in Love County, sounded irritated
and impatient because state law had simply gotten in the way of fed
eral law, and thus in the Court's way, too. And despite the black letter

249. The one possible exception is Love County, where the Court noted that Oklahoma
officials, including its supreme court, continued to invoke state law to demand and then to
hold the Choctaw claimants' taxes, paid under protest, for six years after the U.S. Supreme
Court ruled those taxes unconstitutional. See Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17, 21-22
(1920); see also supra notes 181-203 and accompanying text.
250. Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S.22, 24 (1923) (citing Creswill v.Knights of Pythias, 225
U.S. 246 (1912) (discussed supra notes 176-178)).
251. Love County, 253 U.S. at 22-23.
252. Love County, 253 U.S. at 23; see also Union Pacific, 248 U.S. at 69-70 ("[I]t is the

duty of this Court to examine for itself whether there is any basis in the admitted fa cts, or in
the evidence when the fa cts are in dispute, for a finding that the federal right has been
waived."). As Professor Purcell has observed about other decisions during this period de
claring state grounds "inadequate" in order "to prevent an evasion of real issues": "The 'real
issues,' of course, were federal rights, and the feared evaders were state courts that might
minimize, avoid, or deny them." See PURCELL, supra note 246, at 45;.see also id. at 323 n.44
(noting that "[a)lthough the Court sometimes suspected state court decisions, it seldom ac
knowledged the fa ct").
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rule barring Supreme Court appellate review of state-court state-law
decisions, the Court could not resist reversing those state grounds in
order to reach the federal interests lurking behind. The state grounds
were not inadequate because dishonest, "untenable,"253 "unreason
able,"254 or "without fair or substantial support."255 They were inade
quate because they blocked the view.
III. DIVORCING MISTRUST FROM SUPREMACY: JURISDICTION FROM
ANTECEDENCE

In Union Pacific, Love County, and Davis, the Court's impulse to
enforce federal-law supremacy outright coexisted awkwardly along
side the Court's own reservation that it lacked power to disturb state
courts' state-law j udgments absent some palpable reason to suspect
them of cheating federal law. That tension might have forced the
Court to go through the motions of intimating some actual state-court
misbehavior in these transitional cases when, without that constraint,
it might have claimed a straightforward supremacy-based appellate j u
risdiction from the simple fact that state law stood in front of - or
logically anteceded - a federal issue. 256 This very premise, in fact, had
253. Love County, 253 U.S. at 22 ("Of course, if non-federal grounds, plainly untenable,
may be thus put forward successfully, our power to review [federal questions] easily may be
avoided.").
254. Davis, 263 U.S. at 25 ("[L]ocal practice shall not be allowed to put unreasonable
obstacles in the way [of enforcing federal rights).").
255. Love County, 253 U.S. at 22 ("It therefore is within our province to inquire not
only whether the right was denied in express terms, but also whether it was denied in sub
stance and effect, as by putting forward non-federal grounds of decision that were without
any fair or substantial support.") (citing, inter alia, Knights of Pythias, 225 U.S. at 246, and
Union Pacific R.R. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n., 248 U.S. 67 (1918)).
256. In Broad River Power Co. v. South Carolina, 281 U.S. 537, 540-41 (1930), for ex
ample, the Court sent a mixed message on what would forfeit a state court's right to utter the
last word on what an antecedent state law meant.While the Court suggested that it might
always reverse a state ground simply because it lacked "a fair or substantial basis" in state
law, it also suggested, to the contrary, that the lack of such state-law foundation could only
justify reversal to the extent it proved the state court had "eva[ded]" its "constitutional obli
gations." See id. The Court declared:
Whether the state court has denied to rights asserted under local law the protection which
the Constitution guarantees is a question upon which the petitioners are entitled to invoke
the judgment of this Court. Even though the constitutional protection invoked be denied on
non-federal grounds, it is the province of this Court to inquire whether the decision of the
state court rests upon a fair or substantial basis. If unsubstantial, constitutional obligations
may not be thus evaded. [citing, inter alia, Love County and Enterprise Irrigation} . . . .But if
there is no evasion of the constitutional issue, [citing, inter alia, Vandalia R.R. J . .. and the
non-federal ground of decision has fair support, [citing Enterprise Irrigation, Leuthe v.
Thomas, and Vandalia R.R.} ... this Court will not inquire whether the rule applied by the
state court is right or wrong, or substitute its own view of what should be deemed the better
rule, for that of the state court.
Broad River Power Co., 281 U.S. at 540-41 (emphasis added); accord Knights of Pythias, 225
U.S. at 263 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (arguing that "[w]hen a Federal right is held by a state

court to have been lost by subsequent conduct that of itself involves no Federal question
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driven Martin v. Hunter's Lessee's257 assertion of jurisdiction over the
nonfederal question whether Virginia had successfully confiscated
Lord Fairfax's Northern Neck property before federal treaties pro
hibiting confiscation went into effect.258 Justice Story demanded,

How, indeed, can it be possible to decide whether a title be within the
protection of a treaty, until it is ascertained what that title is, and
whether it have a legal validity? From the very necessity of the case,
there must be a preliminary inquiry into the existence and structure of
the title, before the court can construe the treaty in reference to that ti
tle. If the court below should decide, that the title was bad, and, there
fore, not protected by the treaty, must not this court have a power to de
cide the title to be good, and, therefore, protected by the treaty?259
Otherwise, Justice Story reasoned, the Supreme Court's power to re
view federal questions "may be evaded at pleasure" by any calculating
state court.260 Thus, the Court must have jurisdiction to review and re
verse any state-law judgment that blocks the path of a federally
protected interest, whether or not that state court demonstrably de
served to be mistrusted.261
A.

After Davis: Antecedence Becomes Central

In the years since Davis, the Court has returned to Martin's
supremacy-oriented jurisdictional view: it has increasingly exercised
an antecedence-based power to reverse state grounds divorced from
any particularized state suspicion. For example, where federal law
steps in to protect substantive interests originally created by state law

[like !aches, estoppel, or statute of limitations] I think we are not at liberty to re-examine the
decision unless we can say that the state court in substance is denying the right").
257. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304, 357-59 (1816).
258. See supra notes 89-113 and accompanying text (discussing Martin in detail).
259. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 358. Justice Story, assuming that the Court's appellate
jurisdiction should reach every question that a state court had power to decide, ignored what
we now recognize as a fundamental, and fundamentally constitutional, asymmetry between
state and federal courts: although state courts are ordinarily courts of general jurisdiction
competent to decide all questions of state and federal law (where neither Congress nor the
Constitution has explicitly excluded state courts from hearing federal-law questions), federal
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction competent to decide only those federal or state-law
questions falling within an affirmative jurisdictional grant from Congress.
260. Martin, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 357. Hamilton, by contrast, suggested that granting
state courts concurrent jurisdiction over Article III questions without federal appellate re
view would tempt parties to evade the federal judicial power. THE FEDERALIST No. 82, at
556 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961) (worrying that "every plaintiff or
prosecutor" could evade federal authority "at [their] pleasure" absent federal appellate re
view).
261. See Currie, supra note 103, at 681-87. Professor Currie has argued that Article Ill's
purposes of uniformity and protection of federal rights are served, as Martin suggested, by
Court review of state-court state-law findings that are "precondition[ed) to upholding a fed
eral right." Id. at 686 n.356.
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- like contract or property rights - the Court has routinely claimed
jurisdiction to reverse a state court's decision denying those rights. So,
although state and not federal law ordinarily governs whether and
what kind of contract rights exist,262 the Court will review and reverse
a state court's rulings on those questions to reach the federal claim
that the state's legislature violated the Constitution by impairing the
obligation of contracts.263 Likewise, although state and not federal law
ordinarily governs whether and what kind of property rights exist,264
the Court will review and reverse a state court's ruling on those ques
tions in order to reach the federal-law claim that the state violated the
Constitution by depriving an owner of that property without due pro
cess or by taking it without j ust compensation.265

262. See Hill, supra note 10, at 948
[W)hether a contractual obligation has been created in the first instance, and questions hav
ing to do with the construction and scope of the contract, are all questions of state law. The
constitutional provision forbidding impairment has not been deemed to give rise to a federal
power to shape the law involved in the creation of contractual obligations as an incident to
the federal power to prevent impairment of an obligation once it has been created.
Id. at 948; see also id. at 959-61 (discussing cases where the Supreme Court nonetheless re
versed state-court ruling that no contract existed, in order to reach claim that state legisla
ture had impaired the obligation of contract in violation of U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10; noting
that the Court has refused to permit states the final say on state-law questions in contract
clause cases); id. at 963 (discussing further the Court's contract-clause cases on direct review
from state courts). But see General Motors v. Romein, 503 U.S. 181, 187 (1992) (declaring
that "(t]he question whether a contract was made is a federal question for purposes of
Contract Clause analysis," even though that question should be decided giving " 'respectful
consideration and great weight to the views of the State's highest court.' ") (quoting Indiana
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938)). For discussion of how the more limited
proven mistrust rule would have forced a different outcome in Brand, see infra Section
IV.A.1.
263. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10 ("No State shall . . . pass any . . . Law impairing the
Obligation of Contracts . . . . ). See, e.g., Romein, 503 U.S. at 187 (declaring the Court may
"not surrender the duty to exercise our own judgment" in deciding whether contract was
made and what the terms were) (quoting Appleby v. City of New York, 271 U.S. 364, 380
(1926)); Indiana ex rel. Anderson v. Brand, 303 U.S. 95, 100 (1938) (same, but also noting
that questions about a contract's formation and terms are "primarily of state law").
"

264. See, e.g., Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 538-41 (1985);
Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 9-12 (1978). See generally HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 558-59 ("The cases generally take the view that the question
whether a 'property' interest exists is governed by state law."). Some property interests, of
course, arise under federal law. But see, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding that Congress exceeded its authority
under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment in treating interests created by federal patent and
unfair competition laws as property entitled to constitutional due process protection against
infringement by states).
265. U.S. CONST. amends. V & XIV. See, e.g., Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,
505 U.S. 1003, 1032 n.18 (1992); Bishop v. Wood, 426 U.S. 341, 344-45 (1976). See generally
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 557-59 (discussing cases involving Supreme Court re
view of state-court decisions determining creation or dimension of property rights); id. at
559-62 (discussing related question of how the Court treats claims that state-law created lib
erty interests are entitled to federal due process protection).
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And the Court has asserted an antecedence-based jurisdiction even
where there is no such tight substantive link between state and federal
law.266 For example, in Fox Film Corp. v. Muller,267 while reciting the
"settled rule" that "our jurisdiction fails if the non-federal ground is
independent of the federal ground" and has "fair support" in state
law,268 the Court also acknowledged another - and potentially more
expansive - "rule": the Court may claim jurisdiction to review a
state-court state-law ruling that "constitute[d} a preliminary step
which simply had the effect of bringing forward for determination the
federal question."269 Moreover, the Court frequently has reversed
266. Justice Holmes's 1904 opinion for the Court in Rogers v. Alabama made this very
leap: "It is well known that this court will decide for itself whether a contract was made as
well as whether the obligation of the contract has been impaired. But that is merely an illus·
tration ofa more general rule." 192 U.S. 226, 230 {1904) (emphasis added) (citation omitted)
(asserting, with contract-clause example as support, "a necessary and well settled rule that
the exercise of jurisdiction by this court to protect constitutional rights cannot be declined
when it is plain that the fair result of a decision is to deny the rights").
267. 296 U.S. 207 (1935).
268. Id. at 209, 210 (citing, inter alia, Enter. Irrigation Dist. v. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157
{1917); Eustis v. Bolles, 150 U.S. 361 (1893); and Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 257
(1871)). In Fox Film, the Court disclaimed jurisdiction to review a Minnesota Supreme
Court decision, in an action to enforce a contract, that a clause held to violate federal anti
trust law in an earlier federal-court case was inseverable from the rest of the contract, so
making the whole agreement unenforceable. 296 U.S. at 210. The Fox Film opinion did not
reflect any searching review of that state-law ruling, but simply recorded the fact that the
state court had considered both state and federal precedent on the question and then
reached its decision "upon what it conceived to be the weight of authority." Id. at 209. Based
on that, the Court concluded the state-court ruling was "not without fair support." Id.
269. Fox Film, 296 U.S. at 211. Fox Film is written in a fairly confusing way, so a full
quotation is useful here:
The rule announced in Enterprise Irrigation District v. Canal Co. . . and other cases, to the
effect that our jurisdiction attaches where the non-federal ground is so interwoven with the
other as not to be an independent matter, does not apply. The construction put 11pon the
contracts did not constitute a preliminary step which simply had the effect ofbringing forward
for determination the federal question [which, apparently, would have triggered appellate re
view], but was a decision which automatically took the federal question out of the case if
otherwise it would be there [and thus precluded appellate review]. The non-federal question
in respect of the construction of the contracts, and the federal question in respect of their
validity under the Anti-trust Act, were clearly independent ofone another. The case, in effect,
was disposed of before the federal question said lo be involved was reached. A decision of
that question then became unnecessary; and whether it was decided or not, our want of ju
risdiction is clear.
.

Id. at 210-11 (citations omitted) (emphasis added). By its own terms, this passage appears to
address a problem related to but still different from the question actually decided in Fox
Film, which was whether the state-law grounds for decision were "adequate" to preclude
Supreme Court review. See id. at 210 ("(T]he non-federal ground is adequate to sustain the
judgment."). This passage seems to ask, instead, whether the state-law severability issue was
"independent" of the federal antitrust issue - a distinct question that ordinarily seeks to
determine whether state law incorporated or otherwise relied upon federal law so that the
state court's ruling cannot be said to have been reached "independently" of those federal
law sources. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1038 n.4 & 1039 (1983) (discussing ways in
which state-law grounds may be dependent on federal law). See generally HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 546-51 (discussing special jurisdictional problems that arise
where state-law grounds appear dependent on federal law); id. at 528 (distinguishing "ade
quacy" of state-law grounds from their "independence" from federal law). The Court did not
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state-court decisions enforcing state procedural rules that block the
path of a federal claim or other federal interest, even though they do
not actually violate federal due process standards or other federal
law.270 These special "procedural defa ult" cases come closest to artreat Fox Film itself as involving an "independence" problem, but only an "adequacy"
problem. See Fox Film, 296 U.S. at 209-10. But see id. at 209 (noting, without further com
ment, that the Minnesota supreme court cited both state and federal authorities in evaluat
ing whether tainted contract clause was severable).
Fox Film's use of Enterprise Irrigation furthers the confusion. In the earlier case, the
Court drew a clear distinction between the twin requirements that state-law grounds be both
"adequate and independent" to preclude Supreme Court review. See Enter. Irrigation, 243
U.S. at 164; see also supra notes 162-168 and accompanying text (discussing Enterprise
Irrigation). Enterprise Irrigation described cases where state and federal grounds are "inter
woven" only when discussing the need to determine whether state grounds are "independ
ent." 243 U.S. at 164. But the quoted Fox Film passage, purporting to elaborate on Enter
prise Irrigation, suggests something different: that appellate review is appropriate wherever
state-law "constitute[s) a preliminary step which simply [has) the effect of bringing forward
for determination the federal question." Fox Film, 296 U.S. at 211. This passage describes a
jurisdiction that depends on antecedence alone, derived from a relationship between state
and federal law that has nothing, apparently, to do with state law's dependence on federal
law.
I read Fox Film, thus, as encouraging the Court and commentators alike to move to
wards an antecedence-based jurisdiction wherever a state-law issue crops up to block the
path of a federal interest - that is, where the state-law issue "constitute[s] a preliminary
step" that "bring[s] forward . . . the federal question." Fox Film, 296 U.S. at 211. HART &
WECHSLER, for example, suggests this Fox Film passage means to distinguish "antecedent"
state grounds - which the Court should be able to review so that state courts may not im
properly block federal claims and then evade Supreme Court review - from those situations
where "answering the state law question was not a necessary antecedent to any question of
federal law." See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 520; id. at 525 (discussing Fox Film
passage as emphasizing special situation where state grounds are "antecedent" to federal
claim). Although HART & WECHSLER elsewhere describes the separate "independent state
grounds" question as focusing on whether state law incorporated federal law, in discussing
Fox Film, it uses the term "independent state grounds" to describe those that are not "ante
cedent" in this particular sense. Id. at 520, 525.

270. E.g. Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375-76 (2002); Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S.
722, 729 (1991). See, e.g., Ford v. Georgia, 498 U.S. 411, 424 (1991) (explaining that for state

procedural ground to be "adequate" to preclude appellate review of constitutional claims,
the rule must have been followed consistently); James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341, 345-48
(1984) (holding "inadequate" Kentucky state-law ruling that criminal defendant could not
pursue federal-law challenge to trial court's failure to adopt proposed jury charge because he
labeled request one for jury "instruction" rather than "admonition" as state rule required;
the Court concluded Kentucky had not applied that procedural rule consistently in prior
cases); Hathorn v. Lovern, 457 U.S. 255, 262-63 (1982) {holding state procedural rule "in
adequate" unless applied evenhandedly to all similar claims); Barr v. City of Columbia, 378
U.S. 146, 149 (1964) (explaining that "state procedural requirements which are not strictly or
regularly followed cannot deprive us of the right to review" federal claims); NAACP v.
Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 456-58 (1958) (holding "inadequate" Alabama
state-law ruling that those raising federal constitutional challenges to state-court document
subpoena could only do so by seeking writ of mandamus against issuing trial judge, and not
by writ of certiorari seeking review of trial judge's contempt citation against claimants for
failure to comply with order; the Court concluded the Alabama ruling, while "consistent"
with prior state cases, was too "novel" to bar consideration of federal claim because it ig
nored the parallel practice of permitting similar claims through certiorari); Staub v. City of
Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 {1958) {holding "inadequate" Georgia state-law ruling that criminal
defendant could not raise federal constitutional challenges to prosecution under local permit
ordinance because she failed to comply with state rules requiring special particularity in such
attacks; the Court concluded Georgia ruling was not adequately supported by Georgia
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ticulating a jurisdictional basis for their state-grounds reversals: al
though the Court lacks jurisdiction over state-court judgments that
rest on adequate and independent state procedural grounds,271 the
"adequacy" of those procedural rulings - even absent an outright
federal-law violation - " 'is itself a federal question,' "272 and thus
solidly within the Court's appellate jurisdiction.273 Even more compel
ling, to some, is the simple fact that the state procedural rule stands up
to block - it antecedes - a federal interest.274
Commentators have endorsed antecedence-based jurisdiction
more explicitly than the Court. Hart & Wechsler, for example, con
tends:
where a state law ruling serves as an antecedent for determining whether
a federal right has been violated, some [Supreme CourtJ review of the
basis for the state court's determination of the stat.e-law question is es-

precedents and as applied here the rule resorted to an "arid ritual of meaningless form").
This is only a representative sampling: for more comprehensive analysis of cases in which the
Court has found state-court procedural rulings blocking federal interests inadequate to pre
clude Supreme Court review, see Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1137-45; Wechsler, supra note
11, at 1053-56; Hill, supra note 10, at 966-80. For a more recent summary of these cases, see
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6; Fountaine, supra note 10, at 1064-66.
271. See Lee, 534 U.S. at 375 (quoting Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)).
272. Lee, 534 U.S. at 375 (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 415, 422 (1965)).
273. See 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2000) (granting appellate jurisdiction over federal questions
involved in state-court judgments); Hill, supra note 10, at 943; accord Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S.
391, 465 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (suggesting that although the Supreme Court ordi
narily lacks jurisdiction on direct review to reverse state-court decisions resting on inde
pendent state grounds, federal courts may review state-court rulings that "raiseO federal as
well as state questions," even if they do not "discriminat[e] against or evad[e] the assertion"
of federal claims). For one theory justifying the Court's state-grounds reversals in procedural
default cases as an appropriate use of the Court's federal common lawmaking authority, see
infra Part IV.
Although Lee stated that the adequate and independent grounds rule "applies with
equal force whether the state-law ground is substantive or procedural," 534 U.S. at 375, the
Court has never held that the adequacy of state substantive grounds is a federal question
automatically triggering Supreme Court jurisdiction. There is another significant difference
in the Court's treatment of the two categories: when considering the adequacy of a state pro
cedural rule, the Court asks whether the state has a "legitimate interest in the rule's en
forcement." Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 124 (1990); see also Lee, 534 U.S. at 386 n.16.
The Court has not performed state-interest evaluations when considering the adequacy, on
direct review, of a substantive state ground.
274. As HART & WECHSLER puts the point: "Are not all state procedural rulings that
determine whether a federal question has been seasonably raised in the state courts 'antece
dent' in the relevant sense?" HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 582 (referring to own
suggestion, id. at 521, that "where a state law ruling serves as an antecedent for determining
whether a federal right has been violated, some review of the basis for the state court's de
termination of the state-law question is essential if the federal right is to be protected against
evasion and discrimination . . . . "). Stated another way, Professor Wechsler argued that the
Court's practice makes sense because "where the state ruling found procedural default . . .
the existence, application or implementation of a federal right turns on the resolution of a
logically antecedent issue of state law." Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1054.
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sential if the federal right is to be protected against evasion and discrimi
nation
.275
.

.

.

Or, as Professor Hill put it a generation ago, if a state-law issue should
arise "as a threshold question,"
it is plain that allowing the state courts the last word on the threshold
question, however arbitraryf76] or wrong the particular decision may
seem to be, would mean that . . . [federal law] would have only as much
force as the state courts are willing to accord it.277
Articulated so, the antecedence-based j urisdiction both Court and
commentators appear now to favor represents an enormous exception
to the black-letter rule prohibiting Supreme Court appellate review of
state-court state-law judgments. For it permits the Court to reverse
any state grounds that disposed of a case before the federal issue's
logical turn came up, without having to identify or substantiate any
reason at all to hold the state court's own ruling untrustworthy.
B.

Antecedence and Deference in Bush v. Gore

Bush v. Gore exemplifies the Court's shift away from a formally
limited appellate jurisdiction over state-court state-law judgments.278
Indeed, by Bush v. Gore's time, so ingrained was the assumption that
275. HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 521. Professor Wechsler stated the point as a
jurisdictional given, discussing cases where "the existence, application or implementation of
a federal right turns on the resolution of a logically antecedent issue of state law[:] Because
of that relationship the state court does not speak the final word on the state question . . . . "
Herbert Wechsler, The Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court: Reflections on the Law
and the Logistics ofDirect Review, 34 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1043, 1054 (1977).
276. Remember that Professor Hill meant the word "arbitrary" here to describe a per
ceived state-court fault falling short of an actual due process violation. In this passage, he
carefully excluded from discussion those state-court rulings that so lack foundation in exist
ing state law as to violate due process. Cf Hill, supra note 10, at 959-61 {discussing the very
few cases where the Court declared a state-law ruling "inadequate" because it actually vio
lated due process); id. at 961 {characterizing one of these cases, Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust &
Sav. Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930), as holding that the "posture adopted by the state court
(was] arbitrary in the light of prior indications of the governing law"; that is the Court's re
versal there turned on its finding that there had been "a retroactive overruling of the . . . law
in substance if not in form" thus violating due process) (emphasis added).
277. Hill, supra note 10, at 948-49. Notwithstanding the breadth of Professor Hill's lan
guage in this passage, he followed it with a discussion of cases involving a more specific rela
tionship between state and federal issues in state court, where federal law steps in to protect
state-created interests, as in contract clause cases. LOW & JEFFRIES, supra note 26, at 82
(noting that, in some cases, "if there were no limits" on state courts' "freedom" to decide
antecedent state-law questions, federal rights and obligations standing next in line "might be
easily evaded").
278. Again, most commentators have minimized Bush v. Gore's jurisdictional problems,
proffering a post-hoc federal question foundation and then concentrating on the case's
merits questions. See supra note 22 (discussing commentary). But the Justices' own debate
over how to apply the Court's jurisdictional precedents reveals much about how they view
their power to reverse on state grounds, and I consider their arguments for that purpose
here.
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the Court's power to reverse state grounds derives from the simple
fact of antecedence - the fact that a state-law judgment blocked con
sideration of a federal interest - that both Chief Justice Rehnquist, in
a concurrence advocating a highly aggressive appellate review of the
Florida supreme court's interpretation of Florida election law, and
Justice Ginsburg, in a dissent harshly criticizing that stance, could es
sentially agree that "No doubt there are cases in which the proper ap
plication of federal law may hinge on interpretations of state law. Un
avoidably, this Court must sometimes examine state law in order to
protect federal rights."279
Moreover, not only did these two share a jurisdictional starting
point, but they also invoked largely the same precedents to advocate
their two radicaIJy different views about what the Court should do in
Bush v. Gore. And both used these shared precedents without distin
guishing the straightforward jurisdictional cases among them,280 and
procedural default cases decided under "adequate and independent
state grounds" rules,281 from other cases where jurisdiction was not
279. Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 137 (2000) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
280. Id; see also id. at 114-15 & n.l (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (citing precedents to
support the assertion that the Court may reverse state-court state-law judgments not only
where state law is itself unconstitutional, but also where the Court deems it necessary in or
der to vindicate the Constitution's protections for state-created contract and property
rights). Of the five precedents Justice Ginsburg cited, three involved property or contract
clause claims. See infra note 282. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 137 & n.1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting);
see also id. at 115 n.l (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (also citing Lucas v. South Carolina
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992)). But not all of the property-claim precedents raised
jurisdictional questions. See infra note 282 (discussing Lucas). Chief Justice Rehnquist and
Justice Ginsburg both cite the Court's state-law reversal in Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's
Lessee, jurisdictionally justified in Martin v. Hunter's Lessee , 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816).
See Bush, 531 U.S. at 1 15 n.l (Rehnquist, C.J. concurring) (citing Fairfax's Devisee v.
Hunter's Lessee, 1 1 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813)); id. at 139-40. Chief Justice Rehnquist de
scribed the Court's state-law reversal in Fairfax's Devisee as "simila[r]" to those in contract
and property cases, where the Constitution steps in specifically to provide fe deral protection
to state-created rights. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 n.l (characterizing Fairfax's Devisee merits
decision as following from "independent evaluation of state law in order to protect federal
treaty guarantees"); HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 520-21 (including Martin v.
Hunter's Lessee among cases where "the state law question . . . was an essential antecedent
to the application of the federal treaty provisions giving protection to then-existing land ti
tles"); Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1054 (likening Martin's "title issue" to issues in the con
tract-clause and property, all examples where "state court rulings on substantive state ques
tions obviously may prevent 'the implementation' of a federal right").
281. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ginsburg both cited NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 456-58 (1958), where the Court held "inadequate" a state-court
procedural ruling that state law permitted appellate review of federal constitutional chal
lenges to a trial-court discovery order only where those claims had been appealed through a
petition for writ of mandamus to review the discovery order itself, rather than through a pe
tition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the trial court's contempt judgment for dis
obeying that order, even though that practice was "consistent" with the state court's earlier
precedents. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 457-58; see also Bush, 531 U.S. at 114-15 (Rehnquist, C.J.
concurring); id. at 139 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). But see Bush, 531 U.S. at 114-15
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (suggesting, without explicitly stating, that the procedural
ground in Patterson was so "novel" as to be unforeseeable, thus raising an actual due process
problem; using Patterson as an example where "the Constitution requires this Court to un-
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disputed at all, as where the Court struck down a South Carolina su
preme court's reading of state trespass laws against civil rights sit-in
participants because that reading was "unforeseeable" in light of past
practice and thus violated due process when applied retroactively
against the demonstrators.282
That the Bush v. Gore debaters can depart in such radically differ
ent directions from their shared starting point283 may reveal something
dertake an independent, if still deferential, analysis of state law") (emphasis added}.
Justice Ginsburg also cited Central Union Telephone Co. v. City of Edwardsville, 269
U.S. 1 90 {1925), where the Court refused to reverse an Illinois Supreme Court decision, un
der a state procedural rule, that litigants attempting to raise federal contract-clause and due
process challenges against a state tax had waived those claims by appealing them from the
trial court first to an intermediate appellate court, which lacked jurisdiction to hear constitu
tional claims, rather than to the state supreme court. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 137-38 (citing
Central Union Telephone Co., 269 U.S. at 193-95) The Central Union Telephone Court ex
plicitly rejected the argument that a federal question, necessarily reviewable by the Supreme
Court, was always raised where state law declared a federal constitutional claim to have
been waived. 269 U.S. at 194-95; see also id. at 190-91 (reporting counsel's argument that
"[t]his Court is not bound by the determination of a state court that a federal constitutional
question has been waived . . . . Where there is a plain assertion of a federal constitutional
right in a lower court, local rules as to how far it will be reviewed on appeal do not prevail."
(citing, inter alia, Davis v. Wechsler, 263 U.S. 22 {1923); Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 17,
22 {1920); and Union Pacific R.R. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67 (1918)). Since the
Court decided Central Union Telephone, of course, it has found some state procedural rul
ings "inadequate" to shield a state-court decision from Supreme Court review even where
they do not violate any federal constitutional standard. See, e.g., Henry v. Mississippi, 379
U.S. 443 (1965); Staub v. City of Baxley, 355 U.S. 313 (1958). See generally HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 579-83 (discussing cases holding state grounds "inadequate"
even where not constitutionally flawed}; Wells, supra note 11, at 411-12 (discussing Court's
approaches when considering adequacy of state procedural grounds). See also Meltzer, supra
note 12, at 1 137-45 (same).
282. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); id. at 139 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (both citing Bouie v. City of Columbia, 378 U.S. 347 (1964), where, absent a ju
risdictional challenge, the Court rejected on the merits South Carolina supreme court's in
terpretation of state trespass laws against civil rights "sit-in" demonstrators because that in
terpretation was "unforeseeable" in light of past trespass rulings, and therefore violated due
process when applied retroactively to demonstrators). Similarly, both Chief Justice
Rehnquist and Justice Ginsburg cite Lucas v. Sottth Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003
(1992), to support their shared view that the Court is free to reverse state-court state-law
decisions, even though that case also raised no jurisdictional problem, but simply presented a
straightforward federal question, on the merits, of whether the state could constitutionally
regulate an undisputed state-created property interest despite Fifth Amendment's takings
clause. For a thorough discussion of how the Bush Justices used due process and ex post
facto doctrines - described as doctrines prohibiting "excessive retroactivity" - as a way to
frame their analysis of the Florida supreme court's state-law reading, see Krent, supra note
22, at 495-96, passim.
283. Professor Wells has argued that Chief Justice Rehnquist's citation of all these
precedents reveals something different: "an analytic error and a strategic blunder." Wells,
supra note 11, at 416. He contends that the question the Rehnquist concurrence meant to
and did answer - whether the Florida Court properly observed Article II constraints in
reading Florida election statutes - was a federal constitutional question that, straightfor
wardly, gave the Court appellate jurisdiction to review the state-court judgment de novo,
and on the merits. Id. at 419-20; see also id. at 420 n.68 (noting author's "premise that
[A]rticle II is a source of judicially enforceable rules regulating state presidential election
practices," while acknowledging a "serious constitutional argument" that Article II may only
be enforced by Congress). Thus Rehnquist, by agreeing with the Bush dissenters that the
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fundamental about the Court's modern shift towards an antecedence
based appellate power over state courts. Remember, in cases like
Murdock and Love County the Court once declared itself without ju
risdiction to supplant a state court's reading of state law absent
grounds for declaring it "inadequate" - even where that state law ef
fectively blocked the path of a federally-protected interest.284 But now
that the Court feels free to reverse a state ground wherever it simply
antecedes a federal interest, jurisdiction no longer presents the diffi
cult threshold question it once did. Instead, the Court now assumes its
jurisdiction285 and then asks only how much deference it owes a state
court's judgment on the meaning of state law.286 Thus the stiff "ade
quacy" standards confounding the Court in Union Pacific, Love
County, and Davis have given way to indeterminate, shifting, and dis
cretionary guidelines to govern reversals on the merits.
So, in Bush v. Gore, Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Ginsburg
can essentially agree that the Court has the power (that is, jurisdic
tion) to reverse any state-court state-law judgment that blocks a fed
eral claim, but disagree vociferously over how searching the Court's
review of that state grounds, on the merits, should be. Indeed, Justice
Ginsburg's central criticism of the Chief Justice - like that of fellow
dissenters Breyer and Souter - was that he was insufficiently "mind
ful of the full measure of respect we owe to interpretations of state law
by a State's highest court."287
"task" was to determine whether the state-law grounds were "adequate" to support the
Florida court's judgment, id. at 416, unnecessarily saddled himself with the need to show
deference to the state-court's state-law ruling, instead of freeing himself to conduct the kind
of de novo merits review the Court conducts in the ordinary case challenging state law under
federal constitutional standards. Id. at 417.
284. See, e.g., Love County, 253 U.S. at 22-23; Johnson v. Risk, 137 U.S. 300 (1890).
285. Even so, the Court continues to declare that the rule prohibiting it from reviewing
federal questions in the face of an adequate and independent state ground is "jurisdictional."
Sochor v. Florida, 504 U.S. 527, 534 (1992); Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1037-44 (1983).
286. See supra notes 34-35 (discussing various deference guidelines).
287. Bush, 531 U.S. at 137; see also id. at 138 ("In deferring to state courts on matters of
state law, we appropriately recognize that this Court acts as an ' "outside[r]" lacking the
common exposure to local law which comes from sitting in the jurisdiction.' ") (quoting
Lehman Brothers v. Schein, 416 U.S. 386, 391 (1974)) {alteration in original). Chief Justice
Rehnquist, by contrast, while acknowledging that "we generally defer to state courts on the
interpretation of state law," id. at 1 14, suggested that a more searching "independent, if still
deferential, analysis of state law" was called for wherever state law had an effect on the pur
suit of constitutional interests. ld. But see id. at 1 14-15 & n.1 (citing, as examples of this level
of review, both NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and Fairfax's
Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813), even though neither raised con
stitutional questions). For one view that it was unnecessary for Chief Justice Rehnquist to
give any deference to the Florida court decision, and that his doing so weakened his concur
rence and laid him open to the dissenters' criticism, see Wells, supra note 1 1 , at 417 ("Bush is
actually a simple case of federal law constraining state authority . . . . No deference toward
the state court's interpretation of state law is called for in such a case."). See also id. at 42021 ("While the exact content of (Article II] limits on state courts remain uncertain after
Bush, we know that [A]rticle II may demand scrutiny of the state court's reasoning and a
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And what about the jurisdictional discipline, driving the "ade
quacy" cases decided under Murdock's influence, that state-court
state-law rulings remain untouchable unless there is some palpable
reason to suspect a state court of manipulating state law to thwart fed
eral interests and then evade Supreme Court review?288 Antecedence
based jurisdiction makes suspicion largely irrelevant, for the Court's
power depends on the sequence in which state and federal issues arise,
and not on any particular reason to mistrust one state or all states. The
Bush v. Gore opinions treat that kind of suspicion as irrelevant to the
Court's jurisdiction; rather, it affects only the task of choosing among
the Court's discretionary guidelines for how much deference the Court
will give a state court's reading of state law on the merits.289 Justice
Ginsburg argued, for one, that there must be some extraordinary rea
son to mistrust a state court before the Court should conduct more
than a highly deferential review of its reading of state law. Indeed, she
demanded that there be shown something "close to the kind of recalci
trance by a state high court" which, in her view, explained why the
Court reversed state-court state-law decisions during the civil rights
struggles of the 1950s and 1960s290 and, long before that, during the era
comparison between Florida's election law before and after the Florida Court's interven
tion. . . . George W. Bush did not need to show that the Florida Court 'impermissibly dis
torted' state law in order to win; nor does the state ruling survive scrutiny merely because it
may be a 'reasonable' construction of the Florida election statute.") (citations omitted); see
also Tribe, supra note 20, at 193 (advocating highly deferential review permitting reversal
only where state court reached "manifestly unreasonable" reading of state law).
288. See supra note 160 and accompanying text (discussing, inter alia, Johnson v. Risk
and Leuthe v. Thomas) . Recall that in these post-Murdock cases, the Court asked whether
state-law rulings were "unfounded" to help determine whether the state court had reached
its judgment in good faith, or had, contrarily, used state law in a way that was "essentially
arbitrary or a mere device to prevent a review of the decision upon the federal question."
Enter. Irrigation Dist. v. Farmer Mut. Canal Co., 243 U.S. 157, 164 (1917). It was not
enough, otherwise, to show that the state court had gotten state law wrong, even if very
wrong. See Murdock v. Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 635 (1874) (holding that the Court
may look at the record to determine whether adequate and independent state grounds may
support state-court judgment, but may not determine whether the nonfederal grounds "were
correctly or erroneously decided"); accord Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U.S. 93, 99 (1907)
(Holmes, J.) (holding that where the state court decides a case on "palpably unfounded"
nonfederal grounds, the Court may conclude that the state court was "seeking to evade the
jurisdiction of this [Supreme] court"); Vandalia R.R. Co. v. Indiana ex rel. South Bend, 207
U.S. 359, 367 (1907) ("A case may arise in which it is apparent that a Federal question is
sought to be avoided or is avoided by giving an unreasonable construction to plead
ings . . . . "; where state court read pleading reasonably, "there is nothing to justify a suspicion
that there was any intent to avoid the Federal questions.").
289. See Wells, supra note 1 1 , at 414 (noting that in antecedent state-law cases, the
Court has reviewed state grounds' adequacy under various levels of deference, ranging from
what is essentially de novo review to an intermediate scrutiny that asks whether the state-law
judgment " 'rests upon a fair or substantial basis[)' " to an even less searching review of that
judgment) (quoting Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944)).
290. Bush, 531 U.S. at 141 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing NAACP v. Alabama ex rel.
Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), and emphasizing that it was decided "in the face of Southern
resistance to the civil rights movement" and only three months after the Court claimed judi
cial supremacy over constitutional meaning in Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958)).
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of "vociferous States' rights attacks on the Marshall Court" that pro
duced Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.291 She saw no such extraordinary cir
cumstances in Bush v. Gore.292
By contrast, although Chief Justice Rehnquist admitted that
Florida's election law "may well admit to more than one interpreta
tion," and although he described his scrutiny of the Florida supreme
court's reading of that law as "deferential,"293 he conducted what
amounted to a de novo review of that court's state-law analysis. With
out identifying any particular reason to suspect the Florida supreme
court of cheating here, Chief Justice Rehnquist nonetheless used the
language of mistrust to declare that that court should be reversed for
"impermissibly distort[ing]" the Florida election laws "beyond what a
fair reading required."294 His suspicion of the Florida court colored indeed, it appeared to drive - his entire opinion.295
Thus, in the century and a quarter between Murdock v. Memphis
and Bush v. Gore, the Court shifted significantly from the notion that
having a reason to mistrust a state's particular reading of state law jus
tifies an exception to the ordinary black-letter rule denying the Court
j urisdiction to reverse state-court state-law decisions, to the modern
assumption that the Court may always reverse on state grounds where
state-law antecedes a federal interest in state court. While applying
this view was nearly effortless, justifying this modern view has proven
more difficult.

291. See Bush, 531 U.S. at 140 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (citing Martin v. Hunter's
Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)).
292. Bush, 531 U.S. at 136 ("There is no cause here to believe that the members of
Florida's high court have done less than 'their mortal best to discharge their oath of of
fice.' ") (quoting Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 549 (1981)). The three other dissenters all
agreed that there was no reason to conclude that Florida court's state-law ruling, even if er
roneous, was so far out of line as to warrant the extraordinary step of Supreme Court rever
sal. See id. at 127-28 (Stevens, J., dissenting); id. at 131 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 147-52
(Breyer, J., dissenting).
293. Id. at 1 14 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). For one argument that Chief Justice
Rehnquist committed an analytic and strategic error by admitting the need for any defe rence
at all to the Florida supreme court's reading of state law, see Wells, supra note 1 1 , at 416-19.
See also id. at 405 ("The proper rule for Bush is that the state court's reasoning deserves no
deference.").
294. Bush, 531 U.S. at 115 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring) (contending that, on the basis
of that distortion, the Court should have declared the Florida court to have violated the
Constitution's Article II); see also id. at 1 19 (declaring further that "no reasonable person"
would agree with the Florida court's state-law reading of one provision, and that its reading
of another was "of course absurd").
295. Tushnet, supra note 20, at 115 & n.21 (noting that the concurrence's reliance on
1960s cases using "innovative doctrines to control the excesses of anti-civil rights Southern
supreme courts support[s]" the view that "[t]he Justices in the majority sincerely believed
that they were observing a process in which a highly partisan state supreme court had simply
gotten out of control and was attempting to steal the election from the rightful victor").
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IV. THEORIES OF POWER
Theories justifying the Court's state-ground reversals fall into
three categories: the federal common law theory, the whole case the
ory, and the supremacy/due process theory. All three raise problems,
some made more pronounced by recent cases developing the Court's
doctrines on supremacy, due process, and federalism. Because I con
sider the first two least satisfying, I critique them first. The third taking supremacy as a starting point - is the most promising. While
rejecting the direction that others have taken from there, the proven
mistrust proposal shares some of their basic premises.
A.

The Federal Common-Law Theory

Some argue that state-ground reversals represent an appropriate
exercise of the Court's federal common-law making power.296 Building
on the premise that it is always a federal question whether a state
ground is "adequate and independent,"297 this theory maintains that
the Court may therefore craft federal common-law standards to police
state-law "adequacy" claims, just as the Court may make federal
common law to decide the claim-preclusive effect of a diversity court's
dismissal on statute of limitations grounds.298 As Professor Field has
explained:
state procedural rules applied to block a federal right accord with federal
purposes only when insistence on them in the particular case serves a le
gitimate state interest;f99] otherwise the state rules will be rejected as

296. See generally Martha Field, Sources of Law: The Scope of Federal Common Law,
99 HARV. L. REV. 881 (1986); Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie - and ofthe new Federal
Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383 (1964).
297. See Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362, 375 (2002) ("The adequacy of state procedural
bars to the assertion of federal questions . . . is itself a federal question.") (internal quota
tions omitted); Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443, 447 (1965) ("[T]he question of when and
how defaults in compliance with state procedural rules can preclude our consideration of a
federal question is itself a federal question."); see also Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1160.
298. Semtek Int'I, Inc. v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 508 (2001) (declaring
that "federal common law governs the claim preclusive effect of a dismissal by a federal
court sitting in diversity"); accord Boyle v. United Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 (1988) (in
voking federal judicial common-law making power to formulate special tort defense for mili
tary contractors sued for injuries caused by design defects); Clearfield Trust Co. v. United
States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (creating federal common-law rule recognizing laches defense
against United States' action to recover on fraudulently endorsed federal paycheck); see also
Field, supra note 296, at 967 & n.379 (noting Henry's power "theory does not explain why
state rules cannot stand as long as they are constitutional").
299. See, e.g., Lee, 534 U.S. at 391 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) ("A defendant's failure to
comply with a firmly established and regularly followed rule has been deemed an inadequate
state ground only when the State has no legitimate interest in the rule's enforcement.") (cit
ing Osborne v. Ohio, 495 U.S. 103, 124 (1990)).
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aberrant, or contrary to United States policy, despite the general federal
commitment to allowing state procedures to operate.300
But even its advocates recognize that this theory only justifies the
Court's practice of reversing on state procedural grounds. According
to Professor Field, "When a state substantive rule is broad enough to
support a state-court result, the Supreme Court cannot review the
ruling without holding the state law unconstitutional."301 Thus, the
federal common-law theory cannot justify the Court's decisions - in
cluding Fairfax's Devisee, Union Pacific, Love County, Davis, and the
Bush v. Gore concurrence - reversing state courts' last words on what
state substantive law means.
B.

The Whole-Case Theory

Some commentators build on the early Court's broad supplemen
tal jurisdiction claims in Martin and Osbom302 to justify state-grounds
reversals: "Article III, § 2 of the Constitution gives the Supreme Court
appellate jurisdiction over all federal question cases. Such 'cases' in300. Field, supra note 296, at 969; see also Lee, 534 U.S. at 387 (declaring state proce
dural default inadequate to bar the Court's review of due process claim because, inter alia,
"formally perfect compliance" with rule in case's particular circumstances did not serve a
"legitimate state interest").
301. Field, supra note 296, at 967 (footnotes omitted). Professor Field's argument builds
on the post-Erie notion that there are "two kinds of state law: state law operating 'of its own
force,' and state law applying 'by federal choice.' " Field, supra note 296, at 968. Whereas
Erie requires all federal courts to honor state-court decisions on state law that fall in the first
category - those that operate "of [their] own force" - post-Erie federal common law deci
sions recognize that when a "uniquely federal interest" is implicated by enforcement of state
law, then that state law may be put into the second category - state law applying only "by
federal choice" - thus freeing federal courts to supplant it through a federal common-law
rule. See Boyle, 487 U.S. 500; accord Field, supra note 296, at 973-74 (describing "conven
tional analysis" that distinguishes between two kinds of state law, for purposes of deciding
whether Erie applies or whether, instead, federal court may create common law rule to sup
plant state law; concluding that it is "difficult to understand the distinction" between two
categories of state Jaw). But see Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1054 (arguing that the Court's
power to reverse "inadequate" state grounds should be the same whether "the antecedent
state law issue is substantive or procedural": "It is difficult to understand . . . why there
should be a difference in the nature or the scope of the Supreme Court's examination of the
state determination"). In Lee v. Kemna, the Court explained that the rule barring federal
review of adequate and independent state grounds "applies with equal force whether the
state-law ground is substantive or procedural." 534 U.S. at 375 (citing Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 729 (1991)). But the Court then suggested, obliquely, that there
might be one important difference between substantive and procedural state grounds, speci
fying that " '[t]he adequacy of state procedural bars to the assertion of federal questions . . .
is itself a federal question.' " Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Douglas v. Alabama, 380 U.S.
415, 422 (1965)). If the Court meant to signal that the adequacy of state substantive grounds
was not a federal question, or was somehow less of a federal question, then it would lend
force to Professor Field's argument. Even if the Court did not mean to draw this distinction,
Lee left unanswered Professor Field's question why, even under a federal adequacy review,
"state rules cannot stand as long as they are constitutional.'' Field, supra note 296, at 967
n.379.
302. See supra Section II.A.
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elude issues of both federal and state law."303 This theory reads Article
III as building into the Court's appellate powers an automatic supple
mental jurisdiction that always extends the federal judicial power to
nonfederal issues arising alongside federal ones in state-court cases.
And thus the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine en
forces what is at most a nonconstitutional, prudential constraint304 on
the Court's Article III-based power to decide each and every issue in a
state-court case so long as at least one federal question arises there as
wen.3os
But while superficially tidy, this theory grows more unsatisfying
when probed more deeply. For one thing, while the "whole case" ap
proach may well explain why the Court may exercise a kind of sup
plemental subject matter jurisdiction over state-law issues joined with
federal ones, it does not obviously explain why the Court is free to
contradict state law as declared by the state's highest court, as the
Court necessarily does when it reverses a state ground. By contrast,
when inferior federal courts decide state-law questions in the exercise
of their statutory supplemental jurisdiction,306 they are ordinarily com
pelled to apply state law as they find it to whatever state-law questions
303. Matasar & Bruch, supra note 10, at 1292 n.1; see also id. at 1311 n.77 ("The
Supreme Court's power to reach state issues of law is found only inferentially in the
Constitution. In other than diversity controversies, the power is founded solely on article
I l l 's definition of a 'case' or 'controversy.' "). A more recent commentary takes the same
starting point. See Fountaine, supra note 10, at 1054 n.1. HART & WECHSLER expresses less
confidence that the question is beyond dispute. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at
519-21 (asking, but not answering, the question of whether a statute requiring the Supreme
Court to review state-court decisions on state law would be constitutional, positing contrary
result in Murdock).
304. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 10, at 1293 n.2 (arguing that the Court's restraint
in reviewing state-court judgments expresses values of comity and federalism, but is not itself
constitutionally or statutorily required). Contrast Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 430 n.40 (1963),
where the Court declared:
We need not decide whether the adequate state-ground is constitutionally compelled or
merely a matter of the construction of the statutes defining this Court's appellate review.
Murdock itself was predicated on statutory construction, and the present statute governing
our review of state court decisions . . . limited as it is to 'judgments or decrees rendered by
the highest court of a State in which a decision could be had' (italics supplied), provides am
ple statutory warrant for our continued adherence to the principles laid down in Murdock.
Id.
305. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 10, at 1 293 n.2 (arguing that the "whole case"
theory of judicial power means that the adequate and independent state grounds doctrine
reflects only the Court's "refus[al] to exercise the full breadth of its appellate jurisdiction
over all federal question 'cases' "; concluding that the doctrine's bar against reaching state or
federal issues in such cases "is not compelled by any enacted law," including the
Constitution).
306. See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (1993) (defining terms under which district courts may exer
cise supplemental jurisdiction over state issues in cases that cannot satisfy federal diversity
jurisdiction). This statute appears to encourage federal district courts to avoid decisions that
might alter the course of state law in a way that the state's own decisionmakers would not.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (c)(l) (1993) (specifying that a court may decline to exercise supple
mental jurisdiction if the state-law claim "raises a novel or complex issue of State law").
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they encounter. Thus supplemental jurisdiction is ordinarily just that
- jurisdiction - and it does not automatically convey the distinct
choice-of-law power to displace state law,307 as Erie itself makes
clear.308
Second, the "whole case" theory's main pillar - Osborn v. United
States309
cannot really support it. For one thing, Murdock later
specifically rejected the "whole case" reading of the Court's statutory
appellate jurisdiction, declaring that that statute denied the Court
power to reverse on questions other than those triggering its jurisdic
tion in the first place,310 a repudiation "whole case" advocates ignore.
For another thing, even on its own terms, Osborn provides only
weak, rhetorical support for any modern "whole case" argument for
state-ground reversals. Osborn was a case about the original jurisdic
tion of inferior federal courts, and its more sweeping statements de
pended on the Court's unexamined assumption that everything true
about the inferior federal courts' exercise of original jurisdiction must
also be true about the Supreme Court's exercise of appellate jurisdic
tion, and vice versa.311 That is, to borrow from Professor Caminker,
-

307. When an inferior federal court asserts supplemental jurisdiction over state-law
claims within the same "case" as federal ones, that court must follow state law in answering
those state-law questions; moreover, its reading of state law has no precedential force in
later cases in state courts. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); see also
Matasar, supra note 116.
308. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). As the Supreme Court itself more
recently observed, "a federal court [may] not generally apply a federal rule of decision, de
spite the existence of jurisdiction, in the absence of an applicable Act of Congress," constitu
tional provision or other non-judicial souree of federal law." Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S.
304, 313 (1981) (explaining Erie); see also Matasar & Bruch, supra note 10, at 1299 n.25
(noting that "[t]oday, of course, lower federal courts' decisions on state law issues are con
strained by Erie's choice of law rules" when exercising either diversity or supplemental ju
risdiction over them).
309. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824) (Marshall, C.J.). See supra Part II (discussing
Osborn).

310. See Murdock v. City of Memphis, fr7 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590, 630 (1874) (rejecting the
argument that by repealing explicit limitation to appellate review only of federal-law ques
tions Congress meant to free the Court to review as well state-court decisions on state-law
questions, since even without the statutory limitation, "on general principles the [Court's
appellate jurisdiction] extended no further" than "the correction of errors relating solely to
Federal law"); see also id. (concluding that statutory limitation "may well be held to have
been superfluous, or nearly so"). Indeed, the Murdock majority did so over strong dissenting
opinions from two Justices urging the very "whole case" view of the Court's appellate juris
diction that Osborn is now argued to have institutionalized. See id. at 638-42.
311. Osborn involved an inferior federal court's original jurisdiction to entertain a non
federal claim - not the Court's appellate jurisdiction over state-court judgments - but
Marshall saw no difference between original and appellate jurisdiction in reasoning that fed
eral courts may decide questions beyond their formally granted subject matter jurisdiction.
Having declared that Article III made "[o]riginal jurisdiction . . . coextensive with the judi
cial power," Osborn, 22 U.S. at 821, Marshall reasoned that any constitutional limit on fed
eral supplemental jurisdiction would necessarily apply equally whether federal courts were
exercising original jurisdiction or appellate jurisdiction, like the Supreme Court reviewing
state-court judgments. He maintained:
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Osborn assumes that the Article III j udicial power has a
"one-size-fits-all quality" to it, so that "the power of any one federal
court is identical to the power of any other."312
But while Osborn may be right that no court, federal or otherwise,
could effectively exercise original j urisdiction over a case without the
power to decide each and every question that might arise (whether
governed by state or federal law},313 it does not follow that effective
appellate jurisdiction likewise requires the same. Unlike a court with
original jurisdiction, which must necessarily predict what the authori
tative state court would say state law means in a case's particular cir
cumstances, the Supreme Court exercising appellate j urisdiction over
a state-court judgment (usually} already knows,314 making it function
ally unnecessary for the Court to re-visit state grounds - a distinction
Murdock itself drew, further undercutting Osborn's "whole case"
rhetoric.315 Indeed, even when Osborn was decided, cases entered into
(I]f the circumstance that other points are involved in it [the "whole case"], shall disable
Congress from authorizing the Courts of the Union to take jurisdiction of the original cause,
it equally disables Congress from authorizing those Courts to take jurisdiction of the whole
cause, on an appeal, and thus will be restricted to a single question in that cause . . . .
Id. at 822. Marshall concluded that so limiting federal courts' supplemental jurisdiction

would frustrate Article Ill, which "obviously intended to secure to those who claim rights
under the constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, a trial in the federal Courts."
Id. at 822. Instead, federal claimants would "be restricted to the insecure remedy of an ap
peal upon an insulated point, after it has received that shape which may be given to it by an
other tribunal, into which he is forced against his will." Id. at 822-23.
312. Evan Caminker, Allocating the Judicial Power in a "Unified Judiciary," 78 TEXAS
L. REV. 1513, 1515 (2000) (describing this view as "discrete-vesting postulate"); see also
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 520 (identifying this distinction as one ignored by for
mer-Justice Curtis in his brief in Murdock, but not also citing Osborn).
313. See Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Relations Between State and Federal Law, 54 COLUM.
L. REV. 489, 504 (1954) ("Jurisdiction in the first instance, unlike appellate jurisdiction, is
unavoidably jurisdiction to decide whole cases and not merely questions in cases."). Almost
by definition, when a case comes within the original jurisdiction of a federal court, no state
court has first adjudicated any questions that case might raise, whether under federal or state
law. Even under federal statutes that permit cases to be removed from state to federal court,
a party must petition for removal within thirty days of the initial filing indicating the case's
removability. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (2002) (in diversity case, barring removal on grounds of
diversity of citizenship within one year after the action commenced, even if filing revealing
removability introduced thereafter). This makes it unlikely that the state court where the
action.was first filed would have ruled on any or many issues in the case, absent an early mo
tion in the nature of a temporary restraining order. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at
1623-34. Absent supplemental original jurisdiction, state claims would have to be split off
from federal ones and pursued separately in parallel state proceedings, a significant ineffi
ciency wasting both state and federal judicial resources. See Matasar, supra note 1 16. See
generally supra notes 113-116 (discussing cases and commentary discussing supplemental
original jurisdiction).
314. HART & WECHSLER uses this distinction to explain why the Court's appellate ju
risdiction over federal questions is broader that inferior federal courts' original jurisdiction
over federal questions, which must satisfy the well-pied complaint rule. HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 6, at 900 (observing that original jurisdiction must "be based on conjecture,"
while appellate jurisdiction "can be tailored to the case as it has actually developed").
315. To the contrary, Murdock observed, Congress had consistently recognized a crucial
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the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction, either from inferior federal
courts or from state courts, primarily by writ of error,316 under which
review was strictly limited to questions of law and not of fact, a restric
tion that would have been nonsensical in any grant of original jurisdic
tion. It is far less likely that the Court could have its appellate pro
ceedings "arrested" by its inability to reach nonfederal questions.
Accordingly, while Osborn might help explain why any Article III
based original jurisdiction over a "case" must necessarily also convey
the supplemental jurisdiction to decide nonfederal questions, Osborn
does not persuasively resolve the very different question whether the
Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction should be understood in the
same way.
Finally, the Osborn-based "whole case" explanation takes no seri
ous account of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,317 or of the massive re
ordering of assumptions about the Article III judicial power that deci
sion compelled.318 While contemporary scholars have admitted that
the "whole case" view of the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction
over state-court decisions "may appear strange from a twentieth cen
tury perspective" refigured by Erie,319 no one has asked seriously

difference between the two by granting original jurisdiction over "whole cases," while limit
ing appellate jurisdiction to particular, well-defined questions within cases. Murdock, 87 U.S.
(20 Wall.) at 630-31. Citing various examples, Murdock concluded:
[They] show very clearly that when Congress desired a case to be tried on all the issues in
volved in it because one of those issues was to be controlled by the Constitution, laws, or
treaties of the United States, it was their policy to vest its cognizance in a court of original
jurisdiction, and not in an appellate tribunal.
And we think it equally clear that is has been the counterpart of the same policy to vest in
the Supreme Court, as a court of appeal from the State courts, a jurisdiction limited to the
questions of a Federal character which might be involved in such cases.
Id. at 631.
316. See RITZ, supra note 79, at 68-69, 87-89 (explaining how the 1789 Judiciary Act
used "writ of error" device to limit the Supreme Court's reviewing inferior court judgments
on questions of law only, denying the Court power to retry facts de novo).
317. 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
318. Again, this Article does not purport to resolve the question - itself the subject of
considerate debate - of whether Erie formally governs the Supreme Court's appellate juris
diction to review state-court judgments. See supra note 47 (citing scholarship addressing
Erie's scope). Nonetheless, Erie remains a potential problem for "whole case" proponents,
who routinely cite Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816), and its com
panion, Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 603 (1813), for the continu
ing proposition that the Court may indeed constitutionally review and reverse state-court
judgments on state-law questions. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 115 n.l (2000)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring); Matasar & Bruch, supra note 10. These "whole case" citations
essentially overlook the fact that Martin's author - Justice Story - also wrote Swift v.
Tyson, which Erie of course overruled. See Matasar & Bruch, supra note 10, at 1298 n.22
(admitting that this connection between Martin and Swift may make the former another ex
ample of federal court efforts to discern an overarching natural law, an endeavor Erie de
clared obsolete).
319. Matasar & Bruch, supra note 10, at 1298 n.22. Other scholars have explored more
carefully the inconsistencies between a broad Supreme Court power to reverse state-court
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whether Erie's constitutional limits on all Article III j udicial power
should not also affect the Court's appellate authority to reverse state
court decisions on state-law questions.320 That is, even if Osborn's pre
Erie "whole case" theory could explain why the Supreme Court could
then claim a broad supplemental j urisdiction to decide state-law ques
tions, it does little to answer why Erie should not now compel the
Court to accept state law as definitively governing those state-law
questions, despite the Court's own views of what a more reasonable
state-law reading would be.321
C.

Supremacy Clause and Due Process Theories

Others have j ustified the Court's state-ground reversals using ei
ther due process principles or the intuition that constitutional suprem
acy requires some federal judicial mechanism to police state courts
decisions on state-law grounds and the limits on federal judicial power to supplant state law
that Erie and Murdock erect. See, e.g., Field, supra note 296, at 974 & n.396 (observing that
federal common lawmaking practice, with its distinction between state law that operates by
its own force and state law that may be displaced by federal courts, "undercuts both Erie and
Murdock"); id. ("It undercuts the importance of Murdock because federal courts can alter or
depart from state law chosen as a matter of federal j udicial discretion.").
320. Indeed, in Bush Chief Justice Rehnquist made only a "cf" citation to Erie before
launching into his wholesale critique of the Florida Supreme Court's reading of Florida elec
tion law. Bush, 531 U.S. at 116-20. Professor Meltzer makes slightly more of Erie, drawing a
parallel between it and Murdock:
Just as Erie . . . held that federal courts must follow state decisions on matters governed by
state law, so Murdock ruled that the Supreme Court, in exercising its appellate jurisdiction,
must honor the state law reflected in the judgment under review. . . . Murdock, like Erie,
averts federal decisions on matters governed by state law that have no precedential value in
a state court. As a consequence, the governing law does not depend upon the forum - state
or federal - hearing the case.
Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1134 (citations omitted).
321. Professor Hill argued that the Court's reversal of a state-law decision on nonconsti
tutional "adequacy" grounds represents only a "minimum of interference with matters
within the province of the states, in pursuance of a course giving meaningful protection to
federal rights." Hill, supra note 10, at 969-70. He reasoned:
In assuming such a role [in reversing state-court state-law rulings] the Supreme Court does
not interfere with the law-making function of the state courts, for the latter remain free to
change the decisional law of the state, by the overruling of old decisions or otherwise, as long
as there is no violation of federal law. The effect of proclaiming the decision on the state
question to be "wrong" in the particular case affects only the particular litigants, and the
purpose is to ensure consideration by federal judicial authority of the federal claims in the
case.
Id. at 969.

But when an inferior federal court asserts supplemental jurisdiction over state-law
claims within the same "case" as federal ones, Erie principles require the federal court to
follow state law in answering those state-law questions; moreover, its reading of state law has
no precedential force in later cases in state courts. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383
U.S. 715 (1966); see also Matasar, supra note 1 16; Matasar & Bruch, supra note 10, at 1299
n.25 (noting that "today, of course, lower federal courts' decisions on state law issues are
constrained by Erie's choice of law rules" when exercising either diversity or supplemental
jurisdiction over them).
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that cheat federal law and then hide behind a superficially "adequate"
state ground.322 These advocates use the Constitution's supremacy and
due process principles in two ways, one strong and one modulated.
The strong version, which appears to drive some who advocate appel
late jurisdiction wherever a state-law question antecedes a federal-law
issue, builds on the basic premise that the Court's central role in en
forcing federal-law supremacy gives it a standing jurisdiction to vindi
cate any fe deral right or other interest,323 even (or, perhaps, especially)
if it is lurking behind a state-law question.324 Thus, whenever a state
court's decision on state law somehow blocks a federal-law interest,
the Court may review it to make sure the state-law ruling is worth de
nying that federal interest a hearing in federal court. And the state-law
need not actually violate federal law to be held unworthy - remem
ber, the Court has only very rarely ruled a state grounds "inadequate"
because unconstitutionaP25 - but it can be held unworthy because, al322. See supra notes 276, 286-287, 326 and accompanying text.
323. Professor Fallon described this presumption as intrinsic to a "nationalist" model of
judicial federalism, which works from the "premises that state sovereignty interests must
yield to the vindication of federal rights and that, because state courts should not be pre
sumed as competent as federal courts to enforce constitutional liberties, rights to have fed
eral issues adjudicated in a federal forum should be construed broadly." Fallon, supra note
136, at 1145 (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Nationalist insists, federal jurisdictional
statutes should be interpreted to make that federal forum available:

Absent clear evidence to the contrary, federal judges should assume that federal courts are
likely to be more prompt and effective than state courts in protecting federal constitutional
rights, and they should craft doctrines of judge-made law that permit the federal courts to act
as the presumptively available enforcers of constitutional norms.
Id. at 1160-61 (noting that those holding this view also tend to assume that Congress, "in en

acting much of the remedial and jurisdictional legislation that is most controverted in federal
courts jurisprudence, acted out of suspicion, if not antipathy toward state courts and wholly
rejected notions of practical parity"). Or, as Professor Wells put it in discussing the Court's
appellate jurisdiction in Bush:
The Supreme Court's role is to see that federal law receives the respect it deserves from the
state courts, no more and no less. Consequently, the availability of Supreme Court review of
a state court decision depends on whether the state ruling in some way implicates federal
law. . . . Because the Supreme Court may intervene only insofar as necessary to defend the
federal interest and no further, review is ordinarily limited to the federal issues.
Wells, supra note 11, at 408 (emphasis added).
324. As Professor Wechsler argued, Supreme Court direct review of state-court deci
sions is always appropriate where "existence, application or implementation of a federal
right turns on the resolution of a logically antecedent issue of state law. Because of that rela
tionship the state court does not speak the final word on the state question . . . ." Wechsler,
supra note 11, at 1054; see also id. at 1056 (advocating direct review wherever "necess(ary] to
maintain the effectiveness and uniformity of the federal law").
325. See, e.g., Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust & Savings Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930) (ruling
state-law procedural default inadequate to preclude Supreme Court consideration of equal
protection claim because state rule was "unforeseeable" and therefore violated due process).
See generally HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 577-79 {discussing the few cases in which
the Court actually held state procedural grounds inadequate because unconstitutional); Hill,
supra note 10, at 944-45 (same); id. at 959-60 {observing that "the Court, in disallowing the
state ground . . . almost never invokes the due process clause in support of its holding"; citing
Brinkerhoff-Faris as "a striking exception").
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though entirely constitutional, it is too "erroneous," "burdensome,"
"unreasonable," or "arbitrary" to j ustify silencing a federal interest.326
The Court, in a sense, simply concludes that the lurking fe deral inter
est outweighs the value of the state law blocking its path.327
The modulated version starts with the same basic premise - that
the Court may always enforce the Constitution's due process and su
premacy principles - but builds on it a narrower claim to appellate
jurisdiction: even where the Court finds no actual constitutional flaw
in a state-law ruling, the Court may nonetheless seek to enforce re
lated, sub-constitutional preferences for reasonable, nonarbitrary
state-court decisionmaking wherever supremacy-protected federal in
terests are at stake.328
This is the version Professor Hill advanced in 1965329 when - la
menting the Court's own failure to articulate a doctrinal j ustification
for its practice of reversing state-court state-law decisions330 - he can
vassed the Court's various nonconstitutional "inadequacy" reversals to
that point and offered two "doctrinal" bases for Supreme Court power
to review state-court decisions on state law. First, Hill argued, due
process should discourage states from blocking federal claims "arbi326. But see Hill, supra note 10, at 962 (arguing that the Court should always declare a
state-law ruling to violate due process when it departs substantially from prior sta!e prece
dent, or when the state court "overlooked or misread a point in the record, or characterized
something in the record in a way that seemingly is arbitrary"); id. at 959-60 (acknowledging
that the Court has not followed this path, and only rarely holds a state-ground inadequate
because actually violating due process).
327. See Wells, supra note 11, at 414 (observing that "antecedence" cases raise the "un
derlying problem of balancing state and federal issues," and "the federal interest cannot be
vindicated without paying some attention to the state ground"). The Court adopted this ap
proach most overtly in Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965), which held that failure to
comply with a state's procedural rule would not preclude a criminal defendant from raising
federal constitutional challenges on direct appeal to the Supreme Court where the Court
found the state rule did not substantially serve a "legitimate state interest," or where that
state interest had been adequately met by defendant's actual conduct in case. ld. at 447. Al
though Henry was received as marking out a radical new direction in the Court's state
grounds adequacy review, see, e.g., Hill, supra note 10, at 944, the Court has not pursued
Henry's potential. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 585 ("[T)he Henry decision has
had little effect on the standards applied on direct review in judging the adequacy of state
procedural grounds."); Wechsler, supra note 11, at 1055 (writing in 1977, and observing
"whether the Henry principle has really been established may still be an open question. The
decisions of the last twelve years do not dispel the possibility that it is merely being treated
with intelligent neglect").
328. For analysis of how the Court uses common-law methods to craft sub-constitutional
rules that further constitutional principles on the merits, see Henry P. Monaghan, The
Supreme Court, 1974 Term - Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1,
28-29 (1975).
329. Hill, supra note 10, at 943.
330. Hill, supra note 10, at 943 (noting that "[t]he Court has . . . reserved to itself the
right to determine whether the state ground is 'adequate' or 'tenable' . . . . The doctrinal ba
sis for this type of review has seldom been explored - least of all by the Court itself'); see
id. at 944 (remarking on "(t]he general insufficiency of doctrinal development" on this juris
dictional question).
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trar[ily] " or as the result of "reversible [state-law] error," even where
no actual due process violation has occurred.331 On this view, the
Court appropriately reverses state-court state-law rulings that fail to
meet those sub-constitutional standards, so that it may reach the fed
eral interests standing behind.
Second, "quite simply," the Court has "jurisdiction to determine
whether the state court has given federal law its due under the su
premacy clause."332 But even though the structural concern underlying
supremacy-based j urisdiction is that states may manipulate state law to
disfavor federal interests and evade review333 � that is, one j ust can't
trust states not to cheat334 - Professor Hill argued that the Court's re
versal power in any particular case does not and ought not depend on
any particular finding that a state "willfully evaded" federal law.335 In
deed, Professor Hill considered this one of the chief virtues of his pro
posal: it permitted the Court to reverse state-court state-law rulings
that blocked federal interests without having to attribute "bad faith to
state officers sworn to uphold federal law."336
This reading brings Professor Hill's more modulated theory close
to the stronger claim that the existence of a federal interest always
331. Hill, supra note 10, at 962 (including both substantive and procedural due process
standards in this discussion); see also id. at 957-59 (noting that the Court rarely explicitly
characterizes inadequate state grounds as "arbitrary"). Professor Hill argued that the Court
should characterize more of its "inadequacy" rulings as constitutional rulings, given their
basis in the Court's conclusion that the state-law decision was somehow "arbitrary." But see
id. at 971 (arguing that the Court should not rule state grounds to be "inadequate" because
they may be unduly "burdensome . . . although not so burdensome as to be violative of due
process").
332. Hill, supra note 10, at 959.
333. See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 520 (arguing that "where a state law rul
ing serves as an antecedent for determining whether a federal right has been violated, some
(Supreme Court] review of the basis for the state court's determination of the state-law ques
tion is essential ifthe federal right is to be protected against evasion and discrimination . . . . ")
(emphasis added).
334. But cf. Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1 162. He read the supremacy clause not as creat
ing "a substantive rule of federal law" prohibiting state discrimination against federal claims,
but only as establishing a rule of priority to govern where state and federal law conflict. Id.
Accordingly, Professor Meltzer concluded that the supremacy clause could offer little justifi
cation for inadequate state ground reversals. Id.
335. See Hill, supra note 10, at 957-59 (observing that the Court tends to use "willful
evasion" language in cases where it finds state grounds adequate) (citing, inter alia, Vandalia
R.R. Co. v. Indiana ex rel South Bend, 207 U.S. 359 (1907), and Leathe v. Thomas, 207 U.S.
93 (1907), both discussed supra notes 160-168 and accompanying text), but avoids "exco
riat[ing]" state courts for "purposive error or misconduct" when finding state grounds in
adequate).
336. Hill, supra note 10, at 970. Professor Hill emphasized that a state'.s actual animosity
should be irrelevant:
It is not contended that it is proper to review the state ground for egregious error (or arbi
trariness) every time the state decision on the point is hostile to the federal claimant, but
only when the state ground stands in the way ofhis federal claim.
Id. at 970 n.106 (emphasis added).
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triggers jurisdiction in the Court to reach it, even if it must reverse a
state-law ruling to get there. As a practical matter, both strong and
modulated claims dispense with the need to identify any actual state
wrongdoing - whether by affirmatively violating federal law or by
shirking supremacy cause obligations; both endorse state-ground re
versals no matter how little reason the Court has to suspect that a state
court, or many state courts, have cheated federal law.
Both the strong and the modulated supremacy/due process theo
ries face the same problems. First, they share an unexamined yet argu
able assumption: that the Court has an automatic subject matter juris
diction to decide questions affecting federal interests wherever those
interests lurk, even if it means ignoring formal jurisdictional limits like
the bar on state-ground reversals. If one rejects this premise,337 the
theories collapse.
For example, Professor Hill identified the problem of inadequacy
reversals as "jurisdictional,"338 and then assumed this problem would
be solved by identifying a "doctrinal" - that is, substantive - consti
tutional benefit from "this type of review."339 But unless one already
believes that the Court's prerogative to enforce substantive constitu
tional norms in cases falling within its subject matter jurisdiction340 also
automatically creates jurisdiction to answer any question even a state
law question that implicates those norms, those constitutional benefits

337. See supra Part I (adopting contrary premise requiring affirmative jurisdictional
grant). I have elsewhere critiqued this automatic equation between identifying a federal in
terest, on the merits, and assuming federal subject matter jurisdiction to enforce it. See
Fitzgerald, ls Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, supra note 46, at 1 273-78 (arguing that serious
separation of powers concerns undercut the Court's tendency to dispense federal jurisdiction
based on the substantive federal interests at stake in a dispute, and on the perceived need for
a federal remedy).
338. He observed, "The Supreme Court has traditionally been thought to be without
jurisdiction to review a state judgment, or at least without authority to reverse it . . . . " Hill,
supra note 10, at 943.
339. See Hill, supra note 10, at 970 ("The doctrinal basis for overruling the state ground
for [nonconstitutional] egregious error is . . . ensuring that federal claims are given their due
under the supremacy clause - which is probably the command of the due process clause as
well."). Alternatively, Professor Hill may have been indirectly making an argument about
how to read the federal statute granting the Court appellate jurisdiction to review only fed
eral questions decided by state courts, now codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1257, although he never
mentioned that statute at all. As applied to the Supreme Court, this would be a natural ex
tension of a view Professor Fallon has associated with the "nationalist" approach to federal
court power:
Absent clear evidence of contrary legislative intent, there should be a presumption in the
construction of jurisdictional statutes that Congress generally legislates sympathetically to
federal rights by authorizing easy access, as of right, to the lower federal courts.

Fallon, supra note 136, at 1160; see id. at 1160-61 (adding that Nationalists urge federal
judges to "craft doctrines of judge-made law that permit the federal courts to act as the pre
sumptively available enforcers of constitutional norms").
340. See supra note 248 (citing decisions where the Court has asserted judicial suprem
acy in defining and enforcing constitutional rights).
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will not confer jurisdiction. Thus, while Professor Hill captured the in
tuition that the Court has pursued constitutional or sub-constitutional
values when reversing state courts on state-law questions, he did not
explain where the Court gets the power to do so.
Second, although these proposals argue that the Court's special
role in enforcing federal-law supremacy should free it to catch state
courts that cheat, they offer few real limits on the Court's exercise of
that power: they advocate a suspicion-based jurisdiction that lacks
suspicion-based constraints. The only arguable constraint on the
Court's reversal power derives from the Court's own indeterminate
and discretionary guidelines suggesting how much deference a state
judgment deserves in any particular case341 - a constraint, I have al
ready argued, that is no constraint, not least because the Court does
not recognize it as one.342 Given the premise that federal judicial
power should always be exercised within clear limits,343 this is a serious
flaw.
Third, in the nearly four decades since Professor Hill wrote, the
Court has significantly altered both its due process and supremacy
doctrines. The Court has sharply contracted the scope of the
Constitution's due process protections, not only limiting what
Congress may do to enforce due process principles against the
states,344 but also declaring more and more state procedures to satisfy
the federal due process standard.345 These changes have opened a
much wider spread between what due process formally requires and
what flaws the Court has criticized in its nonconstitutional inadequacy
341. For one effort to summarize the Court's various degrees of deference when re
viewing state-court judgments on antecedent state-law questions, see Wells, supra note 11, at
414 (identifying three different approaches: de novo review, deferential review, and an "in
termediate scrutiny" that asks whether the state-court decision " 'rests upon a fair or sub
stantial basis' " (quoting Demorest v. City Bank Farmers Trust Co., 321 U.S. 36, 42 (1944));
see also Hill, supra note 10, at 963-65 (canvassing cases in which the Court claimed to be
granting state courts different degrees of deference when reviewing state-law grounds). In
his Bush concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed to conduct "an independent, if still
deferential, analysis of state law." 531 U.S. 98, 114 (2000) . Commentators have not yet
agreed on how to characterize the degree of deference Chief Justice Rehnquist accorded the
Florida supreme court's reasoning in Bush. Compare Wells, supra note 1 1 , at 416-17 (de
scribing concurrence's review as "deferential," though arguing that "no deference . . . [was]
called for"), with Klarman, supra note 27, at 1734-35 (observing that "concurring opinion
argues for reduced deference").
342. See supra notes 33-35 and accompanying text.
343. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text.
344. See, e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank,
527 U.S. 627 (1999).
345. See, e.g., Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 740 (1999) (reading Reich v. Collins, which
had been understood to hold that the Constitution's due process principle compels states to
make available a "clear and certain" remedy for state taxes collected in violation of federal
law, as announcing the more limited principle that a state that promises taxpayers a post
deprivation remedy violates due process by then reneging on its promise); Parratt v. Taylor,
451 U.S. 527 (1981).
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reversals, making it far more difficult now to justify those reversals on
quasi-due process grounds.
Fourth, and finally, any supremacy-based justification for the
Court's state-ground reversals must face Alden v. Maine,346 and the
Court's other recent decisions erecting a presumption of state trust
worthiness.347 Absent a good reason to exempt the Court from that
presumption, these decisions suggest that no federal institution should
be interfering with states under the banner of "supremacy" absent
concrete proof that states are cheating.
Some background is necessary to make the point. To the extent its
state ground reversals rest on the Court's intuition that somehow a
state has manipulated its law to thwart a particular federal interest,
they pursue a principle of federal supremacy as interpreted in a line of
decisions associated with 1947's Testa v. Katt.348 There, the Court held
that the supremacy clause - which specifically directs the "Judges in
every State" to recognize and enforce federal law as "the supreme
Law of the Land"349 - prohibits state courts from discriminating
against federal claims by refusing to adjudicate them, so long as state
courts hear similar claims under state law.350 Although the Court itself
346. A lden, 527 U.S. at 758. For an extremely thorough analysis of Alden and its doc
trinal significance, see Louise Weinberg, Of Sovereignty and Union: The Legends of Alden,
76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1113 {2001).
347. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 367-70 (2001) (holding that con
gressional record showing states' irrational discrimination against the disabled was too
scanty to support provisions permitting the disabled to sue states for violations of the
Americans with Disabilities Act); id. at 369 (criticizing Congress for relying on "general
finding" that " 'historically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with dis
abilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination against individuals
with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem' "); see Kimel v.
Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 89-91 (2000) {holding that Congress failed to compile a
factual record sufficient to show a "pattern" of state discrimination on the basis of age to
justify permitting individuals to enforce the Age Discrimination in Employment Act against
states); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 530-31 {1997) {holding that Congress failed to
compile a factual record sufficient to show a "pattern" of state violation of religious free ex
ercise rights to justify the Religious Freedom Restoration Act); see also Williams v. Taylor,
529 U.S. 362 (2000) ; Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1989); accord O'Dell v. Netherland, 521
U.S. 151, 156 (1997) {"The Teague doctrine validates reasonable, good-faith interpretations
of existing precedents made by state courts even though they are shown to be contrary to
later decisions.").
348. 330 U.S. 386 (1947).
349. The supremacy clause provides, in full:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance
thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United
States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 1, cl. 2.
350. In Testa, the Court held that Rhode Island state courts could not refuse jurisdiction
over a treble-damage claim under the federal Emergency Price Control Act so long as they
could entertain state-law claims arising out of analogous state laws. Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S.
386, 391-94 (1947) (noting that state courts had jurisdiction to hear similar double-damage
claims arising under state law). Accord Althouse, supra note 6, at 728 (discussing Testa's
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has not invoked Testa351 to explain its practice of reversing state courts
for resting on inadequate state grounds, the parallel is clear: the Court
has intervened to prohibit a state court from evading its supremacy
clause obligations either by directly refusing to honor a federal claim,
as in Testa, or indirectly refusing to do so by invoking a state-law rea
son for decision, as in the inadequacy reversals.352
nondiscrimination principle); Weinberg, supra note 346, at 1162-63 (same); see also Vicki C.
Jackson, Principle and Compromise in Constitutional Adjudication: The Eleventh Amend
ment and State Sovereign Immunity, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 953, 965 & nn.41-43 (2000)
(describing Testa as holding that "a state may not, in its courts, discriminate against hearing
claims over which [they] . . . otherwise have 'jurisdiction adequate and appropriate under
established local law' based upon the federal character of the law whose enforcement is
sought.") (footnotes omitted). For a thorough analysis of the development and scope of
Testa's "nondiscrimination" principle, see Collins, supra note 3, at 49-52, 161-70.
Not everyone reads Testa as establishing a firm, constitutional nondiscrimination obliga
tion. Professor Meltzer, for example, has pointed out that Testa's nondiscrimination princi
ple was not articulated in the section of the Court's opinion that explicitly discussed the su
premacy clause; he asserts that Testa "simply assumes that discrimination is prohibited
without identifying why." Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1 162. Others have argued that Testa
raises more of a statutory than a constitutional bar against state-court discrimination against
federal claims, focusing less on the supremacy clause itself and more on federal legislation
granting state courts concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over federal claims. See
HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 472-73 (discussing the question whether Congress may
impose outright an obligation on states to open state courts to federal claims, absent existing
state-court jurisdiction over analogous claims). But see Collins, supra note 3, at 166 (de
scribing Testa as holding that "a state court would be obligated to hear a suit for treble dam
ages under wartime, federal price-control legislation, even without an explicit congressional
command to do so."). See generally id. at 145-94 (describing nineteenth century Supreme
Court cases that expressed doubts about Congress's power to impose jurisdiction on state
courts directly).
351. The cases associated with Testa include some decided both before and after Testa
itself. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356 (1990) (Florida courts may not refuse to hear
federal civil rights claim under § 1983 against local school board on grounds of state-law
state sovereign immunity where state had waived its immunity for comparable actions under
state law); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988) (State may not discriminate against federal
civil rights claims in enforcing state notice-of-claim precondition on filing in state court);
McKnett v. St. Louis & San Francisco Ry., 292 U.S. 230 (1934) (Alabama courts may not
refuse to hear FELA claim based on rule that permitted state courts to decide claims against
foreign corporations based on law of sister states, but not on federal law); Mondou v. New
York, New Haven & Hartford R.R., 223 U.S. 1 (1912) (Connecticut courts must entertain
FELA claim because it had jurisdiction over analogous state-law claims; state disagreement
with policy in federal statute could not excuse state courts from supremacy clause obliga
tions). For decisions recognizing "valid excuses" for state courts to refuse to hear federal
claims, see Missouri ex rel. Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. 1 (1950) (Missouri's doctrine
of forum non conveniens may excuse state courts from Testa obligations, so long as doctrine
applied without discrimination based on the federal or state source of their claims); Herb v.
Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945) (where federal claimant filed in Illinois city court, which under
state law lacked jurisdiction over claims, like plaintiffs, arising outside the city limits, and
then failed to transfer to state court adequate jurisdiction before the statute of limitations
had expired, that state court is not required to hear federal claim under Testa). For a thor
ough discussion of how the Testa decision both advanced and also significantly altered then
prevailing views about what kind of obligation the supremacy clause imposed on states, see
Collins, supra note 3, at 166-69 (analyzing Justice Black's majority opinion in Testa).
352. See Hill, supra note 10, at 959, 970 (inadequate state ground reversals rest in part
on "doctrinal basis" of "ensuring that federal claims are given their due under the supremacy
clause . . . . ). But see Meltzer, supra note 12, at 1162 (acknowledging parallel between Testa
and inadequate state grounds reversals, but concluding that "it is hard to view the inade"
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But in 1999's Alden v. Maine,353 the Court appeared to narrow the
nondiscrimination principle that Testa read in the supremacy clause.
Alden's main holding was that the Constitution's state sovereign im
munity principle - before then understood to protect states from un
consented private lawsuits in federal court - also prohibits Congress
from requiring state courts to hear private claims against unconsenting
states, at least where those claims arise under Article I legislation, like
the Fair Labor Standards Act backpay claims pursued by Maine state
probation officers there. The Court rejected the argument that Maine
had violated Testa's npndiscrimination principle by waiving its sover
eign immunity to permit analogous state-law claims to proceed against
it in state court, while refusing to waive its immunity as to the similar
federal claims plaintiffs pursued.354 Without even citing Testa, the
Court declared:

Although petitioners contend the State has discriminated against federal
rights by claiming sovereign immunity from this FLSA suit, there is no
evidence that the State has manipulated its immunity in a systematic
fashion to discriminate against federal causes of action.355
Earlier in its opinion, the Alden majority had reaffirmed the basic
supremacy clause principle that "[t]he States and their officers are
bound by obligations imposed by the Constitution and by federal stat
utes with the constitutional design," which means that "[t]he constitu
tional privilege of a State to assert its sovereign immunity in its own
courts does not confer upon the State a concomitant right to disregard
the Constitution or valid federal law."356 Taken with its later declara
tion that only a state's "systematic" discrimination against federal
claims would cross the constitutional line, the Court's meaning be
comes clear: neither Congress nor the Supreme Court may enforce the
supremacy clause against the states except in relatively extraordinary
circumstances, as on facts showing some widespread cheating by a
state to disfavor federal claims. Alden prefers self-enforcement by the
states themselves:
quate state ground doctrine simply as an interpretation of a constitutional provision barring
discrimination"); id. at 1185 (arguing instead that the Court exercises the power to make
federal common law when declaring state procedural grounds inadequate to preclude Court
review of federal claim).
353. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
354. See Brief for Petitioners at 34-47, Alden (No. 98-436) ; see also HART & WECHSLER
Supp. 2000, supra note 3, at 149.
355. Alden, 527 U.S. at 758. The Alden majority cited Testa only twice, and never for its
nondiscrimination principle. Instead, the Court cited Testa once for its discussion of "early
Congresses" that "enacted various statutes authorizing federal suits in state court," id. at
744; and then again, for the point that Congress may "require state courts of 'adequate and
appropriate' jurisdiction" (quote from Testa) to enforce only federal Jaw that is "appropriate
for the judicial power." Id. at 752 (latter quote from Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 907
(1 997)).
356. Alden, 527 U.S. at 754-55.
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We are unwilling to assume the States will refuse to · honor the
Constitution or obey the binding laws of the United States. The good
faith of the States thus provides an important assurance that "this
Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land."357
Thus, Alden suggests, a state is free to use state laws - like those
determining when the state will or won't invoke sovereign immunity
to prohibit state courts from entertaining a lawsuit against it - in
ways that overtly favor state-law over federal-law claims, so long as
that practice does not rise to the level of a "systematic" effort to dis
criminate against federal law. If this is what the Court meant to sug
gest - and it is difficult to read Alden otherwise, given the close simi
larity between the state-law claims to which Maine consented and the
FLSA claims to which Maine objected - then it may represent a sig
nificant narrowing of Testa's nondiscrimination principle.358 In no
other case before Alden (including Testa) had the Court excused a
state's discrimination against a particular federal claim on the ground
that the state had not been proven to disfavor federal claims "system
atically" in other cases. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine what kind of
evidence would satisfy this new supremacy clause standard,359 although
357. Id. at 755 (quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI.). This confidence in the states - and the
concomitant reluctance to craft constitutional rules that permit federal-law enforcement
against states in the ordinary case - operated again in the Court's Kimel decision, in which
the Court declared that Congress lacked the Fourteenth Amendment authority to abrogate
state sovereign immunity against private suits in federal court to enforce federal age anti
discrimination laws. See Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000). Similarly, in
both Alden and its predecessor, Seminole Tribe, the Court stressed that recalcitrant states
could be adequately policed through enforcement actions brought by the United States
Executive, against which the states may not raise sovereign immunity. See Alden, 527 U.S. at
756-57; Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 73-76 (1996) (noting also that Ex
parte Young actions might be available for individual lawsuits against state officials for pro
spective relief ordering compliance with federal law in the future).
358. See Jackson, supra note 350, at 966:
As I understood Testa before this case, it would then have been clear that, since Maine had
waived its immunity for analogous claims in the state courts, the State was not free to dis
criminate against the federal claims by barring its courts from hearing them. But now, absent
"evidence that the State has manipulated its immunity in a systematic fashion to discriminate
against federal causes of action," a state may limit its consent to suit to exclude certain
claims based on federal law because doing so is "no more than [an] exercise [of] a privilege
of sovereignty." (quoting Alden, 527 U.S. at 758).
As Professor Jackson has put it:
[O]n the facts of Testa
in which the state courts did entertain double damage actions
arising out of similar Jaws and were held to have a Supremacy Clause obligation to entertain
the federal causes of action for treble damages - it is hard to understand how the Alden
Court could have so casually dismissed the argument that a similar principle required the
courts of Maine, which had jurisdiction to entertain state law "straight-time" back pay claims
against the state, to entertain this federal claim [for back pay.under the FLSAJ.
Jackson, supra note 53, at 728 (footnotes omitted).
-

359. See HART & WECHSLER Supp. 2000, supra note 3, at 149 ("[I]f the only significant
distinction between the two classes of suits [one permitted and one not] is the source of law
on which the plaintiff relies, what more needs to be shown to demonstrate discrimination?").
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the Alden Court's language does bring to mind other cases requiring
plaintiffs to prove a "pattern or practice" of constitutional violation
before a state can be called to account.360
Given the close conceptual parallel between Testa and the inade
quate state grounds doctrine, Alden's apparent narrowing of Testa
raises questions about the Court's continued practice of reversing
state-court decisions on questions of state law. If Alden did read the
supremacy clause as allowing states a broader freedom to enforce
state law in state courts - even where state law, though not itself vio
lating federal law, nonetheless has an adverse effect on a federal claim
or a federal claimant - then it is difficult to see why the states could
not also demand that (new) leniency from the Supreme Court as well
in exercising its appellate jurisdiction over state-court j udgments. That
is, if the supremacy clause stands both at the root of the Court's
power, in Testa, to declare that a state must entertain a particular fed
eral claim, and at the root of the Court's power to declare a state-court
judgment on state-law "inadequate" and so reverse it, then a shift in
interpretation that relieves a state from the first exercise of federal ju
dicial power must also, one would think, relieve it from the second,
absent proof of the same kind of "systematic" cheating of federal law.
I recognize the argument that the Alden Court may simply have
announced a special rule that permits states to discriminate against
federal claims only in exercising what Alden described as its "privilege
of sovereignty concomitant to its constitutional immunity from suit"
which the Court had just announced.361 But if that were the case - if
state sovereign immunity were a sui generis constitutional value that
just weighed more than the supremacy clause's nondiscrimination
principle - then it would not make sense for the Court to suggest that
using sovereign immunity to discriminate "systematic[ally]" against
fe deral claims might somehow cross a constitutional line: if sovereign
immunity outweighs supremacy when invoked against one federal
claim, it would still outweigh it when invoked systematically against
every federal claim. Thus, I proceed on the view that Alden appears to
have narrowed the supremacy clause as it had applied generally, under
Testa, to prohibit state courts from wielding state law to disfavor fed
eral interests.
I also recognize the possibility that Alden did not so much author
ize states to raise sovereign immunity selectively (if not systematically)
against federal claims, as it prohibited Congress from creating those
particular federal claims in the first place.362 This argument carries

360. See, e.g., Bd. of Trustees v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 {2001); Kimel
Regents, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).

v.

Florida Bd. of

361. See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 758 (1999).
362. I am indebted to both Michael Collins and Jim Pfander for raising this point to me.
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force, so long as two things are true. First, a "claim" must necessarily
comprise both the substantive federal obligation that the FLSA im
poses on states - which Alden carefully preserved as within
Congress's power to enact
and the permit licensing some entity
(here, a private individual) to seek that obligation's enforcement from
a court.363 That is, to read Alden in this way, one may well need to con
clude that there is no such thing as a federal "obligation" or "right"
detached from the particular mechanism chosen for its enforcement.364
Second, reading Alden this way portrays the supremacy clause, and
the case law developing a supremacy-based nondiscrimination princi-

363. Quoting Blackstone, Chief Justice Marshall defined a "suit" for 11th Amendment
purposes as a demand for one's lawful rights in a court of justice, in a form also prescribed
by law:
The remedy for every species of wrong is, says Judge Blackstone, "the being put in posses
sion of that right whereof the party injured is deprived." "The instruments whereby this
remedy is obtained, are a diversity of suits and actions, which are defined by the Mirror to
be" the lawful demand of one's right." . . . Blackstone then proceeds to describe every spe
cies of remedy by suit; and they are all cases were (sic) the party suing claims to obtain
something to which he has a right. To commence a suit, is to demand something by the insti
tution of process in a Court of justice; and to prosecute the suit, is, according to the common
acceptation of language, to continue that demand.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 407-08 (1821).
364. This rather upends another federal-courts truism - a presumption serving as the
basis for significant claims to federal judicial power - that every substantive right or obliga
tion requires a judicial remedy for its violation. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137 (1803); see also Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388 (1971); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). But the Court's recent major sov
ereign immunity decisions suggest that it will not extend the same presumption - that a
remedy follows a lawful right - to Congress as it extends to itself. In Seminole Tribe, as in
Alden, the Court carefully reaffirmed Congress's power to impose on states the substantive
obligations contained in the FLSA, declining to accept federalist arguments that the obliga
tions themselves exceeded Congress's power to act under Article I. See Seminole Tribe of
Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996) (holding that Congress exceeded Article I power in
abrogating states' sovereign immunity from private suits to enforce the Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act). Both Seminole Tribe and Alden thus conclude that the Constitution simply
prohibited Congress from choosing private causes of action as the mechanism for enforcing
those otherwise permissible obligation. Interestingly, when the Court has shifted its sover
eign immunity focus from Article I legislation to Fourteenth Amendment legislation - to
enforce which Congress may choose the mechanism of the private action - the Court has
shifted its critical attention to the substantive obligations that Congress imposed on states,
concluding in every such case that those obligations exceeded Congress's Fourteenth
Amendment powers. See Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (holding that Congress exceeded its authority
under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in imposing Americans with Disabilities
Act obligations on states); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000) (declaring the
Violence Against Women Act unconstitutional as beyond both Congress's Article I author
ity to regulate interstate commerce and its Fourteenth Amendment authority to enforce
equal protection guarantees); Kimel, 528 U.S. 62 (holding that Congress exceeded its
authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in imposing Age Discrimination
in Employment Act obligations on states); Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense
Bd. v. Coll. Savings Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999) (holding Congress exceeded its authority un
der section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in permitting private federal-court lawsuit
against states for violating federal patent and unfair competition laws); see also City of
Boerne, 521 U.S. 507 (holding, in case where sovereign immunity not at issue, that Congress
exceeded its authority under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment in enacting the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993).
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pie, as caring less whether states comply with their substantive federal
law obligations than whether states recognize a particular enforcement
mechanism - a particular procedural permit - in their own courts.
This would seem to undercut that part of supremacy doctrine which
has enforced the anti-discrimination principle by asking not whether
the state recognized a state claim procedurally identical to a federal
claim, but, rather, whether state courts entertained claims "analogous"
to that federal claim.365 Moreover, to focus the supremacy clause's
mandate on procedural enforcement mechanisms, and away from
states' substantive federal obligations, disregards the fact that for most
of our early history, federal law did not typically create both substan
tive rights and also procedural enforcement mechanisms; rather, fed
eral law provided rights and obligations that were enforced through
remedies borrowed from equity and the common law.366 It might well
be anomalous, therefore, to re-orient the supremacy clause's mandate
away from federal substance and towards procedural enforcement.
Despite these alternative readings, Alden v. Maine raises a real
question about what proof of state disobedience must be established
before the Court will intervene to enforce the supremacy clause. And
when read alongside recent decisions in which the Court has prohib
ited Congress from making any state accountable to individuals for
violating their constitutional rights without proving a broad "pattern"
of transgressions by many states,367 Alden suggests that the Court in365. See, e.g., Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 369 (1 990) (the supremacy clause compels
a state to hear federal claims similar to entertained state claims); Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386,
394 (1947) (state courts had a duty to hear a federal claim when it was the "same type of
claim" as the recognized state claim); Claflin v. Houseman, 93 U.S. 130, 136-37 (1876)
("[R]ights . . . acquired under the laws of the United States, may be prosecuted in thi;: United
States courts, or in the state courts, competent to decide rights of the like character and
class. . . .") For a thorough analysis of how comparisons between "like" state and federal
claims figure in the Court's supremacy clause doctrine, see Collins, supra note 3, at 49-52; see
also id. at 50 nn.29 & 30 (noting that Claflin's focus on "like" federal and state claims was
meaningful even though it left room for manipulation, since "likeness" would vary with
comparison's level of generality).
.

366. See, e.g., Collins, supra note 3, at 50-51; see also id. at 51 n.33 (noting that while
"express, federal created causes of action were absent in the nineteenth century," the federal
statutes creating them "did little more than incorporate the general law forms of action by
giving the litigant an action in law or equity to redress a particular injury." (citing, for exam
ple, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908)).
367. See, e.g., Garrett, 531 U.S. at 367-70 (holding that congressional record showing
states' irrational discrimination against the disabled was too scanty to support provisions
permitting the disabled to sue states for violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act);
id. at 369-70 (criticizing Congress for relying on "general finding" that " 'historically, society
has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with disabilities, and, despite some improve
ments, such forms of discrimination against individuals with disabilities continue to be a se
rious and pervasive social problem' "); see also Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89-91 (holding that
Congress failed to compile a factual record sufficient to show a "pattern" of state discrimina
tion on the basis of age to justify permitting individuals to enforce the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act against states); City of Boerne, 521 U.S. at 530-31 (holding that Congress
failed to compile a factual record sufficient to show a "pattern" of state violation of religious
free exercise rights to justify the Religious Freedom Restoration Act).
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tends to enforce a general presumption of state trustworthiness unless
there is proof to the contrary. To the extent the Court's practice of re
versing state-court state-law decisions rests on the goal of federal-law
supremacy, there is little obvious reason to exempt the Court from the
same constraint.

V.

PROVEN MISTRUST: THE CONSEQUENCES

The proven mistrust alternative would recognize appellate jurisdic
tion in the Court to reverse a state court's state-law judgment only368
where it can identify and substantiate some concrete indication that
the state court deliberately manipulated state law to thwart federal
law and then evade Supreme Court review.369 This rule preserves the
most compelling insight from other theories offered to justify state
ground reversals: federal-law supremacy requires some mechanism
permitting the Court to police state courts that exploit state law to dis
favor federal interests and then evade federal review. But, unlike the
alternatives, the proven mistrust rule finds in that intuition a limiting
principle as well: where the Court can articulate no reason to suspect a
particular court of cheating in a particular case, a state-ground reversal
advances supremacy values only indirectly apd diffusely, justifying nei
ther the encroachment on state-court prerogatives nor the erosion of
the Court's own jurisdictional boundaries that those reversals repre
sent. The· proven mistrust alternative thus satisfies the criteria I have
proposed: it treats the Court as a court of limited jurisdiction subject
to clear constraints, and it places the Court within limits at least com
parable to those the Court increasingly imposes on Congress in its own
dealings with the states.
368. Again, assuming no outright federal-law violation, which would always justify re

versal.
369. See supra Part I. I draw no distinction between substantive state grounds and those
that involve rules of procedure in state court. Absent articulable reason to mistrust a state
court, its state-law procedural rulings should also be final unless the Supreme Court is will
ing to declare a procedural rule unconstitutional in itself. See, e.g., Exxon Corp. v. Eagerton,
462 U.S. 176 (1983); Central Union Tel. Co. v. City of Edwardsville, 269 U.S. 190, 194-95
(1925) (declaring state ordinarily free to enforce its own rules of procedure against those
claiming federal or state rights in state court where those rules comply with due process by
giving "the litigant a reasonable opportunity to have the issue as to the claimed right heard
and determined by . . . [state] court"); see also Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002) (reaffirm
ing that state-law procedural default may raise adequate and independent state grounds pre
cluding Supreme Court review). And if this sounds too restrictive - if even fully constitu
tional state procedural rules offer an unacceptably rich opportunity for state courts to block
federal claims behind disingenuous state grounds - then it is Congress's job (if any federal
institution's) to federalize those procedures, just as it was to provide for uniform procedural
rules for federal courts. Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1 , 9-10 (1941). So widespread a mistrust
of state-court practice should not be left for the Court to address case-by case. Contrast the
work of commentators who have argued that the Court may reject state procedural rules on
nonconstiiutional grounds in the exercise of the Court's federal common-law making
authority. See generally supra Section IV.A (discussing federal common law theory to j ustify
reversing state court judgments on state procedural issues).
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A proven mistrust rule might produce different results in paradigm
cases now usually considered beyond serious debate, including Indiana
ex rel. Anderson v. Brand370 and NAA CP v. Alabama ex rel.

Patterson.371
A. Anderson v. Brand
In this venerable chestnut, an Indiana public school teacher chal
lenged her firing as a breach of her state statutory right to tenure; she
alleged, further, that state legislation abolishing tenure in schools like
hers after she had earned it violated the Constitution's rule against
state laws impairing the obligation of contract. The Indiana supreme
court rejected the teacher's claim on purely state-law grounds: it held
that she had never had a contractual tenure right under state law;
therefore there was no "contract" for the later legislation to impair.372
The Supreme Court reversed. While acknowledging that state and
not federal law ordinarily governed not only the formation of con
tracts, but also the construction of their terms and thus what would
constitute their "impairment" by later state legislation,373 the Court
nonetheless refused to honor the state court's own reading of
Indiana's contract law here. And why not? Because, the Court de
clared, "unless we decide for ourselves" these state-law contract ques
tions "the constitutional mandate may . . . become a dead letter."374
370. 303 U.S. 95 (1938).
371 . 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
372. The state court held that Indiana teachers enjoy tenure-like job security not under
contract but by "grant of a repealable statute." Brand, 303 U.S. at 113 (Black, J., dissenting).

373. Brand does use qualifying language to make this point: these antecedent contract
questions are "one[s] primarily of state law." Brand, 303 U.S. at 100 (emphasis added). But
see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 556 (noting the Court's qualification, but asking
· '.'Isn't the existence of the contractual obligation in fact a question primarily, and usually ex
clusively, one of state law?" (citing, inter alia, Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 213,
256-59, 326 (1 827)).
374. Brand, 303 U.S. at 95. The Court did insist that its state-law review should proceed
with "respectful consideration and great weight to the views of the state's highest court," id.,
but, as I have already suggested, this kind of discretionary deference standard is no substitute
for a real limit on the Court's power to reverse state courts - not least because the Court
itself recognizes it as no limit. See, for example, General Motors Corp. v. Romein, 503 U.S.
181 ( 1992), in which the Court, notwithstanding Brand's deferential language about the
state-law nature of antecedent contract questions underlying contract-clause claim, declared:
"The question whether a contract ·was made is a federal question for purposes of Contract
Clause analysis, and 'whether it turns on issues of general or purely local law, we cannot sur
render the duty to exercise our own judgment.' " Id. (emphasis added) (nonetheless claiming
to give "great weight" to state court's views). Consider also HART & WECHSLER's observa
tion that, before Brand, the Court had declared it would accept a state court's judgment as to
the " 'effect and meaning of the contract as well as its existence . . . unless manifestly
wrong.' " HART & WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 556 (quoting Hale v. State Bd. of
Assessment & Review, 302 U.S. 95, 101 (1937)). But, as HART & WECHSLER intimates,
there is little in Brand to suggest the Court found the state high court's reading of state law
"manifestly wrong.'' Id. (noting that the Brand Court might have been operating on a differ-
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But the Brand Court offered no reason, either in or outside the rec
ord, to suspect the Indiana supreme court had manipulated state con
tract law in order to cheat the putative federal claimant out of her
federal-law rights. Indeed, as Justice Black argued in dissent, there
was ample basis to conclude that the state court, before this dispute,
had "consistently" and "uniformly" read state law in the same way it
had here.375 Thus Brand may only rest on the broad assumption that
the simple fact of antecedence - the very opportunity that antece
dence would give a "recalcitrant" state court to thwart federal rights
despite the supremacy clause - was enough to justify the Court's
state-ground reversal.376
But under the proven mistrust rule the Brand Court would have
had only two choices. It could have identified and substantiated some
reason why the Indiana supreme court should not be trusted to show
the appropriate fealty to supreme federal law in applying state law to
this teacher's case. Or it could have claimed and defended the power,
as in its federal common-law cases of roughly the same era, to declare
the antecedent contract questions federal questions, and then articu
lated substantive rules to govern the tenure question Brand raised.377
Even without advocating the Court's resort to federal common-law
ent standard altogether, substituting an "independent" review that nonetheless gives "great
weight" to state judgment for Hale's standard limiting review of the state grounds for "obvi
ous error." Id. (asking whether two standards differ).
375. Brand, 303 U.S. at 112-13 (Black, J., dissenting).
376. HART & WECHSLER raises - but does not answer - this question: "Can the
Supreme Court's willingness in the Brand case to review a state court's determination of an
issue of state law be squared with Murdock v. Memphis?" HART & WECHSLER, supra note
6, at 556-57; see also id. (noting that where, as in Brand and Manin v. Hunter's Lessee, "state
law is antecedent to federal law" there may be "a much stronger argument for some federal
review of state law").
377. Brand's own casual claim to the power to reverse the Indiana Supreme Court on
what it acknowledged was a state-Jaw contract question might be partially explained by the
fact that Brand was decided before Erie made it constitutionally suspect for a federal court to
countermand a state high court's reading of federal law. See Indiana ex rel. Anderson v.
Brand, 303 U.S. 95 {1938); Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). But after Erie, the
Court nonetheless claimed to retain the power, where it felt federal interests warranted it, to
create federal substantive rules to displace state law on some or all questions arising in the
course of a dispute not governed by federal constitutional or statutory provisions. See, e.g. ,
Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943) (adopting federal common-law
rule that one who seeks to raise )aches as a defe nse against the United States in a suit to re
cover payment on forged commercial paper must prove actual damage resulting from the
United States' delay in notifying of forgery); D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315 U.S. 447
(1942) (adopting federal common-law rule that one who makes a fraudulent note to a bank
later insured by FDIC may not raise a claim of lack of consideration in an FDIC action to
enforce the note); see also Semtek Int'! v. Lockheed Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 507-08
(2001) (adopting federal common law rule to govern claim preclusive effect of a dismissal by
a federal court sitting in diversity); Boyle v. United Tech. Corp., 487 U.S. 500 {1988)
(adopting federal common-law defense for federal military contractors to state products
liability action). For a suggestion that the Court was making federal common law in Union
Pacific when it declared the Missouri supreme court's state law estoppel ruling "inadequate"
to preclude Supreme Court review of commerce clause claim, see supra note 178.
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making power in Brand or elsewhere,378 an overt claim to lawmaking
power is preferable to the more indirect claims like the Brand Court's.
At the very least, the Court's lawmaking aspirations would be flushed
out into the open from behind the screens of "adequacy" and "degrees
of deference" its modern state-ground reversals erect. And an open
power claim increases the chances that the Court will be held institu
tionally accountable - by the Congress, by individual Justices, and by
the political and legal community - when it goes too far.379
Thus, under the proven mistrust rule, if the Brand Court could nei
ther name a concrete reason to mistrust the Indiana high court's rul
ing, nor convert the substantive contract questions into federal ques
tions, then it would have had to declare itself powerless to reverse that
state-law judgment.
B.

NAACP v. Patterson

By contrast, the proven mistrust rule might have produced the
same result - but on different reasoning - in another bedrock
precedent, NAACP v. Patterson.380 There, the Court ruled that the
NAACP's failure to follow Alabama's rules of appellate procedure, as
construed by the Alabama supreme court, could not bar it from raising
a First Amendment challenge to a state court's subpoena of its mem
bership lists.381 The Alabama procedural default was "inadequate" to
preclude Supreme Court review of the federal constitutional question,
the Court declared, because - given numerous Alabama supreme
court decisions rejecting the procedural distinction invoked· to default
the NAACP382 - it was so "novel" a reading of state law that "peti
tioner could not fairly be deemed to have been apprised of its exis
tence. "383
And yet the Patterson Court did not go the next step and declare
the Alabama procedural rule, as applied, to violate federal due proc•

378. Cf Friendly, supra note 296.
379. See, e.g., Kevin McNamec, Do as I Say and Not as l Do: Dickerson, Constitutional
Common Law and the Imperial Supreme Court, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1239 (2001).
380. NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see supra note 270 and
infra note 381 -389 and accompanying text (discussing Patterson dispute). Patterson was one
of the cases used by the Bush Justices debating when the Court might reverse on state
grounds. See supra notes 281 -295 and accompanying text (discussing debate); see also
Klarman, supra note 27, at 1738-40.
381. Recall that the Alabama Supreme Court had held that the NAACP's claim had to
be raised by petition for writ of mandamus, and not by petition for writ of certiorari. See
supra note 270 (discussing dispute).
382. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 456 (declaring that " [w]e are unable to reconcile the proce
dural holding of the Alabama Supreme Court in the present case with its past unambiguous
holdings . . . . ).
"

383. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 457.
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ess standards,384 or any other federal-law rules governing the retroac
tive application of new rules.385 From this remove, it is unclear why
not.386 Had the Court done so overtly - and thus been willing then to
embrace and integrate that addition to its overall due process juris
prudence - then Patterson would easily have satisfied the proven mis
trust rule, for state grounds that violate federal law outright always fall
within the Court's appellate j urisdiction over state courts.
Moreover, and more controversially, the Patterson Court might
have admitted outright that, given southern resistance to the civil
rights movement, the Court simply could not trust the Alabama
supreme court to treat the NAACP fairly under state law even absent
an outright federal-law violation. Commentators readily assert that
this is the real reason the Court decided Patterson as it did. As
Professor Klarman has recently observed,

384. See Hill, supra note 10, at 976 (describing the Patterson Court as rejecting Alabama
procedural default because although "consistent" with pre-existing state Jaw, it was "hyper
technical and surprising in the light of then available indications of the governing law "and
to that extent unfair. But unfairness at this level is not the kind of gross unfairness that has
been thought to be an indispensable basis for condemnation under the due process clause. A
decision 'consistent' with earlier precedents is neither irrational nor arbitrary."); id. at 949
(including Patterson among cases where the "state ground would not be subject to review (as
itself violating federal law] in the absence of a separate federal question"); HART &
WECHSLER, supra note 6, at 580 (characterizing the Patterson ruling as one where the Court
found the state procedural ground inadequate because "novel" or "inconsistently applied,"
although not itself violating due process). The Patterson Court itself hedges on the question
whether the flaw it detected in the Alabama court's judgment had a constitutional dimen
sion: after holding that judgment inadequate. because "novel" in light of prior Alabama rul
ings, the Court included a "cf." citation to Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673
(1930), one of the very few cases in which the Court has ever declared a state ground "in
adequate" because it actually violates due process. See Brinkerhoff-Faris, 281 U.S. at 678-79
(state court denied litigant due process by enforcing an "unforeseeable" rule requiring ad
ministrative exhaustion of an equal protection claim when prior decisions had held that the
administrative body lacked the power to award relief). But cf., Bouie v. City of Columbia,
378 U.S. 347, 350 (1964) (holding that the South Carolina supreme court violated due proc
ess by retroactively applying a state trespass statute in a way that "did not give them fair
warning, at the time of their conduct [that makes it a crime]").
385. See, e.g. Bouie, 378 U.S. at 350 (retroactive application of novel state-law reading
constitutes due process violation). See generally Krent, supra note 22, at 495, passim (dis
cussing various Supreme Court doctrines - like ex post facto rules - that govern when the
Court will reverse a state court for applying state law in a way that deprives litigants of "set
tled expectations" under state Jaw; describing the problem as one of "excessive retroactiv
ity").
386. The Court has, since Patterson, cited it to support more straightforward due process
rulings. See, e.g., Reich v. Collins, 513 U.S. 106, 111 (1994) (holding state court violated due
process through remedial "bait and switch" that first held out prospect of post-collection re
fund procedures by which taxpayers could challenge state tax, and then later refusing to pro
vide refunds on grounds that state law permitted only pre-payment challenge). And in his
Bush concurrence, Chief Justice Rehnquist used Patterson as an example of a case where
"the Constitution requires this Court to undertake an independent, if still deferential, analy
sis of state law." Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 1 14-15 (2000) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring). See
Tushnet, supra note 20, at 115-16 (noting that Rehnquist's citation of Patterson and other
1960s civil rights cases supports the view that he considered the Florida supreme court to
have acted illegitimately to "steal the election from the rightful victor").
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It is inconceivable that the Justices' view of the [Patterson] case, both on
the merits and on the alleged state procedural default, was uninfluenced
by their knowledge that the state of Alabama, including its jurists, were
engaged in a project of massive resistance toward Brown v. Board of
Education, a fundamental part of which involved shutting down the
NAACP's operations in the state.387
But if that suspicion really drove the Patterson Court's reversal on an
Alabama-law ground, why should the Court not have to say so and
substantiate its mistrust in that case? Historians and other commenta
tors argue that the Court could readily have done so in Patterson and
elsewhere.388 Thus, under the proven mistrust rule, the Patterson Court
might still have reversed the Alabama state grounds, but only if it had
been willing either to own up to its due process concerns about the
state procedural rules, or to admit its political concerns about
Alabama's resistance to civil rights enforcement, despite that state's
own supremacy clause obligations.389

387. Klarman, supra note 27, at 1 738-39. Justice Ginsburg thinks so, too. In her Bush v.
Gore dissent, she criticized Chief Justice Rehnquist for ignoring that Patterson was "embed
ded in [the] historical context" of "Southern resistance to the civil rights movement," Bush,
531 U.S. at 1 40; she rebukes the concurrence for failing to distinguish the Florida supreme
court's conduct from the state high court "recalcitrance" - as in Patterson - "that warrants
extraordinary action by this Court." Id. at 141 (concluding that the Florida court "surely
should not be bracketed with state high courts of the Jim Crow South"). But see Tushnet,
supra note 20, at 115-16 (suggesting Rehnquist's citation to Patterson suggests he harbored
similar suspicions about the good faith of the Florida supreme court in Bush).
388. See, e.g., Bush, 531 U.S. at 140-41 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that southern
civil rights recalcitrance explains Pauerson). See generally supra note 27 and accompanying
text (discussing Justice Ginsburg's more general assertion that "historical context" best ex
plained cases where the Court rejected state courts' reading of state law). Professor Klarman
has collected a number of scholarly sources developing this point as well as his observation
that, like Patterson, "most of the other leading cases rejecting the adequacy pf state proce
dural grounds for denying federal rights also involve southern states obstructing the civil
rights movement." Klarman, supra note 27, at 1739 & n.84. I borrow and reproduce his own
research here. See NUMAN v. BARTLEY, THE RISE OF MASSIVE RESISTANCE: RACE AND
POLITICS IN THE SOUTH DURING THE 1 950'S (1 969); LOW & JEFFRIES, supra note 26, at 109
("It is no coincidence that many such cases arose in the civil rights litigation in the 1 960s.");
MARK V. TUSHNET, MAKING CIVIL RIGHTS LAW: THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
SUPREME COURT 1 936-1961 , at 284-89 ( 1994); Walter F. Murphy, The South Counterattacks:
The Anti-NAACP Laws, 12 W. POL. Q. 371 (1959). For other similar discussions, see
Glennon, supra note 27, at 887-900; see also Solimine, supra note 1 0, at 348 (noting that
"considerable evidence also supports [Justice Ginsburg's] view of the recalcitrance of at least
some of the state courts in the deep South during the Civil Rights Era . . . . ") (citing
MICHAEL E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS: THE
INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM 4-9 (1999) (citing sources)).
389. Cf. Bush, 53 1 U.S. at 128 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (noting that the concurrence's
argument must have rested on "an unstated lack of confidence in the impartiality and capac
ity of the state judges who would make the critical decisions if the vote count were to pro
ceed") (emphasis added).
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C.

Benefits, Consequences, and One Lingering Puzzle

The proven mistrust rule offers one especially important advantage
over the Court's and commentators' alternatives: it seeks to place dis
cernible limits on the Court's jurisdiction over state courts, which, if
breached, could open the Court to meaningful criticism, thus account
ability, from its observers, political and otherwise. That discipline will
never come from the Court's own indeterminate, shifting, and above all - discretionary guidelines for how much deference it owes a
state high court's "last word" on state law.390 Thus, the proven mistrust
rule would bring the Court closer to the Constitution's fundamental
goal of having all federal institutions - and not just Congress and the
inferior federal courts - wield their power only within discernible
boundaries.391
There is also a real benefit in the practical constraints this rule
would impose on the Court's use of judicial power. For, just as the
Court has prohibited Congress from acting on unsubstantiated suspi
cions (and prejudices) that states, or a particular state, cannot be
trusted to handle federal law honestly,392 so should the Court be forced
to confront and prove its own suspicions and prejudices about state
courts before reversing state grounds that do not themselves violate
federal law.
I can imagine two possible consequences if the Court were to ac
cept a discipline for itself comparable to what it now imposes on
Congress. First, Justices might discover that they can indeed substanti
ate the kind of "suspicion in the air" that might have troubled the
Court in some key state-ground reversal cases like Ward v. Love
County, Davis v. Wechsler, and Bush v. Gore.393 That candor would
strengthen the Court's claim to jurisdiction in a particular case: no one
seriously questions the Court's prerogative to enforce federal law's
supremacy against states that cheat.394 And such candid state grounds

390. See supra notes 34-35; see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 928 (1997) (de
claring "imprecise barrier[s] against federal intrusion upon state autonomy" likely to be inef
fective).
391. See generally Pushaw, supra note 37, at 739, 823-34 (discussing the "limited" nature
of federal institutions' power as a "principleD of constitutional structure").
392. See supra notes 1 -8 (discussing cases); supra notes 29-32 and accompanying text
(elaborating scope and justification for the Court's constraints on Congress.
393. See supra Part II, at notes 181-203 and accompanying text (discussing Love
County) ; supra Part II, at notes 204-230 (discussing Davis v. Wesche/er) ; supra note 40 and
accompanying text (discussing "political" interpretation of Bush v. Gore) .
394. See, e.g., supra notes 201-203 and accompanying text (discussing the Court's fa ilure
to invoke a compelling history of state animosity to Indian tribes - relying instead on un
persuasive and cursory analysis of state common law - in Ward v. Love County, 253 U.S. 1 7
(1 920)).
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reversals would carry the unmistakable message - both to a particu
lar misbehaving state court and to others tempted by the opportunity
for cheating federal law that antecedent state grounds present - that
the Court's authority over them cannot be subverted by the improper
use of state law.
Alternatively, the Court might find that it cannot substantiate its
suspicion about a particular state court's judgment.395 In those cases,
there would unavoidably be less Court oversight of state high courts,
even where state grounds block the path of very important federal in
terests. While this result would counter the modern assumption that
the Court has a roving prerogative to vindicate federal interests wher
ever they lurk,396 it is the natural and necessary consequence of the ba
sic constitutional principle that all federal courts - like all federal in
stitutions - face real jurisdictional constraints while pursuing the
federal good.
Finally, I raise (but do not answer) one last question. If the Court
cannot bring itself to name and substantiate a reason to suspect a state
court either of violating federal law outright or of cheating it through
disingenuous use of an antecedent state ground, should the Court re
quire Congress to prove widespread state misbehavior before it can
act against the presumption that a state will self-enforce its
supremacy-clause obligations? If, that is, the proven mistrust rule sets
an unrealistic and insurmountably distasteful task for the Court, why is
the task not equally unrealistic and distasteful for Congress? The
Court's recent decisions imposing a presumption of state trustworthi
ness pose real questions about how to enforce the Constitution's for
mal limits on all exercises of public power - federal or state. The
Court's own long practice of reversing state grounds, despite its black
letter limit to federal questions, inevitably carries those questions
home to the Court itself.

395. See Strauss, supra note 40, at 746 (suggesting that the Bush majority was spurred by
an "inchoate" sense that the Florida supreme court had misbehaved).
396. I have discussed this tendency of thought in some detail elsewhere. Fitzgerald, Is
Jurisdiction Jurisdictional?, supra note 46 (documenting the Court's tendency to claim judi

cial power to act whenever important federal interests are at stake, even when formal juris
diction is compromised).
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